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ABSTRACT

The thesis examines the complex, causal interconnection among freedom, power, and
utility found in J. S. M ill’s conception of individual development in On Liberty. For Mill,
individuals must form their character through modes of independent thought, and the free
expression of opinions and conduct in order to expand their developmental power. Thus,
individuals can obtain knowledge of self and society, and thereby add to the common beneficial
social and epistemic consequences, namely utility.
The thesis analyzes Mill's argument that free individual expression adds to utility. The
freedom-utilitarian project's pursuit of individual development and multi-sided truth relies on
practices that are inconsistent with the goals to maximize the individual's developmental power
and knowledge acquisition by the majority of society. The project facilitates the elite's role as
benefactors and beneficiaries to utility, but it hinders others' roles in utility, and thus it is more an
elitist project than a utilitarian one.
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Unequal Benefactors and Beneficiaries:
The Utilitarian Inadequacy of Mill's Arguments for Freedom
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
Mill argues that freedom has beneficial consequences for society.

Mill views

utilitarianism, not as merely the mechanical application of principles, but as a "long-term social
project" (Wilson, 2007). In accordance with this interpretation of Mill's utilitarianism, this thesis
discusses the various roles of freedom in Mill's utilitarianism, as evident in On Liberty (1859),
and understands his utilitarianism as a freedom-utilitarian project. As a project, utilitarianism
seeks to intensify the societal expression of utility, which is the common beneficial consequences
of individual progress, the intensity of which is based on the utility that society assigns to each of
its members. The more that society contributes to the maximization o f the utility of each of its
members, the more that society can be called utilitarian. Thus, I maintain that utility and political
equality are intertwined.
Mill grounds utility on the "permanent interests of man as a progressive being" (CW, 18,
Ch. 1, T]11),1 and thus, he causally bases utility on individual progress. Individual progress is the
advancement of an individual's capacity for the exercise of developmental power. Developmental
power is an individual's capacity to learn about self and others, act and think creatively, exercise
choice, and determine her2 individuality.

The acquisition of knowledge of self and others

depends on an individual's capacity to exercise her individuality, that is, to keep individuality
active by means of free individual expression. Mill's view of free individual expression includes
two general forms of freedom. The first part is characterized by free speech and independent

1
Throughout this thesis, I will use the abbreviation CW to refer to the Collected Works o f John
Stuart M ill: the full citation o f this work can be found in the bibliography o f the current thesis. For Mill's
essay On Liberty and for his work Utilitarianism. I will textually draw primarily from the eighteenth and
the tenth volumes respectively o f the Collected Works o f John Stuart M ill.
2
For the rest o f this thesis, I will use the feminine pronouns “her” and "she" to balance the use o f
the masculine pronoun in the quoted material.
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Mill defines free speech as socially, politically, and legally unrestricted

speech (CW, 18, Ch. 2, 1142). He defines freedom of opinion as the capacity for independent
opinion formation.

The second part of free individual expression is characterized by free

individual conduct. Mill defines free conduct as conduct that lacks social interference in matters
that regard only the self and that have no consequences for others.
Mill characterizes freedom as that capacity which permits the independence of the
individual. Freedom is the capacity for the independent pursuit of individual improvement, or the
pursuit of "our own good in our own way" (CW, 18, Ch. 1,1)13) without impeding others' same
pursuit (CW, 18, Ch. 1 ,1J13). Freedom adds to the developmental power o f an individual without
undermining the developmental power of others. Because it directs the developmental power
maximization of everybody, freedom is a good that facilitates the expansion of individual
developmental power; this expansion is individual progress.

Freedom adds not only to the

potential utility of an individual which is the individual's potential capacity to add to the common
good, but also to potential societal utility which is the potential of society as a whole3 to
contribute to its common good; this potential is developmental power. Because it permits the
exercise and advancement of developmental power, freedom adds knowledge and cultural and
social improvements to the common good.

In the ways discussed above, Mill's freedom-

utilitarian argument posits that the freedoms of speech, opinion, and conduct are necessary for the
maximization of utility.

In short, Mill's freedom-utilitarian argument is that freedom of

individual expression adds to the common good, and that, therefore, society should encourage this
freedom.
Mill proposes a freedom-utilitarian project for the pursuit of utility maximization by
means of free individual expression.

Mill's treatment of the freedom of conduct is more

consistent with the maximization of utility than his treatment of the freedom of opinion
3
For Mill, society is the sum o f its individual members (CW, 18, Ch. 3, 1(9). With society thus
defined, since freedom adds to individual developmental power, freedom also adds to societal
developmental power.
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expression and opinion formation. My thesis argues that Mill's freedom-utilitarian argument
provides inadequate consequentialist support for its freedom-utilitarian project, and is impractical
for the maximization of utility. This thesis suggests some requirements for a practical freedomutilitarian project.
Mill does not consider all the main likely consequences of his freedom-utilitarian project.
That project is also a social epistemological one, for it is intended to advance knowledge at the
social level by facilitating the expansion of individual developmental power which includes the
capacity of individuals to obtain knowledge about self and others. This thesis will show how the
practice of the freedom of speech and opinion formation that Mill's freedom-utilitarian argument
calls for would be counterproductive to the expansion of individual developmental power. Thus,
this thesis will argue that Mill's project would fail to optimize individual expression to the extent
that he claims freedom can facilitate it.

Since the maximization of utility depends on the

optimization of individual developmental power, and Mill's freedom-utilitarian project would be
unlikely to optimize individual developmental power, that project would likely fail to reach its
utilitarian aims.
Mill's social and political philosophy is normally viewed as an equalitarian one. The
present thesis identifies some ways in which Mill's social and political philosophy of freedom is
not equalitarian. One of these ways is that elitism misguides Mill's claims about the personal
requirements for the optimization of individual development, and the maximization of social
utility. Elitist premises are argumentative assumptions that reward only or more highly certain
social interests, and can unfairly have politically differential consequences for the various social
groups. The thesis shows how the elitist premises of Mill's freedom-utilitarian argument are
unacceptable. If followed to their final implications, it is evident that those elitist premises
contradict Mill's conclusion that his freedom-utilitarian project would help maximize utility.
The elitist premises that only a few persons inherently have strong levels of individuality,
and that the stronger individualities can developmentally benefit more from freedom of individual
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expression imply that the capacity for developmental power varies among individuals and that so
does the capacity to benefit from free individual expression.
Even worse for the capacity of the freedom-utilitarian project to help optimize freedom
and thus maximize utility, what Mill considers freedom fails to meet the most important
requirement for the optimization of cognitive freedom: the promotion of mental independence
and open-mindedness. In this way, it lacks the capacity to enhance individual developmental
power which includes the capacity of an individual to obtain knowledge. The elitist premises that
only a few individuals can be impartial and that impartiality is necessary for the individual
attainment of knowledge imply that the majority of individuals would not be able to obtain
knowledge of self and others sufficient for self-determination. Thus, the social epistemology of
Mill's freedom-utilitarian project impedes the capacity of individuals to add knowledge to the
common good, that is increase epistemic utility, and thus the project cannot reach the
maximization of epistemic utility for which it aims.
Another way in which Mill's freedom-utilitarian project is not equalitarian is that it
implicitly supports the tyranny of the inherently strong and the politically privileged. Admittedly,
Mill neither overtly supports the tyranny of the inherently strong nor does he seem to consciously
intend to do so. Mill recognizes the need for the social discipline of strong individuals to prevent
their exercise of their greater developmental power to acquire political power in socially harmful
ways.

Yet, we should be aware that, under what Mill considers socially and politically

unrestricted speech and opinion formation, including opinions about which opinions are true, the
politically and inherently strong are most likely to have rule over truth that would be tyrannical in
at least two ways. First, it would be culturally imperialistic in that the culture of the elite social
groups would have the most influence over what society accepts as truthful opinions. Second, the
presumed rational justification of the elite's knowledge would depend on the maintenance of the
majority's ignorance or false opinions.

What Mill considers unrestricted expression is

counterproductive even to the individual development of tyrants insofar as it hinders their
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capacity to obtain social discipline and to obtain reliable knowledge about others. An even worse
way in which Mill's view of free expression is counterproductive to utility maximization is how
what Mill considers unrestricted expression actually restricts the individual expression of the
politically and presumably developmentally normal or weak. "Unrestricted" expression not only
impedes the exercise of their developmental power but hinders the expansion of that power, that
is, their individual progress.

Because what Mill considers a freedom-utilitarian project is

practical for the power maximization of only the developmentally and politically powerful
individuals, it is best understood as an elitist project.
The lack o f equalitarianism of Mill's freedom-utilitarian project will be made yet further
evident. I develop the term 'political egoism' to account for Mill's bias. An argument's premises
are politically egoist if they rely on elitist assumptions concerning the group to which the arguer
belongs. Another term that I use to account for Mill's bias is 'epistemic fairness,' and I develop a
version of the concept 'epistemic fairness' that fits the utilitarian aims of Mill's arguments for
freedom.

Epistemic fairness is a characteristic of epistemological methods.

In my view,

epistemic fairness4 is the degree to which these methods consider the number and the variety of
epistemic agents who are the active and direct benefactors and beneficiaries to the pursuit, and the
attainment, of knowledge.
This thesis constructively critiques the freedom-utilitarian project in the following two
ways.

For its critique, this thesis diagnostically applies the concepts 'political egoism' and

'epistemic fairness' to identify the ways in which Mill's freedom-utilitarian project lacks
equalitarianism, its social epistemology is flawed, and its practices that Mill recommends for that
project are inconsistent with the project's progressive aims. For its constructiveness, this thesis
uses these concepts to suggest some general requirements for an adequate freedom-utilitarian
project. The thesis suggests that utility maximization requires consideration of the variety and

4
Epistemic fairness is an idea "entailed by social empiricism" (Solomon, 2001, p. 12), which
"evokes the social side o f epistemology" (Solomon, 2001, p. 148).
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number of epistemic agents who actively and directly participate in, and benefit from, the pursuit
of knowledge of self and others, and of social and natural world.
Mill’s freedom-utilitarian project at first glance appears to be for a developmental
meritocracy in which there is fair competition over social worth, and which rewards individuals
in proportion to their proved developmental power. However, the society that puts this project
into practice sets up self-fulfilling prophecies against the developmental outcomes of the many
individuals, if the project accepts unparsimonious assumptions about human nature which
contribute to perceptions that utility is exclusive. Mill assumes that human beings vary in their
degree of psychobiological developmental power and in their possession of the attributes that
facilitate their capacity to improve their developmental power.

This assumption is

unparsimonious because we all belong to the same species. So, the simplest assumption sets the
emphasis on commonality, not on difference. However, Mill emphasizes the inherent differences
in human nature and implies variations in inherent developmental power.
Mill provides an inconsistent discussion of freedom with various implications for the
strength of developmental power which freedom can foster, and for the extent to which freedom
can contribute to utility. To show that Mill provides multiple treatments of freedom which vary
in their consistency with utility, the thesis explores the causal relationships among developmental
power, freedom, and utility.
The second chapter, entitled "Diversity for the Individual and Developmental Power,"
discusses Mill's treatment of freedom that is most consistent with the utilitarian aims of his social
project. Under the treatment of freedom which is most consistent with utility maximization, Mill
suggests that freedom applies only to actions that add to developmental power while the same
actions do not hinder others' developmental power. For Mill, utility gains the most from social
conditions that permit as much freedom as the optimization of developmental power requires.
Society's capacity for progress gains from its members' free exercise of individuality and
especially from the consequent expansion of their developmental power.
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The second chapter reconstructs Mill's argument that freedom of individual expression
and social diversity have developmentally and epistemically beneficial common consequences. It
will examine Mill's politically egoistic argument that society would be wise to let the
intellectually strong lead it.

His premises for that argument make elitist and empirically

unjustified claims; they require but lack relevant scientific support.
The second chapter shows how Mill causally connects individual development to utility.
To show this connection, the chapter addresses the following questions:

For Mill, what is

individual development? What causes individual development, and what does it cause?
The second chapter begins an overview of Mill's thought on the nature, the causal factors,
and the effects of individual development; the third chapter continues that overview. The second
chapter argues that, for Mill, individual development depends on individuality which is the
developmental power of self and society. Individuality has both a passive and an active form and
its expression varies by degrees.

In its active form, individuality consists of (1) inherent

developmental power, (2) activity to follow or be led by the inherent power, (3) activity to
cultivate the power, and (4) the consequent nature from the exercise of the power. In other
words, active individuality can be described as having at least three dimensions: potential, action,
and consequence. Active individuality requires the original exercise and/or free exercise of one's
developmental power to intelligently follow one's nature, and thereby cultivate individual and
social developmental power.

In its passive form, individuality consists of (1) inherent

developmental power, (2) neglect of the power, (3) the degradation o f the power, and (4) the
consequential inability to use the power. The type of individuality that one has depends on
whether one actively exercises one's individuality or passively tries to conform one's individuality
to socially desired ideals. As long as the individual maintains the active form of individuality,
she can remake her nature.
The developmental power of everyone can be expanded by being effectually exercised
for the cultivation of one's nature. However, according to Mill, a small proportion of individuals
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have more inherent developmental power than others and, as long as their individuality remains
active, their developmental power is more likely than that of others to cultivate a great nature.
Others, on the other hand, are more likely to exercise passive individuality, and thus can lose their
capacity to define and redefine their nature.
Mill recognizes that individuality has psychobiological and social bases.

Mill

emphasizes the psychobiological diversity of human beings over their commonalities, claiming
that, to a large extent, every individual has a unique inherent psychological nature. From this
nature is derived her inherent developmental power. There are constraints for an individual's
capacity to expand her developmental power. First, the individual is capable of making her
nature under the constraints of her unique inherent developmental power. There is a limited
range within which her capacity for self-definition can operate. The individual can leam about
her psychological developmental needs and capacities by means o f self-education. Experiments
of life are educative. In such experiments, the individual tries, and may invent, modes of life to
find which one best suits her inherent nature for the facilitation of its growth. Paradoxically, for
an individual to be able to lead her nature, a necessary precondition is that she must leam how to
intelligently follow the inward tendencies of her nature. There are limits to the leadership that she
can exercise over her nature. She cannot remove the inward tendencies, only discipline them. To
some extent, following the inward tendencies of one’s nature is inevitable.5 Following those
tendencies under intelligent exploration, however, to obtain sufficient self-knowledge to properly
discipline them is a greater challenge.
Other constraints of an individual's capacity to expand her developmental power include
two necessary conditions for the individual to actively exercise her individuality.
conditions include freedom and diversity.

These

Particularly, Mill argues for socially, culturally,

politically and legally unrestricted freedom to think independently, express one's opinions, and
act in self-regarding matters, i.e. in matters that have no direct consequences for others.
5

See J. S. M ill’s On Nature 118741.
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Additionally, Mill argues for toleration of diversity of opinions, education, modes of life, and
experiments of life. The greater the degree to which freedom and diversity are present in her
society, the greater the likelihood that the individual will be able to expand her developmental
power, and thus, that her individuality will be effectual. Another constraint for the expansion of
developmental power is that the individual must exercise it, and if she does not exercise it, she
risks not only its reduction, but also its loss.
A final constraint on the capacity of the individual to expand her developmental power is
negative political power which is a suppressive form of power that socially restricts the conduct
of individuals, and imposes limits upon their behavioural range. This exercise can impede the
capacity of individuals to choose behaviours that would facilitate their growth.

Mill is not

completely opposed to the exercise of negative political power. What Mill argues against is the
excessive exercise of negative political power over the individual. This exercise is excessive
when it restricts freedom and diversity so much that it undermines active individuality.
The more freedom and diversity that one's social environment permits, the less likely that
one will remain a passive and relatively under-developed individual. Thus, freedom and diversity
serve protective functions for individual development, whereas their lack endangers active
individuality, and thereby also endangers individual development.
So too, lack of freedom and lack of diversity undermine the capacity for social progress.
For Mill, social progress requires significant increases in developmental power. At the personal
level, the developmental power of individuality consists primarily of originality. At the social
level, developmental power consists primarily of developed individuals and persons of genius
whose contributions have proved to be socially effectual and beneficial. The capacity for social
developmental power is protected by such individuals. Also, eccentrics and individuals who, at
times, deviate from the social norms serve to protect the developmental power of their society.
Simply put, the greater the number of these individuals in society, the greater the protection for
the power.
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Individuality by means of its favourable contributions to the capacity for individual
development is of the utmost social utility. That is to say, individuality is the most likely to
improve the common good, and individuality brings the greatest benefits to society, for
individuality produces social progress.

For Mill, social progress means social change with

positive qualities, such as political improvements, especially increases in liberty and justice,
moral, social, cultural, and intellectual improvements.

Also, social progress can include the

increased general psychological well-being of society's members. Individuality is crucial for the
social attainment of happiness. For, according to Mill, the amount of social happiness6 depends
on the happiness of the members of society, and their happiness is facilitated by the satisfaction
of their particular psychological and biological developmental needs and the consequential
growth of their natures.
Mill gives an account of the interrelationship between freedom and power. Arguing that
Mill gives both negative and positive accounts of freedom, Baum (1998) finds that
Mill's developmental view o f individuality and autonomy leads him to articulate an indispensable
account o f the interrelationship between freedom and power. Freedom, he maintains, consists o f
both the absence o f burdensome constraints on people's possible actions and the capacity of
persons for self-determination and self-government, (p. 215)

Mill views the negative aspect of freedom as freedom from others' excessive exercise of political
and social power over one's inner and outer conduct. He views the positive aspect of freedom as
freedom to discover and make one's nature, articulate one's character, determine one's mode of
life, and, ultimately, leam to identify the idiosyncratic requirements for one's happiness. In this
way, he connects the positive aspect of freedom with developmental power. An examination of
Mill’s On Liberty suggests that power over is not the problem that he targets. 'Power over' can be
exercised socially, interpersonally or intra-personally. Simply stated, developmental power is
power over the development of one's nature and thus a capacity for free control over one's

6
It is beyond the scope o f this thesis to detail Mill's understanding o f happiness. For the purpose o f
this thesis, it is sufficient to note that Mill treats social happiness as the aggregate o f individual happiness
(CW, 18, Ch. 3, H9), and that he views individual happiness as the active individual's long-term
developmental outcome.
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actions. The negative form of political power is the capacity to influence the behaviour of others,
whereas the positive form of political power is the capacity to determine one's behaviour or to
protect oneself from others' interference with one's behaviour. Developmental power, for Mill, is
neither completely a negative form of political power, nor a problem. As well, individuals can
exercise power over others in ways that assist other individuals to properly discipline their
natures, i.e. beneficially exercise power over their natures, so that, for example, they cultivate
their social sympathy. In this way, even power over others is not necessarily a corrupt form of
power. Therefore, Mill does not suggest a clear cut distinction between negative and positive
political power as many thinkers today construe it.

Mill does not argue for the complete

elimination of negative political power (power over) or its sources, e.g. customs. Rather, he
argues against the inappropriate7 use of negative political power and against excessive8
conformity to custom. Negative political power works against utility when negative political
power is used to impose unnecessary restrictions upon individuals. Developmental power (power
over oneself) serves utility, for developmental power consists of abilities that when exercised by
the individual can have progressive social consequences.
To explore how Mill assigns utility, the second chapter of this thesis will find support for
the following five interpretive hypotheses regarding power which can affect the degrees of
freedom and utility possible for various individuals. First, Mill treats developmental power more
as a positive than a negative form of political power.

He characterizes a psychobiological

minority with higher levels of developmental power, and thereby also with a greater capacity to
benefit others and themselves through their freedom. This is problematic because it implies that a
small social group is more likely than other groups to serve the common good.

The use o f negative political power is inappropriate when it interferes with matters that regard
only the self. I will not discuss the problems with the claim that there are matters that regard only the self,
it is sufficient to say that most matters, if not all, are not self-regarding matters.
8
Conformity to custom is excessive when it results in despotic custom
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The second interpretive hypothesis is that Mill negatively correlates9 the amount of
negative political power that a person has with the amount of developmental power that she has.
Mill emphasises the morally negative aspects of negative political power. He characterizes the
masses of persons with higher levels of negative political power, and thereby with the lack of
capacity to benefit others and themselves through their freedom. This is problematic because it
implies that they lack the capacity to serve the common good. The third interpretive hypothesis is
that Mill positively correlates original actions with progressive consequences. He attributes
original actions to the developmental elite.

This is problematic because it implies that the

developmental elite have a utility advantage above others, since they are most likely to contribute
to social progress. The fourth interpretive hypothesis is that Mill positively correlates conformist
actions with regressive consequences. Mill causally attributes conformist actions to the societal
majority. This is problematic because it implies that the majority of persons are the least likely to
serve the common good. The first to fourth interpretive hypotheses will find support in the
second and third chapters of this thesis.
Mill positively correlates the exercise of positive political power with improved
psychological well-being and the attainment of individual happiness.

The fifth interpretive

hypothesis is that, in contrast to his favourable view of positive political power, for Mill, the
informal exercise of negative political power includes mental coercion. As the first and second
hypotheses discussed, Mill characterizes the developmental elite as having more positive political
power than the masses of persons, and he characterizes the masses as having, and promoting,
more negative political power than the developmental elite.

This is problematic because it

implies that the masses are to blame for lack of social happiness, whereas the developmental elite

9
For this thesis, whenever I say that Mill 'negatively correlates' or 'negatively relates' and 'positively
correlates' or 'positively relates,' I am referring to particular claims Mill makes about the direction o f an
empirical relationship between two variables. When two variables are said to be positively related, what is
meant is that as one variable increases, so does the other, or vice versa, when one variable decreases, so
does the other. When two variables are said to be negatively correlated, what is meant is that as one
variable increases, the other decreases, and vice versa.
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are the most likely to contribute to social happiness. The fifth interpretive hypothesis will find
support in the third chapter's part entitled "The Justice of Utilitarianism: Just for the Elite."
As mentioned in the discussion for the second hypothesis, Mill characterizes ordinary
persons as having a greater likelihood for the exercise of the morally corrupt form of negative
political power, and he characterizes intellectuals with the exercise of progressive positive
political power. Because of his interest in the maximization of actions that have progressive
consequences, Mill is concerned with the need to minimize the morally corrupt form of negative
political power, and to maximize the developmental power of society. He calls upon people to
tolerate diversity in order to reduce society's exercise of negative political power and permit
individuals to exercise their developmental power. Mill aspires for society to assign greater
political power to individuals with the most developmental power.
Mill claims that individuals who have the most developmental power in society tend to
have the least political power. That claim is inconsistent with his other claim that the actions of
developmentally powerful individuals are more likely to produce social progress than the actions
of persons who have more negative political power. Since the capacity to add to, or effect, social
progress depends on the capacity for politically and socially influential actions, it remains to be
clarified what Mill means by the claim that individuals who are the most likely to bring about
progressive consequences are less powerful.10 The response to that question I provide in the
second chapter is that Mill positively links the political and social influence of developmentally
powerful individuals to the positive form of political power, of which he implies there is a
deficiency. But he does not make such a link to the negative form, o f which he claims that there
is an excess. Thus, Mill thinks that the placement of more formal political power in the hands of

10
When those with higher levels o f negative political power exercise influence over others it likely
contributes to social regression, if to any change at all. By assuming that the societal majority have higher
levels o f negative political power than the developmental elite have formal political power, Mill implies
that social regression and no social change are more likely than social progress. This can explain what Mill
means by the claim that those who have more developmental power, and thereby more capacity to
contribute to social progress, do not have more political power.
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individuals who have greater levels of developmental power would foster positive political power
and reduce negative political power.
The third thesis chapter, entitled "The Progress of the Elite," argues that Mill's
developmental elitism, including moral, intellectual, and political elitist aspects, fosters political
inequality. Also, the absolute notion of political equality that Mill accepts is counterproductive to
the maximization of individual development.

Mill's elitist claims about developmental

differences and the nature of individual development, if accepted, would result in a greater
likelihood that the elite would make self-fulfilling prophecies11 against the societal majority's
development maximization.

In particular Mill denies the capacity of the least developable

individuals to meaningfully be history makers.
Mill claims that the active exercise of individuality causes individual development, that
individual development can cause progress, and that individual progress can cause history.
Without individuality, there is no individual development, and without individual and social
progress, there is no history.

Mill claims that, more indirectly, individuality causes social

progress and individual development causes history.

Social progress depends on favourable

moments in the struggle between individuality and despotic custom.12 History involves the
struggle of developmental power to overcome the excesses o f negative political power and to
reach greater levels of the expression of individuality and thereby human freedom. Thus, history
is the purposive and political movement towards the individualization of humankind.
The second chapter's parts on experiments of life and the third chapter argue that Mill's
social epistemological prescriptions for the advancement of developmental power by means of
self-education promote the developmental power of the developmental elite, not the

11
An individual makes a self-fulfilling prophecy when s/he acts in ways that influence her own
experiences or another individual's experiences to confirm the expectations that the individual had prior to
making her actions (Aronson et al., 2004).
12
A despotic custom is a common cultural practice that is exercised to an extent which undermines
the social capacity for progress.
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developmental power of the whole of society. The problem is that Mill's conception of individual
development, upon which those prescriptions are based, makes some un-parsimonious or
unnecessarily strong assumptions about human nature. In particular, M ill’s assumptions about
the

inherent

differences

among the

individual

levels

of developmental

power are

counterproductive to the pursuit of the maximization of the developmental power of every
individual. His assumptions about individual inherent differences set limitations for the utility
that is possible for most individuals. Specifically, the way that Mill assigns high utility to an
exclusive set of mental attributes is counterproductive to the aim to maximize the utility of every
member of society, or their capacity to serve the common good.
A serious problem with M ill’s freedom-utilitarian conception o f individual development
is that its assignment of utility lacks impartiality; that assignment is both elitist and politically
egoist. These biases lead the project to be inconsistent with its aim for political equality which
according to Mill is the essence of justice. The project is based on the belief that society should
accept certain practices because they will benefit society. The belief is incoherent because the
consequentialist arguments that support it imply that those practices would directly benefit mainly
the developmental elite who should rule society. Mill fails to see that, if their society gives them
unequal levels of political power, the political interest conflicts between the developmentally
powerful and the underdeveloped or the least developable would intensify.

Society would

conduct this differential assignment on the basis of the various levels o f developmental power
which the developmental elite presume the society's members have. However, Mill does not urge
society to consider how this assignment would affect the capacity o f the underdeveloped
individuals to satisfy their various psychological developmental needs. Thus, Mill's conception
of individual development promotes political inequality.
An additional sign of Mill's lack of impartiality is that his conception of individual
development is also one-sided because of its political egoism. Mill accepts assumptions about
human nature that are in line with the political interests of the intellectual minority group to
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which he belongs. He assigns more value to the characteristics and causal attributes that reflect
his individual nature.

He fails to see the oppressive implications of his development

maximization principles for persons whom the developmental elite treat as the underdeveloped or
least developable. In short, Mill's project offers a politically biased assignment of utility.
The assignment is unnecessarily politically exclusive, because it is based on un
parsimonious or unnecessarily strong assumptions about human nature; these were explained
previously. Even worse, his consideration of differences is elitist, for he prefers the political
power of individuals whom he considers have a greater capacity to effectively exercise such
power because of their greater ability to obtain developmental power; he recommends that the
developmental elite should rule.

The problematic bias is Mill's failure to consider how the

developmental elite's rule could undermine the capacity of the underdeveloped to meet their
various developmental needs. That lack of consideration for developmental interests different
from his own contributes to the politically egoistic nature of his argumentation. By accepting
elitist and unparsimonious assumptions, he sets up a self-fulfilling prophecy against not only the
developmental power, but, because developmental power affects utility, also the utility of most
individuals. Consequently, the freedom-utilitarianism that Mill proposes is weak.
The fourth thesis chapter, entitled "Freedom of Expression and Cultural Imperialism over
the Truth," argues that Mill's view of free speech misdirects his freedom-utilitarian project's
social epistemology. What Mill considers socially unrestricted speech lacks the functions for the
enhancement of epistemic and individual development that he claims it has.
Concerned with negative political power because its excess interferes with liberty, Mill
makes recommendations to optimize liberty. Mill claims that the developmental elite's exercise
of power, whether that power is negative or positive, is more likely to be virtuous than that of
others, and would optimize positive freedom because it would optimize negative freedom, as the
fourth chapter will explain. Mill thinks that greater positive freedom facilitates the exercise, and
expansion, of individual developmental power, and thus also enhances the capacity of society for
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progress.
Mill's prescriptions for epistemic progress hinder the freedom-utilitarian project's
capacity to maximize utility through its promotion of the individual's exercise of freedom.
Political egoism again misinforms the freedom-utilitarian project's social epistemological
recommendations. Mill inadequately considers the likely consequences of the freedom-utilitarian
project's recommended practices for freedom. That project prescribes the socially unrestricted
practice of speech, but this practice conflicts with the maximization of utility.

The

recommendation for socially unrestricted speech is socially and cognitively incoherent, as the
fourth chapter of this thesis will explain. Consequently, that project is unlikely to serve the social
and epistemic utility which Mill claims that it can.
Unfortunately, Mill's treatment of free speech and opinion formation is inconsistent with
the maximization of utility. Mill clearly demands "absolute freedom" for cognitive expression
(CW, 18, Ch. 1,1(12). He writes: "Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is
sovereign" (CW, 18, Ch. 1, ^[9). Further, Mill clearly states that it is "obvious that law and
authority have no business with restraining" the overt expression of opinions (CW, 18, Ch. 2,
^]42). Thus, Mill makes clear his position on free speech: society should not politically or legally
restrict speech.
My responses to Mill's freedom-utilitarian project are consistent with the aims of his
project and with many of its claims. For instance, the most developable individuals, if there are
such individuals, require social discipline to prevent them from impeding their personal
development as well as others' development, according to Mill.

So too, I add, for opinion

formation and opinion expression to be free, there must be social regulations to optimize their
freedom, to give society rational justification for the claim that opinion formation and opinion'
expression are free, and to prevent the tyranny of the politically strong.
That tyranny, as the fourth chapter of this thesis argues, is likely to occur under the
condition of what Mill considers socially unrestricted speech and opinion formation.
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acquisition of the multi-sided truth which Mill seeks to promote is unlikely in a politically
unequal context. The main point of the fourth chapter is that under "unrestricted" expression,
which is invisibly restricted expression, the formation of truth would be elitist and thus
inconsistent with the promotion of cultural diversity, the advancement of rationality and mental
independence, and the synthesis of truth.
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CHAPTER 2: DIVERSITY FOR THE INDIVIDUAL AND DEVELOPMENTAL
POWER
I. Introduction
Mill calls for toleration of social diversity because social diversity is a necessary
condition for the expansion of individual developmental power. Social diversity facilitates the
individual's capacity to developmentally and epistemically benefit from free individual
expression. In turn, freedom of individual expression fosters social diversity. The second section
of this chapter will focus on the central role of individuality in the expansion of developmental
power, whereas the third section will focus on the instrumental role o f social diversity in that
expansion.
The position o f this chapter is that political egoism weakens Mill's freedom-utilitarian
argument that the freedom of individual expression helps to maximize utility. That argument's
consequentialist considerations are elitist in politically egoistic ways that prevent the project from
being adequately utilitarian. In particular, its one-sided premises emphasize that it is socially
important to maximize the developmental capacities of the individuals whom Mill presumes are
strong; these individuals belong to the same developmental group to which he belongs. He even
argues that society should permit the rule of the developmental elite for the maximization of
utility.
Mill claims that human nature is inherently diverse so much that the various individual
natures have various needs for their development maximization.

To take into account their

various developmental needs, he recommends the social toleration of diverse cultures and
opinions, and the free expression of individuality so that the inherently various individual natures
may have a chance to develop themselves. The free expression of individuality includes not only
choice of lifestyle but also free opinion formation and what Mill considers socially and politically
unrestricted expression of one's opinions.
Since Mill's argument that free expression of individuality should be socially permitted is

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

-

20

-

utilitarian, its argumentative strength depends on the adequacy of its consequentialism, which is
the approach to arguing for certain actions based on the consequences o f those actions. For,
utilitarianism considers the consequences of actions to understand their utility. I maintain that if
it is to advance utilitarian aims, the strength of a consequentialist argument for certain social
conditions requires that all or at least most individuals are (1) benefactors to the society by
contributing to those social conditions and (2) the societal conditions' beneficiaries. Yet, Mill
assumes that the characteristics that are most likely to contribute to the social conditions that he
recommends are inherently rare or scarce, so much that only a few individuals could contribute to
those social conditions. Thus, he expects only a societal minority to meaningfully add to the
common good. Further, he expects that the minority of strong individuals are most likely to
immediately and directly benefit from the social conditions, whereas he expects that the societal
majority would benefit from the social conditions mainly in the long-term and indirectly.
This chapter explores Mill's elitist assumptions and claims about inherent differences
among individual natures that reduce the strength of his main argument that free individual
expression maximizes utility. This chapter will reconstruct the components of that argument,
with focus on its premise that freedom of individual expression facilitates the expansion of
individual developmental power. To reveal how individual developmental power affects the
utility of one's actions, the chapter explores how Mill assigns utility to multiple categories of
human beings based on the various degrees of developmental power of which he presumes they
are capable.
Problematic bias is evident in Mill's lack of consideration for whether persons who are
under-developed can obtain the same developmental and epistemic benefits as the developmental
elite.

He claims that the vast majority of persons who are under-developed lack the

characteristics that he considers necessary for service to the common good, but does not consider
whether this lack will adversely impact their developmental outcomes.

Mill inadequately

considers the consequences that the individual practices that he recommends most likely would
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have for the development of those whom he presumes have normal or weak individual natures.
Thus, his argumentation is one-sided; his arguments for free individual expression largely
disregard the interests of persons whom he presumes their inherent nature excludes from the
developmental elite.
This chapter finds support for the following four interpretive hypotheses regarding
individual capacities for freedom, power, and progress which are relevant to an individual's
capacity to add to utility. First, Mill positively correlates the innate capacity for individuality
with the capacity to improve individual developmental power.

The second interpretive

hypothesis is that Mill negatively correlates the degree of negative political power with the degree
of developmental power that the person possesses. He characterizes the underdeveloped or what
he considers the least developable group with higher levels of negative political power. In other
words, (1) the less negative political power persons actually have, the more they have
developmental power, and vice versa, (2) the more negative political power persons have, the less
they are capable of developmental power. Particularly, Mill claims that the masses of persons
have more negative political power than intellectuals. He characterize the masses with, and
causally attributes to the masses, the exercise of negative political power over one another and
especially over statistical deviants, and thereby the interference with, or the reduction of, the
chances that individuals will cultivate, benefit from, and benefit others by means of their
developmental power. Therefore, he does not assume only that the masses are less capable of
individuality and thus of developmental power and social diversity. He also assumes that they are
more likely to interfere with, and exercise negative power over, the developmental power of
others than intellectuals are, because the masses, in his view, threaten social diversity and thereby
endanger the availability of social opportunities that individuals need to expand their
developmental power.
The third interpretive hypothesis is derived from the second way that Mill treats
developmental power as a positive form of political power: Mill positively correlates the degree
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of the developmental power of a person with the degree to which she likely will choose actions
that have progressive consequences, that is, original actions. Mill causally attributes progressive
consequences to the actions of persons whom he thinks have greater levels of developmental
power.
The fourth interpretive hypothesis is that Mill negatively correlates the degree of the
developmental power of a person with the degree to which she likely will commit conformist
actions which result in mere social change, if any social change at all. He causally attributes a
greater likelihood to promote conformist actions to the masses of persons than to the intellectual
minority of persons. As opposed to progressive social change, he positively correlates the masses
with social change that is either (1) the empty form of social change, i.e. social change without
improvement, or change for change's sake, or (2) the regressive form of social change, i.e. change
for the worse.

II. Individuality and Developmental Power
For Mill, the individual characteristics and causal attributes that have high utility because
they enhance an individual's developmental power include genius, active individuality,
originality, intellectualism, impartiality, eccentricity, and emotional intensity. This section draws
from On Liberty (1859) to explore how Mill assigns various levels of social utility to at least two
kinds of individuality and to individual attributes based on their social consequences.
Individuality has active and passive forms. In the first part of this section, entitled "Individual
Developmental Power and Human Nature," I will discuss that the maintenance of active
individuality is important because it adds to the satisfaction of one's idiosyncratic developmental
needs, and thus contributes to the perfection of one's nature based on its own ideal. In contrast to
active individuality, passive individuality can at most hope to satisfy social ideals of perfect
human nature, and these ideals are not necessarily consistent with the satisfaction of one's
individual psychological needs. The second part of this section, entitled "The Individual
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Characteristics that Have High Utility," concerns how Mill assigns high levels of utility to
presumably exclusive individual attributes.

In the third part of this section, entitled "Mill's

Argument that Society Should Grant the Developmentally Powerful Greater Political Power," I
will evaluate Mill's argument that intellectuals and persons of genius deserve high levels of
formal political power, and discuss its fallacies and unacceptable assumptions. Third, in this
section, especially in the part entitled "Argument that the Free Expression of Individuality Adds
to Progress," I will show how Mill claims that freedom affects individuality, and, in turn,
individuality affects epistemic and cultural progress.

i) Individuality and Human Nature
Here, I will show that Mill implicitly distinguishes between active and passive
individuality, and he expects that individual natures vary in their likelihood to lead an active
individuality. One type of individuality benefits from free expression and is most likely to benefit
society through that expression. The other is the product of social restraint and lack of free
exercise. Mill emphasizes that individuals can follow and make their nature only so long as they
maintain their individuality active. Further, Mill suggests that passive individuality reaches a
point in time at which it is no longer reversible. In light of these developmental limitations, I will
discuss the implications for the developmental capacities of the individual who has either the
active or passive form.
From the third chapter in On Liberty, entitled "Of Individuality, as one of the Elements of
Well-being," it is evident that Mill is preoccupied with the adequate and proper cultivation of
human nature. This cultivation requires a broad theory of life. He stresses that "human nature is
not a machine to be built after a model, and set to do exactly the work prescribed for it, but a tree,
which requires to grow and develope itself on all sides, according to the tendency o f the inward
forces which make it a living thing" (CW, 18, Ch. 3, T[4, emphasis added). Because the human
nature of all cannot fit into the same ideal type, treatment of human nature as if it can conform to
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the same model impedes its dynamic capacity for growth. Precisely because of this impediment,
Mill criticizes the Calvinistic theory, according to which, "human nature being radically corrupt,
there is no redemption for any one until human nature is killed within him" (CW, 18, Ch. 3, f7).
The Calvinistic theory promotes passive individuality, and represents a tendency towards a
"narrow theory of life" (CW, 18, Ch. 3, T|8) under which society cannot recognize the dynamic
capacity of individual development. Mill, however, prefers a broad theory of life, since only
through the guidance of such a theory can the growth process of the individual be kept active.
M ill’s use of the expressions "while mankind are imperfect" (CW, 18, Ch. 3, Tfl), “ideal
perfection of human nature" (CW, 18, Ch. 4, ^5) "perfect human being" (CW, 18, Ch. 3, ^5), and
his criticism of Calvinistic theory combined with his belief that human error is "corrigible" (CW,
18, Ch. 2, ^7) show that Mill believes in some sort of human perfectibility,13 not just
improvability. For example, Mill writes: “Among the works of man, which human life is rightly
employed in perfecting and beautifying, the first in importance surely is man him self’ (CW, 18,
Ch. 3, Tf4). For another example, after he discusses that persons should be allowed to make errors
in matters that regard only the self, Mill claims that, nevertheless, society should tolerate personal
judgments about the qualities that regard only other selves. He writes:
I do not mean that the feelings with which a person is regarded by others ought not to be in any
way affected by his self-regarding qualities or deficiencies. This is neither possible nor desirable.
If he is eminent in any o f the qualities which conduce to his own good, he is, so far, a proper
object o f admiration. He is so much the nearer to the ideal perfection o f human nature. If he is
grossly deficient in those qualities, a sentiment the opposite o f admiration will follow. (CW, 18,
Ch. 4, ^[5, emphasis added)

Mill considers the capacity of social criticism to be constructively useful to the criticized. He
writes:
Though doing no worse to any one, a person may so act as to compel us to judge him, and feel
him, as a fool, or as a being o f an inferior order: and since this judgment and feeling are a fact

As it will be discussed in the next section o f this chapter and in the third chapter o f this thesis, Mill
thinks that humans, to a large extent, differ in their psycho-biological natures. So, humans can perfect their
natures observing their own inherent range o f developmental possibilities and their idiosyncratic
psychological needs and preferences. That is, the ideal state o f the human nature o f each is the main
referent in her pursuit o f perfectibility. Mill assumes that there is not enough commonality among human
natures for there to be an ideal type o f human nature.
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which he would prefer to avoid, it is doing him a service to warn him o f it beforehand, as o f any
other disagreeable consequence to which he exposes himself (CW, 18, Ch. 4, f5 , emphasis added)

If one is to benefit from such criticism, the criticism must be true, and it must be possible to
modify one’s nature in the proportion the criticism calls for. However, it is uncertain to what
extent Mill thinks that one can modify one's nature. On the one hand, he writes that one can
develop and modify the expression of one's nature through one's "own culture" (CW, 18, Ch. 3,
f5). One's nature is one's work (CW, Ch. 3, ^4, 18).
On the other hand, although he implies that one has a chance to contribute to the value of
one's "comparative worth as a human being" (CW, 18, Ch. 3, ^4), Mill claims that personal worth
depends not only on what one does (CW, 18, Ch. 3, ^4). What one is also matters.

The

biologically inherent mental capacities with which one can make one's nature, in Mill's view, vary
from person to person. Some developmental factors are beyond one's control. For example, "the
inherent force of the human understanding" is unequal across human beings (CW, 18, Ch. 2, ^[7,
emphasis added). According to Mill, only a few have a strong inherent capacity to understand,
and even in their rare case it is only relatively greater than that o f others.14 Additionally, Mill
suggests that some persons have more inherent potential than others, for example, to experience
strong sentiments, which he claims add to their potential to develop a strong conscience, as the
third section in the next chapter will discuss. This entails that Mill thinks that some persons have
innate advantages in their moral perfectibility.
"The danger which threatens human nature is not the excess, but the deficiency, of
personal impulses and preferences" (CW, 18, Ch. 3, T[6), warns Mill. Persons who presumably
have a lower capacity for individual development pose a greater threat than those who have a
higher capacity, because the former are most likely to suffer from this deficiency.

The

development of their individuality reduces the level of threat which they pose. Since they have a
lower level of developmental power, they will always likely pose this threat more than the

14

For Mill, human beings have little potential for understanding, over all.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

-

26

-

developmentally powerful.
Mill discusses that individual development requires one to follow and make one's nature;
to follow one's nature, one must observe one's inherent potential, and to make one's nature, one
must put effort towards one's individual development. Mill is often unclear in regards to the
distinctions and connections that he draws between the two developmental requirements.
Nevertheless, it is clear that with the analogy of the growth of plants, Mill suggests that
environmental constraints restrict inherent growth potential (CW, 18, Ch. 3, f 14). In Mill's view,
the inherent potential is not fixed, at least for being lowered. For example, the religious and
cultural pressures of society can kill human nature.
Active individuality protects and fosters individual growth. The exercise of one's human
capacities provides one's inherent nature with the nourishment that it needs. In contrast, passive
individuality threatens the capacity for individual growth.

Once one has not followed one's

inherent potential for a long enough period of time, one has no nature left to follow, since one's
human capacities have become "withered and starved" (CW, 18, Ch. 3, f6). Therefore, evidently,
Mill implies that human nature can degrade, that is, that it can become less human.
Mill does not follow his logic to its final implications. If one has no inherent human
potential left to follow, it is not possible to have a human nature left to cultivate through one's
efforts. If one lacks the capacity to understand oneself, one cannot intelligently follow one's
nature and leam how to direct one's individual developmental efforts. Thus, Mill suggests that
the individual cannot reverse the degradation of her inherent human potential.
That passivity can kill human nature holds implications for the developmental power
possible for, and thereby the utility of, the dead natures.

The dead natures would lack the

capacity for individual development. Persons who live as passive individuals for a certain length
of time, which Mill does not specify, lose the capacity to exercise active individuality. Mill does
not consider whether dead human natures can rise again. If society cannot assist the rebirth of a
dead human nature, there are worse implications than if it is only the individual who cannot
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reverse her passive condition. For example, rehabilitation would not effectively direct older
passive individuals away from criminal activities. Mill emphasizes self-development, not social
intervention in support of individual development. Thus, it is unlikely that he considers the
potential helpfulness of society to reverse the degradation of human nature that results from lack
of use. Instead, he suggests that society is most useful when it does not interfere, in the first
place, with individual development. Mill thinks that if persons were left alone to do what they
think best suits their development, freed from social censorship, they could "grow and thrive"
(CW, 18, Ch. 3, T|6). Therefore, to the question of whether individuality that has for long been
passive can reactivate, Mill provides no direct and clear response, and, if anything, his work
implies a response in the negative.

ii) The Individual Characteristics that Have High Utility
Mill assigns high utility to eccentricity, intellectualism, emotional intensity, individuality,
originality, impartiality, and genius, but he claims that high levels o f these are uncommon. Here,
I will textually support this chapter's position that Mill assigns utility to various personal
characteristics in elitist ways. The third chapter of this thesis will discuss Mill's claims about the
innate scarcity of impartiality and emotional intensity, and provide additional textual and
argumentative support for the claim of elitism.

The current part of this chapter explores Mill's

view of the causal connections among freedom, these attributes, the expansion of developmental
power, and progress including improvements in freedom, and cultural and epistemic
improvements.
Mill posits that freedom lets, individuality be active, which, in turn, fosters individual
progress. For Mill, progress is the "development of the capacity for self-direction" (Harris, 1956,
p. 173). In this way, progress requires personal autonomy and increases in social freedom, i.e.
freedom of the individual from society’s interference. In Mill's view, the individual must be free
from society to determine herself. Mill posits that individual development is a necessary causal
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condition for social advancement, and suggests that if society were to recognize this link, "there
would be no danger that liberty should be undervalued" (CW, 18, Ch. 3, f2).

Individual

development increases the individual's social utility, for that development leads to individual
happiness, and thereby also to social happiness. He writes:
It is not by wearing down into uniformity all that is individual in themselves, but by cultivating it,
and calling it forth, within the limits imposed by the rights and interests of others, that human
beings become a noble and beautiful object of contemplation; and as the works partake the
character of those who do them, by the same process human life also becomes rich, diversified,
and animating, furnishing more abundant aliment to high thoughts and elevating feelings, and
strengthening the tie which binds every individual to the race, by making the race infinitely better
worth belonging to. In proportion to the development o f his individuality, each person becomes
more valuable to himself, and is therefore capable o f being more valuable to others. There is a
greater fullness of life about his own existence, and when there is more life in the units there is
more in the mass which is composed of them. (CW, 18, Ch. 3, Tf9, emphasis added)
Mill advises that society should foster the "free development of individuality" (CW, 18, Ch. 3,
112), because it is "one of the leading essentials of well-being" (CW, 18, Ch. 3 , 1|2). Individual
development directly contributes to "civilisation, instruction, education" and "culture" (CW, 18,
Ch. 3, H2).
As well, Mill expresses concern for the need to develop consideration for the good of
others. He asserts that society should restrict the actions of individuals only to the extent that the
socially imposed restraints will shape individuality to be in accordance with the good of others,
and the social purpose of justice. Consider:
As much compression as is necessary to prevent the stronger specimens o f human nature from
encroaching on the rights of others, cannot be dispensed with; but for this there is ample
compensation even in the point of view of human development. The means of development which
the individual loses by being prevented from gratifying his inclinations to the injury of others, are
chiefly obtained at the expense of the development of other people. And even to himself there is a
full equivalent in the better development of the social part of his nature, rendered possible by the
restraint upon the selfish part. To be held to rigid rules ofjustice fo r the sake o f others, developes
the feelings and capacities which have the good o f others fo r their object. (CW, 18, Ch. 3,1(9,
emphasis added)
His discussion about the wisdom of ordinary people who call upon individuals endowed with
genius to govern also expresses the same concern for the need to develop consideration for the
good of others. Mill writes that he is
not countenancing the sort of 'hero-worship' which applauds the strong man of genius for forcibly
seizing on the government of the world and making it do his bidding in spite of itself. All he can
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claim is, freedom to point out the way. The power o f compelling others into it, is not only
inconsistent with the freedom and development o f all the rest, but corrupting to the strong man
himself. (CW, 18, Ch. 3 , 1J13)

He asserts that the spirit of improvement should not drive persons o f genius to undermine the
spirit of liberty, because to do so would undermine the freedom of others and corrupt the self.
It is clear, therefore, that Mill's ideas on individual development could not justify overt
tyrannical actions of persons of genius. He aspires for an age in which the people would reach a
stage of individual development sufficient for them to accept, appreciate and support the
emergence of an “intellectual aristocracy” (Harris, 1956, p. 167). Nevertheless, to the extent that
Mill promotes intellectual elitism in the distribution o f social power, his position on innate
differentials in developmental power supports subtle forms of the tyranny o f persons that have
genius, as I will argue in the third section of the third thesis chapter.
In Mill's view, the proper development of individuality is high in social utility. First,
personal development requires the development of individuality. Once developed, the individual
can contribute to the development of other individuals. Mill writes: "Individuality is the same
thing with development, and that it is only the cultivation o f individuality which produces, or can
produce, well-developed human beings...these developed human beings are o f some use to the
undeveloped " (CW, 18, Ch. 3, ^10, emphasis added). Thus, individual developmental power
contributes to the capacity of society for progress.
The result of individuality is originality which also has social utility, for originality can
add to epistemic and cultural progress. Mill writes:
It will not be denied by anybody, that originality is a valuable element in human affairs. There is
always need o f persons not only to discover new truths, and point out when what were once truths
are true no longer, but also to commence new practices, and set the example o f more enlightened
conduct, and better taste and sense in human life. (CW, 18, Ch. 3, ^[11)

Mill criticizes people, however, because they tolerate originality on only abstract grounds, and do
not actually accept or engage in its practice (CW, 18, Ch. 3, ^12). He encourages them to accept
originality in "thought and action," because they too could benefit from originality, first, by fully
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"opening their eyes" (CW, 18, Ch. 3, TJ12). Doing so would permit them the chance to be original
themselves (CW, 18, Ch. 3, 1(12).
Further, Mill suggests that eccentricity serves a social purpose in that eccentricity
demonstrates by example how to resist the tyranny of popular opinion. He writes:
In this age, the mere example o f non-conformity, the mere refusal to bend the knee to custom, is
itself a service. Precisely because the tyranny o f opinion is such as to make eccentricity a
reproach, it is desirable, in order to break through that tyranny, that people should be eccentric.
(CW, 18, Ch. 3,1(13)

Mill views lack of eccentricity as a sign of the tyranny of popular opinion; he says, "that so few
now dare to be eccentric, marks the chief danger of the time" (CW, 18, Ch. 3, 1(13). Mill
positively correlates the "amount of eccentricity" present in a society with the "amount of genius"
and with attributes that he thinks contribute to the development of genius such as "strength of
character," "mental vigour," and "moral courage" (CW, 18, Ch. 3,1(13).
A problem of how society affects individual development is that the common modes of
thought hinder it. For instance, persons tend to resist the individual spontaneity which eccentric
or uncommon modes of life express. For, persons tend to not have that spontaneity and it is not
in their immediate political interest to recognize its worth. Mill writes:
the evil is, that individual spontaneity is hardly recognised by the common modes o f thinking as
having any intrinsic worth, or deserving any regard on its own account. The majority being
satisfied with the ways o f mankind as they now are (for it is they who make them what they are),
cannot comprehend why those ways should not be good enough for everybody . . . [Spontaneity is]
looked on with jealousy, as a troublesome and perhaps rebellious obstruction to the general
acceptance o f what [the majority o f moral and social] reformers, in their own judgment, think
would be best for mankind. (CW, 18, Ch. 3 ,1|2, emphasis added)

In the above passage, Mill implies that individual spontaneity positively correlates with
eccentricity, and that individual spontaneity has both social utility and intrinsic worth.

He

observes that many persons are too vainly focused on the worth o f their own way of life to
recognize the worth of spontaneity.
Because Mill presumes persons of genius are the most likely individuals to possess
superior potentials for originality, which, as we have seen, is a requirement for social progress, he
recognizes that intellectualism is high in social utility. In his view, it is especially important for
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society to permit intellectual and creative individuals as much freedom of expression as they need
to adequately develop their superior social utility. For, it is the exceptionally intelligent and
creative minority which is most capable of individuality, and, thus, this minority of individuals
has greater potential for social utility.

Mill views such individuals as inherently and

developmentally superior to others, and warns against “reducing” (CW, 18, Ch. 3, ^11) their
nature to that which is common. Mill writes:
Persons o f genius, it is true, are, and are always likely to be, a small minority; but in order to have
them, it is necessary to preserve the soil in which they grow. Genius can only breathe freely in an
atmosphere o f freedom. Persons o f genius are . . . more individual than any other people — less
capable, consequently, o f fitting themselves, without hurtful compression, into any o f the small
number o f moulds which society provides in order to save its members the trouble o f forming their
own character. If from timidity they consent to be forced into one o f these moulds, and to let all
that part o f themselves which cannot expand under the pressure remain unexpanded, society will
be little the better for their genius. If they are o f a strong character, and break their fetters, they
become a mark for the society which has not succeeded in reducing them to commonplace. (CW,
18, Ch. 3, TJ11, emphasis added)

In the above way, Mill suggests that the availability of a few lifestyle options is far from
sufficient for the development of the capacity for genius. The fewer options that there are, the
more common are social practices. The exercise of choice among things that are commonly done
is more a matter of conformity than individuality. But the activity level of individuality benefits
from the exercise of choice among original and various things. Thus, there is no better alternative
to have than many alternatives. The more life style alternatives that are available, the more that
one can exercise one's individuality.
In sum, original individuals permit the creation of multiple life-style alternatives.
Originality both adds benefits to, and benefits from, the development o f individuality. Thus,
there is a mutual, positive relationship between originality and individuality. Mill's discussion on
the need to encourage eccentricity suggests that where there is originality, there is individuality.
Also, it suggests that the more these two are present, the more there is eccentricity, but that where
there is eccentricity, there is not necessarily genius. Eccentricity can serve some social utility, for
eccentricity models a variety of ways of life. The more the originality serves social utility in
terms of social progress, the more there is genius. The capacity for genius at least initially
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requires eccentricity, but genius stands above it in terms of social utility. Thus, according to Mill,
genius not being entirely innately, or in today's terms genetically, based depends on more than
self-development; it also, importantly, depends on the social consequences of one's originality.

iii) Mill's Argument that Society Should Grant the Developmentally Powerful
Greater Political Power
Here, I will reconstruct and evaluate Mill's argument that society should give persons of
genius greater political power. That argument suffers from inconsistent premises. Additionally,
the argument suffers from unacceptable elitist assumptions, and I will discuss two of those
assumptions. One elitist assumption, which I will discuss here, is that high levels o f individuality
are inherently scarce. The second assumption is that the masses are less culturally diverse than
intellectuals.

Other elitist assumptions include that there is a developmental elite that has

intellectual and moral developmental advantages, which result from their superior endowments of
impartiality and emotional intensity, that most individuals do not have, and these are explored in
the next chapter of this thesis.
For Mill, the societal majority, which not surprisingly consists of persons whose
intellectual experiences and political interests are different from his own, are not capable of much
social utility. So, persons who lack the capacity to serve social utility are most wise when they
simply let the gifted few set the public policies. He writes:
No government by a democracy or a numerous aristocracy, either in its political acts or in the
opinions, qualities, and tone o f mind which it fosters, ever did or could rise above mediocrity,
except in so far as the sovereign Many have let themselves be guided (which in their best times
they always have done) by the counsels and influence o f a more highly gifted and instructed One
or Few. The initiation o f all wise or noble things comes and must come from individuals;
generally at first from some one individual. The honour and glory o f the average man is that he is
capable o ffollowing that initiative; that he can respond internally to wise and noble things, and be
led to them with his eyes open. (CW, 18, Ch. 3, ^13, emphasis added)

An implication of such views is that they could serve many self-fulfilling prophecies, as the next
chapter's third section, "The Elitist Assignment of Social Utility," discusses.
If one reads the passages, which the first part of this section provided, and in which Mill
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discusses the social consequences of the exercise of individual characteristics that cause
individual development, it is evident that he emphasizes the superior developmental
characteristics o f persons of genius. From this emphasis, one can quite easily get the impression
that Mill's basic argument that society should assign greater social power to persons of genius
rests on the claim that they have more developmental power. Mill supports the argument that the
intellectual elite should be the political elite in at least two structurally problematic ways. In the
first way, he seems to argue in a circle. Society's intellectual superiors have more individual
developmental power, which is also a form of positive political power, because individual
developmental power contributes to social developmental power and thereby to the common
good.

So, intellectuals deserve greater political power to maximize the common good.

Additionally, individuals who can have more individuality, i.e., individuals who have greater
developmental power which is a form of political power, can counteract the political power of
persons who lack strong individuality. This capacity that Mill considers protective applies more
when the developmentally and thus politically powerful are granted greater political power, for
example, when society encourages them to express their greater individuality.
The second way that Mill supports the argument that society should grant the
developmental elite greater political power suffers at the very least from inconsistent premises.
For Mill, geniuses possess greater individual developmental power, but not greater political
power. Mill states: "In sober truth, whatever homage may be professed, or even paid, to real or
supposed mental superiority, the general tendency of things throughout the world is to render
mediocrity the ascendant power among mankind" (CW, 18, Ch. 3, ^13, emphasis added). Mill
claims that power tends to be possessed by persons of mediocrity. He continues: "The only
power deserving the name is that of masses, and of governments while they make themselves the
organ of the tendencies and instincts of masses" (CW, 18, Ch. 3, HI3). Popular opinion was to
become the most powerful agency in his time. Mill writes:
in bringing about a general similarity among mankind, is the complete establishment, in this and
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other free countries, o f the ascendancy o f public opinion in the State. As the various social
eminences which enabled persons entrenched on them to disregard the opinion o f the multitude,
gradually become levelled; as the very idea o f resisting the will o f the public, when it is positively
known that they have a will, disappears more and more from the minds o f practical politicians;
there ceases to be any social support for non-conformity—any substantive power in society, which,
itself opposed to the ascendancy o f numbers, is interested in taking under its protection opinions
and tendencies at variance with those o f the public. (CW, 18, Ch. 3, ][12, emphasis added)

While he does not fully acknowledge that the ascendance of the multitude of persons
itself results from increases in liberty and thus social progress, Mill speaks o f the ascendance as
an ongoing change that is counterproductive to social progress. Thus, society should counteract
the ascendance, in his view. He stresses that his complaint is not with the fact that mediocrity
controls itself, but rather with the fact that "the government of mediocrity" is "mediocre
government" (CW, 18, Ch. 3,T|13).
Mill suggests that the more that the masses of mediocrity gain control over society, the
greater becomes the extent to which individuality can benefit society. He writes:
when the opinions o f masses o f merely average men are everywhere . . . becoming the dominant
power, the counterpoise and corrective to that tendency would be the more and more pronounced
individuality o f those who stand on the higher eminences o f thought. It is in these circumstances
most especially, that exceptional individuals, instead o f being deterred, should be encouraged in
acting differently from the mass. (CW, 18, Ch. 13,1(13, emphasis added)

In the above way, Mill asserts that to counteract the excessive power of mediocrity over society,
people should encourage the individuality of intellectuals and persons of genius. Simply stated,
the greater the excess of mediocre power, the greater the need to encourage the expression of the
individuality of the exceptional members of society.15
However, it is difficult to be convinced by Mill's explicit claim that intellectuals do not
constitute a powerful elite, for he clearly characterizes them as having greater developmental
power with all the capacity to socially influence the direction of progress that it entails. Thus, he
recognizes developmental power as a form of political power. Yet, he ignores this recognition
when it is strategically advantageous for him to do so, in particular, when taking this into account

Mediocre persons are unaware o f the worth o f individuality, whether it is their own or that o f
others. So, they are unlikely to encourage the individuality o f intellectuals. Thus, it is up to intellectuals to
encourage their own individuality.
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may not help to persuade society that its intellectual superiors should also be its political
superiors.
Mill implicitly admits that the developmental power of persons of genius and intellectuals
permits them positive political power with which to direct social progress. This includes the
exercise of influence over the content of progress; for example, the developmental elite originate
and diversify cultural practices, and have influence over what cultures remain available. Indeed,
one reason that Mill gives for his observation that originality has utility is that originality makes
possible social diversity, for original persons can invent new cultural practices by means of life
experiments. Originality is a causal factor of the live, "social experiments" which prevent the
degeneration of social life into only a state in which persons act out traditions, and which keep
civilization alive. This experimental service, however, according to Mill, can be rendered only by
a few individuals to whom I refer as the developmental elite; in the third chapter of this thesis, I
will show that Mill suggests that intellectuals merit this designation, but I will argue that to give
this designation to any one is unfair because society lacks reliable means to identify the persons
who merit this designation. Mill writes:
It is true that this benefit is not capable o f being rendered by everybody alike: there are but few
persons, in comparison with the whole o f mankind, whose experiments, if adopted by others,
would be likely to be any improvement on established practice. But these few are the salt o f the
earth; without them, human life would become but a stagnant pool. Not only is it they who
introduce good things which did not before exist; it is they who keep the life in those which
already existed. If there were nothing new to be done, would human intellect cease to be
necessary? Would it be a reason why those who do the old things should forget why they are
done, and do them like cattle, not like human beings? There is only too great a tendency in the
best beliefs and practices to degenerate into the mechanical; and unless there were a succession o f
persons whose ever-recurring originality prevents the grounds o f those beliefs and practices from
becoming merely traditional, such dead matter would not resist the smallest shock from anything
really alive, and there would be no reason why civilization should not die out. (CW, 18, Ch. 3,
T[11, emphasis added)

In the above, Mill associates persons who supposedly cannot creatively and beneficially affect
society with death, whereas he associates with life only the few who are the successful
participants in their original experiments of life. Whereas the masses tend to conform to the
existent cultural practices and add to social stagnation, the developmental elite are most likely to
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reject certain practices and replace them with improved practices.
Mill's argument that society should grant exceptional intellectuals greater political power
is based on some unproven and elitist assumptions.

He assumes that the small number of

individuals who are most capable of individuality serves a greater diversity function than the
masses which he views as an increasingly homogeneous body. Thus, the masses "of merely
average men" (CW, 18, Ch. 3, TJ13) are, by definition, "mediocre" and the main sources of
developmental interference and diversity endangerment. "No government by a democracy or a
numerous aristocracy.. .ever did or could rise above mediocrity," holds Mill (CW, 18, Ch. 3, ^|13).
He does not expect that the self-education of the masses can reverse their mediocre and
developmentally dangerous condition. Instead, he implies that the masses' epistemic capacities
are so limited that they cannot obtain adequate self-knowledge because they cannot benefit from
the social knowledge upon which self-knowledge largely depends, as I will show in this chapter's
section, "Diversity and Developmental Power."

I will further argue that the majority of

individuals would not be able to meaningfully benefit from the knowledge that the developmental
elite acquire, in the fourth chapter's response to Mill's argument that free speech facilitates the
synthesis of truth. Also, in the fourth chapter, I will show the inconsistencies present in the
endanger and protect associations, and the life and death associations that Mill makes in his
discussion of the rationality of free speech, and in his claims that both truth and falsehood can add
to the societal capacity to acquire truth.
As we have seen, M ill’s claim that persons of genius have less political power than others
conflicts with his claim that persons of genius have more developmental power than others.
Additionally, Mill's claim that the masses of persons whom he considers mediocre do not have
more developmental power than persons of genius conflicts with his claim that the "mediocre"
masses are more politically powerful than persons of genius. Political power can enhance the
capacity of an individual to develop her abilities, regardless of what those abilities may be. No
where does Mill claim that the masses of persons have fewer abilities than the developmental
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elite, although he rules out certain abilities for them.
Mill assumes that the masses lack the individual developmentally powerful abilities
which are also the socially progressive abilities.
developmentally

powerful

individuals

have

more

It is plausible that Mill thinks that
positive

political

power,

i.e.

the

disproportionately low level of political power exercised in society. Yet, they do not have more
negative political power, i.e. the disproportionately higher level of political power exercised in
society. This explanation is consistent with this chapter's interpretive hypotheses on the empirical
relationships which Mill assumes exist among intellectuals, the mediocre masses, power, and
progress.
Mill's argument that society should allow the developmentally powerful to lead is weak.
For, the validity of the argument depends on the empirical claims that he makes about inherent
individual developmental capacities, but he cannot substantiate those claims. Mill implies that
social progress already belongs to the developmentally powerful, and that their leadership would
maximize their own utility. He also implies that social permission for the developmental elite to
formally rule society would contribute little to the utility of others. For Mill says the rule of the
developmental elite would lack direct, beneficial consequences for most members of society. As
I will explain in the discussion of experiments of life, most persons would not benefit from social
comparison enough to obtain adequate knowledge of self and others and the knowledge they
could obtain would mainly be knowledge originally acquired by the developmental elite. Hence,
the argument for the rule of the developmental elite is inadequately utilitarian.

iv) Argument that the Free Expression of Individuality Adds to Progress
Here, I will show that Mill posits that self-development by means of free individual
expression adds to epistemic and cultural progress. Self-development favourably contributes to
the acquisition of not only self-knowledge but also social knowledge. As well, self-development
provides an individual culture that is more compatible with the satisfaction of the idiosyncratic,
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Thus, self-development

favourably contributes to individuals' happiness and thereby to social happiness.
Mill proposes that free individual expression is crucial for self-development through
experiments of life.

Consider the passage below which clearly suggests the proposed

experimentation and its aims. The proposition for developmental experimentation regards (1)
diversity of opinions, (2) diversity of modes of life which are experiments o f life whose worth
must be practically proven, and (3) the free expression of individuality.

For Mill, these

conditions are necessary for progress so long as humankind remains imperfect. The former two
states are the expression of the factor of individuality which is the most influential factor in
individual and social progress. Mill writes:
As it is useful that while mankind are imperfect there should be different opinions, so is it that
there should be different experiments o f living; that free scope should be given to varieties o f
character, short o f injury to others; and that the worth o f different modes o f life should be proved
practically, when any one thinks fit to try them. It is desirable, in short, that in things which do
not primarily concern others, individuality should assert itself Where, not the person's own
character, but the traditions or customs o f other people are the rale o f conduct, there is wanting
one o f the principal ingredients o f human happiness, and quite the chief ingredient o f individual
and social progress. (CW, 18, Ch. 3, Tfl, emphasis added)

Similarly, there are passages in which Mill claims that humankind must accept freedom of
individual expression, opinions, and modes of conduct to optimize its intellectual advancement.
For this end, Mill optimistically views the long-term importance of diversity of opinions. After
he argues for free expression from the acquisition of truth and from the sustenance of the life of
truth, Mill introduces his argument that free expression of opinions is necessary for the synthesis
of truth,16 in this way:
It still remains to speak o f one o f the principal causes which make diversity o f opinion
advantageous, and will continue to do so until mankind shall have entered a stage o f intellectual
advancement which at present seems at an incalculable distance. (CW, 18, Ch. 2, f33, emphasis
added)

For Mill, diversity of opinions is a necessary condition for the synthesis of truth. Mill expects

In the fourth chapter o f this thesis, I will discuss Mill's argument that free expression is necessary
for the synthesis o f truth.
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that in the distant future the partial truths17 would be combined into the whole truth.
Because of the importance of individuality's expression through various modes of life for
the purpose of individual development, Mill criticizes the excessive social restrictions imposed
upon the expression o f different modes of life. He writes:
In our times, from the highest class o f society down to the lowest, every one lives under the eye o f
a hostile and dreaded censorship. Not only in what concerns others, but in what concerns only
themselves, the individual or family do not ask themselves—what do I prefer? or, what would suit
my character and disposition? or, what would allow the best and highest in me to have fair play
and to enable it to grow and thrive. (CW, 18, Ch. 3, ^6)

The above passage claims that social restrictions of the modes o f life and modes of conduct
restrain the human capacity for growth, for the restrictions do not permit persons the opportunity
to consider what would be best for their individual development.
With emphasis on the social utility of free expression, Mill argues that free expression is
a necessary condition for individual development. Through the promotion of diversity, not only
of diverse opinions but also of diverse modes of conduct, free expression facilitates individual
development, and, in turn, social progress. For example, Mill writes: "To give any fair play to
the nature of each, it is essential that different persons should be allowed to lead different lives.
In proportion as this latitude has been exercised in any age, has that age been noteworthy to
posterity" (CW, 18, Ch. 3, ^[9). Therefore, Mill views freedom as anecessary condition for the
"fair play" (CW, 18, Ch. 3, ^9) of the development of each.
For Mill, the freedom and diversity requirements for individual development are
secondary to the more utilitarian requirement that human society should advance. He thinks that
individual development is the main factor in social progress, and focusesonsuch development as
the central factor in the progress of human society.

Throughout this thesis, I will use the term "partial truth" to refer to either propositions whose
degree o f accuracy is not complete, i.e. propositions that in one or multiple ways are partly true and partly
false or to systems o f belief that are based on both true and false propositions.
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TIT. Diversity and Developmental Power
This section draws from On Liberty (1859) to explore Mill's claims that social diversity is
a necessary condition for individual development, and the expansion of developmental power.
Particularly, Mill recognizes the development enhancement functions o f diversity including
diversity of opinion, education, modes of life, and of experiments of life. I will discuss diversity's
development enhancement function in the first, third, and fourth parts o f this section.
This section's second part, entitled "The Rise of Negative Political Power and the Descent
of Developmental Power," finds support for this chapter's four interpretive hypotheses. These
hypotheses can be listed simply: (1) the more one is capable of individuality, the more one is
developmentally powerful; (2) the more one is developmentally powerful, the less one can
exercise negative political power; (3) the more one is developmentally powerful, the more likely
one commits actions that have progressive social consequences; and (4) the less one is
developmentally powerful, the more likely one commits actions that result in mere social change
or even regressive social change, if any social change at all.
Mill assumes that the developmental problem of the masses of persons whom he excludes
from the category o f developed individuals begins with their relatively lower levels of
developmental power. And, he treats the masses of persons as problem people that interfere with
the development of persons of genius. Mill characterizes the masses o f persons with the greater
likelihood to promote, and choose, actions that result in mere social change, if any change at all.
In response to Mill's claims on the empirical relationships among the individual
capacities for freedom, power, and social progress, this section challenges the validity of Mill's
claims on the empirical relationships between intellectuals and the masses, and the level of power
and freedom which Mill assumes they have. The third part of this section, entitled "The Rise of
Negative Political Power and the Descent of Developmental Power," shows the high
questionability of Mill's following claims.

He claims that the masses have lower levels of

developmental and positive power, and higher levels o f negative power, that they have less
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diversity than intellectuals, and, hence, are unlikely to tolerate diversity, and thus that they hinder
free individual expression.

i) Argument that Diversity Renders Benefits to Individual Development
Mill argues that society should tolerate diversity because o f the social benefits that
diversity renders to the capacity for individual development. For one, Mill argues for diverse
modes of life and modes of conduct, for such are necessary for human growth. He compares
persons to plants, and holds that since persons have various inherent natures as the plants do,
persons correspondingly, i.e. on the basis of their inherent potentials, also have various
developmental needs for growth (CW, 18, Ch. 3 ,1J14). Mill continues:
The same things which are helps to one person towards the cultivation o f his higher nature are
hindrances to another. The same mode o f life is a healthy excitement to one, keeping all his
faculties o f action and enjoyment in their best order, while to another it is a distracting burthen,
which suspends or crushes all internal life. Such are the differences among human beings in their
sources o f pleasure, their susceptibilities o f pain, and the operation on them o f different physical
and moral agencies, that unless there is a corresponding diversity in their modes o f life, they
neither obtain their fa ir share o f happiness, nor grow up to the mental, moral, and aesthetic
stature o f which their nature is capable. (CW, 18, Ch. 3, ^14, emphasis added)

As the above passage suggests, Mill's human growth argument for diversity of modes of life can
be briefly stated: Because persons are psycho-biologically and socially different from each other,
they must follow their own life paths, if they are to obtain their optimal developmental outcomes,
and happiness.
Mill refers to Wilhelm von Humboldt's thought that originality contributes to the power
and development of the individual, for originality gives incentive to (1) the free expression of
individuality and permits (2) the availability of various situations. Citing von Humboldt, Mill
writes:
the object 'towards which every human being must ceaselessly direct his efforts, and on which
especially those who design to influence their fellow-men must ever keep their eyes, is the
individuality o f pow er and development,' that for this there are two requisites, freedom, and
variety o f situations-,' and that from the union o f these arise 'individual vigour and manifold
diversity,' which combine themselves in 'originality.' (CW, 18, Ch. 3, \2 , emphasis added)

The above suggests that the alteration of the degree to which the two necessary conditions are
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present affects the strength of the individual developmental power which is possible under the
circumstances.

Mill recognizes that social circumstances can reduce the possible degree of

individual developmental power.

He comments that the second necessary condition for

individual development, i.e., variety of situations is, unfortunately, "everyday diminishing" in
England (CW, 18, Ch. 3, HI8).
Precisely because it denies a sufficient range of life mode options, Mill objects to the
public's selective toleration of solely those preferences which are within the socially accepted
range. Mill criticizes the discrepancy between the recognition that there are various preferences
across human beings and the social rejection of the diverse expression of those preferences.
Specifically, he criticizes the way that persons are deprecated for "doing 'what nobody d o es'" or
for "not doing 'what everybody does'" (CW, 18, Ch. 3, fl4 ).

ii) Diversity of Opinions and Diversity of Modes of Life
Here, I will show that Mill expects that diversity of opinions will diminish in time,
because of epistemic progress. But he is concerned that diversity of opinions will prematurely
diminish because of the ascendance of the masses. Mill believes that diversity of opinion and
diversity of modes of life diminish due to the ascendance of public opinion and what he considers
“mediocre culture,” as I will discuss in the next part of this chapter. Mill emphasizes the social
utility of the free expression of diverse opinions and diverse modes of conduct, one for epistemic
advancement, and the other for individual and social improvement.
Mill thinks that the "gradual narrowing of the bounds of diversity o f opinion is necessary
in both senses of the term, being at once inevitable and indispensable" (CW, 18, Ch. 2, Hf31). He
takes such narrowing as a sign of society's approach toward the truth. He claims that although the
loss of diversity would be a significant drawback, that loss would not put a complete stop to our
ability to sustain the life of truth. He writes:
The loss o f so important an aid to the intelligent and living apprehension o f a truth, as is afforded
by the necessity o f explaining it to, or defending it against, opponents, though not sufficient to
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outweigh, is no trifling drawback from, the benefit o f its universal recognition. (CW, 18, Ch. 2,
131)

After actual diversity of opinion ceases, Mill suggests, we should substitute for actual diversity of
opinion the attitude of acting-as-if persons remain who have not yet converted to the truth. He
writes:
Where this advantage can no longer be had, I confess I should like to see the teachers o f mankind
endeavouring to provide a substitute for it; some contrivance for making the difficulties o f the
question as present to the learner's consciousness, as if they were pressed upon him by a
dissentient champion, eager for his conversion. (CW, 18, Ch. 2 ,1f31)

Thus, Mill suggests that when society obtains the desired truth society should act as if it has not
yet obtained it in order to sustain that outcome.
However, Mill does not expect that diverse self-knowledge will diminish in time.
Since diverse modes of life facilitate the acquisition of self-knowledge, which, in turn, adds to
individual happiness, it is reasonable to assume that Mill would agree diverse modes of life likely
will remain after humankind obtains complete knowledge of the social and physical world. The
thesis of On Liberty is that each person has "a unique range of potentialities, expressible in a
relatively small range of possible lives," and "the actualization o f these potentialities is
indispensable" for any person's "greatest well-being," according to Gray (1991, p. 200). Social
toleration of diverse modes of life is necessary so that persons may learn about their individual
inborn tendencies through a process of self-experimentation. Since individuals vary in their
inborn tendencies, they have various requirements to achieve happiness. Through the exploration
of their own nature, they may identify those requirements. "Mill denies that any one can achieve
happiness or the good life, unless he has his own conception of happiness; and the diversity of
legitimate conceptions of happiness is grounded in the plurality of individual natures," writes
Gray (1991, p. 203). Thus, evidently, for Mill, the various tendencies in psychological human
nature make it impossible for one conception of happiness and the way to attain the "best" mode
of life to apply to everybody. For the aim to optimize individual development, Mill calls upon
people to tolerate the social diversity that such development requires, and he is concerned that
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social diversity's premature diminishment has negative implications for the capacity of
individuals to develop themselves. Mill characterizes the masses as lacking social diversity so
much that they cannot help but be intolerant about social diversity, as I will discuss next.

iii) The Rise of Negative Political Power and the Descent of Developmental Power
Mill claims that public opinion adds to the negative political power o f society through the
ascendance of the masses, and that by means of mentally coercive public opinion the masses
cause developmental and cultural degradation, promote social conformity, and regressive social
change. Mill opposes the ascendance of the masses, because he positively correlates losses in the
cultural capacity to meet the developmental needs of society with the ascendance of the masses.
His fears about the harms that the ascendance of the masses can cause stem from his assumption
that the masses are less culturally diverse than intellectuals; I will challenge that assumption.
Lastly, I will challenge the claim that the ascendance of the masses endangers individual and
thereby social development power, and likely adds more to either social change without
improvement or regressive social change than to progress.
Specifically, Mill claims that the ascendance of the masses contributes to cultural
assimilation. He writes:
The circumstances which surround different classes and individuals, and shape their characters,
are daily becoming more assimilated. Formerly, different ranks, different neighbourhoods,
different trades and professions, lived in what might be called different worlds; at present, to a
great degree in the same. Comparatively speaking, they now [read,] listen [to, and] see the same
things, go to the same places, have their hopes and fears directed to the same objects, have the
same rights and liberties, and the same means o f asserting them. Great as are the differences o f
position which remain, they are nothing to those which have ceased. And the assimilation is still
proceeding. All the political changes o f the age promote it, since they tend to raise the low and to
lower the high. (CW, 18, Ch. 3,1(18, emphasis added)

In this way, Mill claims that increases in the social mobility open to persons from the various
classes accompanies that the persons increasingly share common influences that shape their
behaviour. Society used to subject the members of the same class to similar influences, and there
were more class-based cultural differences among persons. Now it is all persons, regardless of
class, who share common influences in the determination of their conduct. Therefore, as class
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differences diminish so do the class-based cultural differences.
In the above passage, Mill believes that the process that diminishes class-based cultural
differences, e.g. differences in rank and position, places persons who formerly lived in separate
worlds into the same one. Mill would rather all existent cultural differences remain, and this
includes the class-based cultural differences, and he would rather various persons be kept in
"different worlds" (CW, 18, Ch. 3, ^18). The price to raise the low is to lower the high, and that
price is too high for it to be worth raising the low. Thus, Mill does not object to the raising of the
low itself, but to the lowering of the high as a means to raise the low. Instead, he aspires for the
raising of high culture as a means to raise the lower. He causally attributes to the ascendance of
the masses the lowering of the high. Mill positively correlates heightened individual culture with
the elevation of the low that does not negatively affect high culture. In his view, the ascendance
of the high has more utility than the ascendance of the masses. Therefore, Mill prefers a cultural
solution, i.e. cultural conditions that permit the free development of the individual's culture,18 for
a social structural problem, i.e. economic and political inequality.
Mill believes that the political ascendance of mediocre culture has adverse effects, for the
ascendance reduces cultural diversity and originality, and thereby hinders social progress in the
following ways.

He does not consider the personal and social benefits of the advancement

towards political equality, which result from the ascendance, and which, in turn, adds to social
progress. He believes that public formal educational systems can facilitate cultural assimilation
since "education brings people under common influences, and gives them access to the general
stock of facts and sentiments" (CW, 18, Ch. 3, ^|18). He does not acknowledge that public
educational systems can allow persons to share the cultural literacy necessary in order to stand a
chance at levelling the political playing field in economic and social life, and thus have the
potential to contribute to social progress.

18
See Verburg (2006) for a discussion on Mill's position on the primacy o f individual moral
development for the treatment o f poverty.
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When he claims that the ascendance of the masses interferes with cultural progress, Mill
does not acknowledge any benefit from improvement in the means of communication such as
educational opportunities. Rather, he complains that communicational improvement promotes
cultural assimilation because the improvement brings "the inhabitants of distant places into
personal contact, and [keeps] a rapid flow of changes of residence between one place and
another" (CW, 18, Ch. 3,1(18).
Mill additionally complains that the ascendance of mediocre culture inculcates overly
selfish values, e.g. self-indulgence without regard for others, in his discussion that "the increase
of commerce and manufactures" (CW, 18, Ch. 3, f l 8 ) promotes cultural assimilation. This
increase diffuses "more widely the advantages of easy circumstances, and [opens] all objects of
ambition, even the highest, to general competition, whereby the desire o f rising becomes no
longer the character o f a particular class, but of all classes" (CW, 18, Ch. 3 ,1[18). In that context,
Mill complains about the values that, he thinks, cultural assimilation brings the masses. He
prefers that the masses not seek the privileges that have, in past times, belonged to the higher
classes but are now more accessible to all than to aspire for the same conveniences, luxuries, and
prestige that greater economic wealth may bring. Particularly, Mill opposes the aspiration of the
masses to improve the economic and social terms of their lifestyle because this aspiration
conflicts with the interests of others to maintain their lifestyles; he does not consider that the
lifestyles that the masses could undermine may be over-privileged so that this conflict may not be
an adequately reasonable concern.

Mill focuses so much on whatever may undermine the

individual development o f a virtuous, unselfish, character, that he does not give nearly as much
weight to the favourable progressive significance of the social conditions.
Mill thinks that the redistribution of power is made at the expense of, as mentioned
earlier, the reduced extent to which individual developmental power is possible under
circumstances that diminish cultural diversity. He spends much time in complaint about the
adverse effects that the ascendance of the masses presumably have upon the degree of actualized
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individuality and diversity present in society. In particular, he believes the ascendance interferes
with the social experimentation, i.e. the live tests of the utility of various opinions and ways of
life, and the practical way to produce the good society. Mill does not recognize the social utility
in their ascendance, i.e. that their ascendance contributes not only to their personal progress, but,
in noteworthy ways, also directly contributes to social progress.
It is important to carefully explore the consequences o f the redistribution of power which
is involved in the ascendance of the masses, not only the potentially negative consequences. The
power redistribution, which is involved with the ascendance, facilitates the expression of the
masses in ways which are, in fact, developmentally beneficial for them. Mill does not take into
account that the power that the ascendance brings the masses is not only the negative sort of
power - power over others. There is also positive power - power to do something for oneself or to
do something with others, which includes individual developmental power and can add to (though
also interfere with) the developmental power of others as well. Another aspect o f the ascendance
is the redistribution of both negative freedom, i.e., freedom from being overpowered by others,
and positive freedom, i.e., freedom to exercise positive political power and developmental power.
Thus, individual developmental power is not being undermined as much as Mill claims, and
neither is freedom. The threat of the ascendance of the masses is not nearly as great as Mill
claims. Rather, the developmental power which gains expression is likely to be different from
that which was previously more dominantly expressed. The developmental power that gains
expression is that of persons whose preferences have previously more likely fallen outside of the
socially accepted range which the developmental needs of those in positions of power has shaped.
The gained power is that of persons who those above them likely punished for their deviations
from the social norms with political and economic exclusion. Thus, the ascendance actually gives
the chance to develop their selves more freely to persons whose development or growth of
individual developmental power other persons in positions of power undermined.
Power is not evenly distributed among the masses, and the power differentials among
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them add to their diversity, but that does not mean that with fewer power differentials among
them, they will be meaningfully less diverse. It is very telling that Mill assumes that the societal
majority of persons are less diverse than an intellectual minority of individuals, when it is more
reasonable to expect that the larger group has more diversity than the smaller group.

Mill

characterizes the masses of persons as less capable of individuality than the developmental elite,
and, since diversity benefits from high levels of individuality, that characterization makes the
masses by definition less diverse. The undeniable fact, however, is that the "mediocre masses,"
not only intellectuals, have always had diverse life styles and circumstances and thus various
political interests. The fact that the masses of persons are culturally diverse makes Mill's claim
that the masses constitute social forces against cultural diversity questionable. As well, his claim
that the "mediocre masses" are less capable of individuality is unacceptable because o f its
negative political implications and unreliable means of justification.

Persons who have not

realized socially recognizable levels of individuality are neither necessarily unrealized due to, nor
likely to remain unrealized due to, a psycho-biologically inferior capacity for individuality.
Rather, social deprivation of developmental opportunities, such as opportunities for education,
tends to undermine the capacity for self-development. Also, the lower levels of self-development
may falsely appear to exist because society does not recognize the developmental achievements
of persons whose life-styles are based on priorities that deviate from the norm. Mill recognizes
that developmental opportunities are necessary for human growth. Unfortunately, his emphasis
on the need to give such opportunities to intellectuals obstructs his outlook on the masses, and he
misunderstands why the majority of persons are mediocre; the third section in the third chapter
will explain this misunderstanding further. Next I will explain how Mill expects that social
diversity by permitting experiments of life facilitates the acquisition of knowledge of self and
others which is necessary for individual development.
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iv) Diversity of Education and Diversity of Experiments
Mill connects freedom of individual expression, diversity, and education to experiments
of life. Mill speaks of experiments, such as in his discussion that rare originality facilitates the
effectuality of "experiments" (CW, 18, Ch. 3, HI 1), as discussed earlier in this chapter. And, Mill
speaks of diversity of education as itself being one of the "competing experiments" (CW, 18, Ch.
5 ,1J13). According to Mill, the experiments of life that he encourages are important aids to attain
self-knowledge (Gray, 1991, p. 200) to inform one's self-development.
For Mill, diversity of experiments of life contributes to the satisfaction of diverse
developmental needs through diversity of self-education and the consequent self-knowledge.
Likewise, Mill advises that society should treat public education as one among many "competing
experiments" (CW, 18, Ch. 5, 1J13) which contribute to social education, and the consequent
social knowledge. For opinions and modes of life to be diverse, education needs to be diverse.
Diverse modes of education advance the self-knowledge and social knowledge which the
attainment of societal happiness requires.
Although Mill is ambivalent about the social utility of formal, public systems of
education, because they can conform minds to one another, Mill thinks that public education can
be a part of social experimentation. Formal education can serve as an aid to epistemic and social
progress by being itself an experiment, an instance of diversity o f education, which, when taken
together with the other modes of education, promotes diversity of opinions and conduct.19 Mill
suggests further that public educational systems could counteract the movement towards
mediocre culture and public opinion. For, formal, public education can exemplify and promote a
certain high standard of human developmental achievement. Thus, Mill aspires for diversity of
thought and conduct, for diversity of education, and even for diversity o f what he considers life
19
Mill writes: "All that has been said o f the importance o f individuality o f character, and diversity
o f opinions and modes o f conduct, involves, as o f the same unspeakable importance, diversity o f
education" (CW, 18, Ch. 5, 1)13). He continues: "An education established and controlled by the State
should only exist, if it exist at all, as one among many competing experiments, carried on for the purpose o f
example and stimulus, to keep the others up to a certain standard o f excellence" (CW, 18, Ch. 5,1(13).
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experiments.

1) The Roles of Social Comparison and Competitive Free Play in SelfEducation and Experiments of Life
Mill claims that social comparison and competition have instrumental significance for
self-education by means of experiments of life. Yet, it is questionable whether experiments of
life could help all or most individuals to obtain knowledge of self and others, and to advance their
capacity for individual expression. For instance, Gray (1991) comments:
Mill moves bewilderingly between the perspective o f the practical agent and that o f the detached
observer. On some views o f practical knowledge, it might seem that an experiment o f living could
yield knowledge only to the committed partisan, the agent actively involved in its undertakings.
On other views, just the opposite would be true. (p. 202)

In the question of who benefits most from practical knowledge, if any one, as a result of engaging
in experiments o f life, it matters whether one tries to learn only from one's experiments or also
from those of others. Experimenters can benefit from the social interaction of their experiments
of life through social comparison and competitive free play. Individuals can observe the results,
not only of their own experiments but also of the experiments o f others. Thus, individuals can
learn about themselves in relation to others.
In his criticism that the British do not value individuality and do not recognize that free
individuality facilitates the capacity for individual development, Mill connects social comparison
to individual development. He writes:
It is individuality that [they] war against: [they] should think [they] had done wonders if [they]
had made [themselves] all alike; forgetting that the unlikeness o f one person to another is
generally the first thing which draws the attention o f either to the imperfection o f his own type,
and the superiority o f another, or the possibility, by combining the advantages o f both, o f
producing something better than either. (CW, 18, Ch. 3, ^[17, emphasis added)

Mill recognizes the constructive significance of individuality when combined with social
comparison, especially, as is evident in the above passage, to what today is termed 'upward social
comparison,'20 for individual development. That is to say, when persons are different from each
other, they can compare themselves to one another in areas in which the referent person is more
20
Persons use upward social comparison as a strategy to enhance their capacity to develop their
skills (Aronson et al., 2004, p. 169).
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skilled. Such comparisons can show persons their relative weaknesses, and thus, guide their
efforts for personal growth. Persons need to obtain estimates of their abilities relative to the
abilities of others, and exercise their abilities in order to improve them.

It can be added,

individuals can serve as teachers by giving others the opportunity, even through downward social
comparison,21 to learn from the mistakes of others without having to repeat them.
For Mill, it is important that every person strives to increase her "comparative worth as a
human being" (CW, 18, Ch. 3, f4). A person can do so through the employment of all of her
faculties in the appropriate situations in which each of those faculties is useful.
In Mill's view, experiments of life are also important in the determination of comparative
personal worth and in the attainment of self-knowledge. The free play of individual natures has
beneficial social consequences. Mill views individual natures as if they are in a constructive
competition over the utility of their original products and the individualities that they bring forth
in relation to their ability to contribute to social progress.
Mill's work in the third chapter of On Liberty suggests that he views social life as a
process in which individuals learn about what is good, just and truthful by means of
experimentation, trial and error, social comparison, and competition. I will provide answers to
the questions that follow. What does Mill mean by the term 'experiments'? And how does he
connect trial and error, social comparison and competition to these experiments? How reasonable
is his claim that experiments of life are developmentally beneficial, because they are
epistemically beneficial? I will argue that Mill suggests two kinds of experiments, and that
neither is likely to prove much common developmental and epistemically beneficial
consequences for society. The first kind of experiment of life can be called a meta-experiment of
life; by "meta-experiment" what I mean to say is that it is an experiment within an experiment; it
belongs at the individual level and is a subcomponent of the second kind o f experiment which is a

21
Persons use downward social comparison as a strategy to identify their strong skills relative to the
skills o f others (Aronson et al, 2004, p. 168).
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social experiment of life.
I will argue also that the kinds of experiments of life which Mill proposes would likely
lead to politically biased knowledge about the self and others. I will provide an analysis of these
experiments which shows that these are unlikely to contribute to epistemic and cultural progress.
To begin with, it should be noted that Mill calls himself an experimentalist. He does so,
in part, to distinguish himself from other empiricists who, in his time, were not well-liked, thus to
give his position more credibility. Also, it could be that he makes this distinction because of the
experiments of life which he proposes. He argues that these experiments are useful for the
individual to obtain self-knowledge and knowledge of others. His work suggests that he thinks
that the historical stage is a setting of experimentation for the discovery of the psychological laws
of individual natures and for their perfection.
A charitable reading of his use of the term 'experiment' sees that Mill uses this term
loosely, that is, he proposes only informal experiments. I will discuss the kinds o f informal22
experiments which Mill proposes. Mill calls the modes of life "different experiments of living"
(CW, 18, Ch. 3,1(1). He does not treat these as if they can be understood independently from
each other. He means that there are multiple kinds of experiments. The experimental kinds all
require diversity, but vary in their social scale. In one kind of experiment, an individual tries
ways of life. Diversity is necessary for individuals to have multiple life style alternatives to try.
Each individual can try only one way of life at a time to search for the one which is the most
suitable for the actualization of her inherent potential. Mill thinks that human nature and inherent
22
The social experiment is informal for the following reasons. First, there is no overseeing
researcher in charge o f the social experiment. The experiment requires individuals to trial modes o f life.
These individuals are the only "researchers." Each individual is in charge o f her life style trials only. The
"researchers" are not organized for the purpose o f the social experiment. Most likely, they do not even see
the larger picture, and are unaware that their experiments o f living are within the social experiment of
living. They are meta-researchers in that the social experiment o f living depends on their individual
experiments o f living. There is no one keeping records o f the results o f the social experiment. The results
can be found in the outcomes o f individual lives. No one is keeping track o f all those outcomes and
comparing them. Individuals can be aware o f the results o f their own trials. The social experiment does
not yield a single set o f results but rather continuously updated results. It is a historically ongoing
experiment whose duration extends beyond each generation as various individuals test the ways o f life.
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potential vary across individuals, and thus the modes of life that could optimize their growth also
vary.
Another kind of experiment of life that Mill uses refers to a social experiment. Mill
recognizes that the epistemic and thus individual developmental practical value of the various
ways of life can be understood relationally. This recognition supports the social experiment
interpretation. The use of the phrase "competing experiments" (CW, 18, Ch. 5, ^[13) suggests a
social experiment. The various opinions and modes of conduct, and the various social programs,
of which he gives the example of public education, cannot properly compete only with
themselves. If they are to compete, it is with each other. Additionally, recall that Mill claims that
social comparison is beneficial for self-improvement (CW, 18, Ch. 3. 1J17). The experiment of
life depends on competition and social comparison; it depends on social interaction among
individuals who compare the results of their developmental trials or the fit between their
individual natures and the capacity of various modes of life to satisfy their developmental needs.
Thus, the experiment of life can be called not only an experiment for individual development but
also an experiment for educative socialization. The test at a larger social scale o f the various
ways of life provides more information about the practical value of each way of life. In the
experiment that occurs at a larger social scale, various individuals compare the outcomes of their
ways of life with those of others, and thus permit the various ways o f life to compete for being the
most practical way of life for certain individual natures.
That Mill argues for diversity and free expression of individuality, diverse opinions, and
actions for their epistemic instrumental significance supports the social experiment interpretation.
These are the necessary conditions for the implementation of the social experiment.

The

aforementioned necessary conditions for the implementation of the social experiment permit the
co-existence of multiple modes of life and the diversification of modes of life. As well, without
the satisfaction of the necessary conditions, social comparison and competition, the instruments
for the participants to apply in their social epistemological exploration would not be relevant.
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That is, no one would be able to compare one's mode of life with those of others. For, cultural
homogeneity would minimize the capacity for social comparison and competition. Thus, without
free individual expression and diversity, the social experiment would not be capable of epistemic
service. This social experiment is an irrelevant social epistemological method in a culturally
homogenous social context.
Next I will argue that political inequality in a culturally diverse context can interfere with
experimental output such that it erratically reflects the politically privileged cultural inputs more
than others and thus yields roughly culturally homogenous outputs. The fourth chapter's response
to Mill's argument that "unrestricted" speech helps to maximize the acquisition of truth will make
it further evident that experiments of life do not necessarily demote the cultural assimilation of
the truth; these can, indeed, facilitate cultural imperialism over the truth, which is inconsistent
with the aim of Mill's social project to maximize the societal capacity to synthesize the truth.

2) The Epistemic Limitations of Experiments of Life
Here, I argue that the informal social experiment is an irrelevant social epistemological
method in a politically unequal social context.

The proposed experiments of life can be

understood, and the social experiment interpretation can be explained, in today's terms. The
epistemic value of the live, social experiment which Mill proposes can be most accurately
analyzed based on current knowledge about the likely consequences of judgements derived from
social comparison cognitive processes and on how to conduct social experiments.
The necessary condition of diversity is easy to satisfy, for it simply requires the presence
of multiple modes of life in the working context of the social experiment. Diversity can be
considered one of the main independent variables of the social experiment. The working context
of the social experiment has multiple experimental conditions. Each experimental condition tests
a separate mode of life. Each mode of life can be considered an independent variable.
The social experiment's examination of the ways of life treats them as competitors for
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The higher in social utility, the more the ways of life facilitate the

advancement of knowledge. The advancement of knowledge can be considered the secondary
dependent variable of the social experiment. Self-knowledge is instrumental for the attainment of
individual happiness and thus contributes to social happiness. The intensity and scope of social
happiness can be considered the social experiment's primary dependent variable.
One important problem of the social experiment is that its working context does not
satisfy the necessary condition of free individual expression. Mill views free opinion formation
and expression of opinions as socially unrestricted expression. This view of free expression is
incorrect, as I will argue in the fourth chapter. Here, I argue merely that the research instruments,
namely, social comparison and competition, are incompatible with the working context of the
social experiment. I base this argument on the following main reasons.
Social comparison is problematic when it occurs in a politically unequal context, because
in that working context social comparison can interfere with the arrival at accurate judgments.
The reasons for this interference is that one's social position influences one's judgment and
thereby the assessment of one's abilities and opinions in comparison to those of others (Festinger,
1954). Mill overestimates the extent to which members of various groups benefit from the
observed differences of others and can competitively yet constructively compare themselves with
others. He expects persons to acknowledge the good qualities that others have which are different
from their own, and even merge the diverse good qualities. Even a brief examination of social
comparison processes shows us that this is unlikely, as we will see next.
The following cognitive tendencies bias one's social comparative judgments (Festinger,
1954), and thus impair the capacity for impartial judgments. The dominant groups tend to have
the most influential power in social comparison processes. Persons tend to compare themselves
with others who are most like themselves and thus to open themselves to influence from those
who are most like themselves. Persons tend to conform more to the opinions of the perceived
socially important referent groups. For example, consider:
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When there is a range o f opinion or ability in a group, the relative strength o f the three
manifestations o f pressures toward uniformity will be different for those who are close to the
mode o f the group than for those who are distant from the mode. Specifically, those close to the
mode o f the group will have stronger tendencies to change the positions o f others, relatively
weaker tendencies to narrow the range o f comparison and much weaker tendencies to change their
own position compared to those who are distant from the mode o f the group. (Festinger, 1954, p.
134-135)

Thus, social comparison is likely to result at best only in the integration of the aspects of like
groups, and at worst in the assimilation of subdominant cultures into the main referent cultures.
Today's social research knowledge suggests three additional problems with the social
experiment which contribute to the incompatibility between social comparison and competition
among individuals on the one hand and the working context of life experimentation on the other.
First, nothing is done to prevent the experimental conditions from being non-equivalents. Second
and related, the extraneous or confounding variables, that is, the variables that interfere with the
accuracy o f the experimental results, are never considered as such. For instance, Mill does not
view political inequality in the working context of life experimentation as a factor that interferes
with an individual's capacity to obtain knowledge from personal experiences. But Mill expects
that, as the social experiment yields its results, the social experiment will remove factors, such as
political inequality. Third, the social experiment does not have a control condition; thus it is
reasonable to expect the accuracy of its knowledge results to be weak. I do not deny that some
knowledge is possible from informal social experimentation, but I deny the credibility of the
knowledge persons may claim they obtained from personal and socialization experiences alone
especially when reaching conclusions about how various individuals stand in comparison to each
other.
The purpose of the social experiment is to facilitate the development of competitive
experiments of life, that is, life styles which are practical for individual development. The social
experiment requires epistemic and cultural success for the practicality of the life-styles that it
initiates. The social experiment's epistemic success requires the satisfaction of the following
condition: the research instruments, namely social comparison and competition, must facilitate

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

-

57

-

every participant's ability to correctly identify the available lifestyle which is the most practical
for the maximization of her individual development. However, the research instruments cannot
facilitate such identification, because they are incompatible with the working context of the
experiment. For, political inequality is present in the experimental conditions. But, political
inequality interferes with the accuracy of judgments drawn through social comparison. Thus, it
also interferes with the identification of the most practical competitors. The research instruments
unlikely enhance the capacity of the participants to identify the most practical available life style
alternatives or invent ones which are more practical than the available ones.

So, the social

experiment's participants are unlikely to benefit epistemically from their experiments of life.
The social experiment's cultural success requires the satisfaction of the additional
following conditions. The working context of the social experiment must be such that every
participant is able to switch to the experimental condition in which her preferred lifestyle is the
independent variable. This ensures that the participants can refuse to practice the modes of life
which are impractical or less practical than the available life style alternatives for the
maximization of their individual development.
The following two events would demonstrate that the requirements for the social
experiment's epistemic and cultural success have been met. First, the experimental conditions
which have impractical independent variables suffer from participant attrition.

Both the

individual developmental needs and the lifestyle preferences o f the participants are thus in
agreement with the acceptance or removal of certain experimental conditions.

Second, the

original participants introduce new experimental conditions. The participants invent new lifestyle
alternatives which actually have more practical independent variables than the removed
conditions.

In a politically unequal context, these requirements for the social experiment's

success ensure its failure.
The social experiment suffers from the following two problems.

First, its research

instruments are incompatible with the working context. Mill overestimates the extent to which
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persons can developmentally and epistemically benefit from social comparison and cultural
competition in a politically unequal social context. The informal social experiment would lead to
politically biased knowledge about the self and others. The second problem from which the
social experiment suffers is that it does not do much to satisfy the requirements for its cultural
success; cultural progress is still possible under it, but it is likely to be elitist. Therefore, the
social experiment would likely yield results in favour of the cultural preferences of the politically
privileged; it would be an epistemically unreliable and politically confounded type of experiment.

IV. Conclusion
Mill envisions a society in which the individuality of the inherently strong elite carries
the unfortunate inherently weaker masses of persons who, even when they exercise their
individuality, cannot join the strong in the high standing of social worth. In M ill’s freedomutilitarian world, happiness is, in principle, accessible by all, but, as I have argued, it is not well
distributed in practice. Some individuals are able to benefit more from the intellectual pleasures,
which Mill considers the higher pleasures, whereas others are not for the following three main
reasons. First, some inherently have stronger capacities for feelings and impulses, according to
Mill, as the next chapter will further show. Second, as lack of use leads to the degradation of
persons' inherent potentials for human capacities, and thus there are persons who cannot
experience or appreciate the higher intellectual pleasures.

The third main reason for why

individuals vary in their capacity to experience and benefit from the higher intellectual pleasures
is related to the second aforementioned reason.

The best society can do is prevent the

degradation of persons; it can permit the individual to develop herself without censorship, and
with a variety of socialization opportunities. Mill suggests that neither can individuals favourably
alter the inherent nature of their developmental capacities, nor that society can do something to
reverse the condition after the degradation of their inherent capacities.
Admittedly, the likelihood that one's actions will have high social utility does not entirely
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The strength of the social aspects of

developmental power to a large extent depends on the consequences of the actions that involve
the required characteristics. Consider originality. If an individual's original achievement proves
to be of great practical worth and the achievement is thus socially beneficial, then the
achievement proves the social strength of her originality. In this way, the consequences of one's
actions influence the social value and strength of the developmental capacities which those
actions exercise.
However, Mill expects that only the originality of a few through their modes of life can
have practical worth proven by the effectuality of their experiments of life. Thus, only a few can
influence culture through effective participation in the production of the lifestyle alternatives.
Since the developmentally powerful are more likely to be original, their actions are more likely to
be effectually original.
Furthermore, Mill's politically elitist aversion to the ascendance of the masses leads Mill
to overlook the social utility of the masses' potential contribution to social progress. He speaks
about the ascendance of the masses with emphasis on its negative aspects as if it is simply a
matter of undesirable social change, and as if that ascendance involves no noteworthy social
progress. Mill claims that "the permanent source of improvement is liberty, since by it there are
as many possible independent centres of improvement as there are individuals" (CW, 18, Ch. 3,
1117). However, he speaks about the very masses being liberated as if they do not consist of
individuals, and as if they cannot contribute to improvement and are unlikely to benefit from it.
He does not recognize their liberation as such.

Instead, he takes the signs that the masses

experience gains in power, i.e. power which permits liberation, as simply signs of loss to the
societal capacity for freedom.
In contrast to how he treats the masses, Mill focuses on the social utility of intellectuals,
eccentrics, and persons of genius; in his view, they possess the characteristics which increase the
likelihood that one will add to social improvement. Mill does not consider that the masses may
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also have characteristics that can add to social improvement. He implies that the ascendance of
the masses does not serve any meaningful social utility.

He overstates the causal role of

individual development in the production of social progress, and understates the significance of
improved social conditions for social progress.
Additionally, Mill claims that the principle of social utility is not arbitrary and that,
therefore, it can be impartially used, for example, to resolve conflicts between other moral
principles (CW, 10, Ch. 5, 1(29). Yet, as I argued, Mill's considerations o f the social utility of
various cognitive attributes are problematically biased, namely elitist, and arbitrarily, overly
individualistic: the more he associates a thing with individuality, the more social utility and value,
whether intrinsic or extrinsic, that he assigns to it. He implies that individual spontaneity has
intrinsic worth, though his arguments for the worth of individuality suggest only its extrinsic
worth. He argues for individuality's worth because it facilitates human development, and, in turn,
it adds to social progress, and, ultimately, to happiness. He claims that all eccentricity, which
requires individuality, has at least extrinsic value. Of genius, he says that it is inherently capable
of greater individuality, and he assigns genius high effectual social worth.
Mill considers the instrumental value of diversity for individual development, and claims
that the ascendance of the masses of persons functions to endanger diversity. He claims that,
even in the absence of the ascendance of the masses, diversity of opinions diminishes as society
approaches truth. In contrast to this view of diverse opinions, he claims that there are multiple
inherent human potentials, and correspondingly various needs for human growth.

Thus, he

suggests, because of their developmental function, various modes of conduct should remain.
Finally, the developmental functions that Mill attributes to diversity through its role in
self-education and experiments of life are at best optimistic. As discussed in the final part of this
chapter on the limitations o f the experiments of life, these experiments are less likely to be
beneficial than Mill expects. An implication of these limitations is that the overstatement of the
utility of experiments of life can be harmful for the capacity to develop, for this overstatement
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suggests that individuals are responsible for their developmental outcomes to an extent greater
than they actually are. While he ignores the effects of differential political relations among
diverse groups, Mill places the locus of developmental responsibility on the individual, and builds
unjustified expectations about the extent to which self-development is possible for individuals.
That locus of developmental responsibility and, as the next chapter will argue, the unjustified
expectations, can, instead, hinder the desired individual development.
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CHAPTER 3: THE PROGRESS OF THE DEVELOPMENTAL ELITE
I. Introduction
In this chapter, I will argue that the practices that Mill considers optimize individual
progress are mainly likely to facilitate the developmental power, and thereby the progress of elite
individuals. This chapter will support the interpretive hypotheses that Mill treats developmental
power mainly as a positive form of political power, and that he expects that the developmental
elite have the most capacity to exercise this power, and thus they also have the most capacity to
progress as individuals in ways that add to utility.
Mill views individual development as the advancement towards the triumph of
developmental power over negative political power. The power o f individuality is the capacity to
develop. Individual development is the effectual exercise o f that power which forms the causal
basis of history. That is to say, developmental power causes history, and the actions of the most
developable individuals are most likely to have progressive significance. For Mill, history is
purposive and its purpose is progress, not mere social change, but rather social improvements or
increases in liberty. History concerns the consequences of individuality towards the triumph of
good in its struggle against evil. The continuation of history requires that individuality be in a
social state in which it has the capacity to win the struggle. Mill favourably views individual
development, and he assumes that the outcomes of the individualization o f self are inclined
towards the good. For Mill, the main purpose of individual development is the attainment of
individual and social happiness.
Mill thinks that individual development has crucial importance for the advancement of
history. Mill's argument for his freedom-utilitarian project is politically egoistic, for whereas he
recognizes the developmental elite as potential history makers, he excludes the underdeveloped or
whom he presumes are less developable from this recognition.

Thus, political egoism has

implications that the developmental elite are unlikely to expect that persons who they presume are
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developmentally below them to be history makers, and thus the developmental elite can set up a
self-fulfilling prophecy against the social majority's capacity to add to utility.
The political egoism of Mill's argument for his freedom-utilitarian project is additionally
evident in that he assumes that individuals from the developmental elite group to which he
belongs have a greater capacity to serve as benefactors and beneficiaries. For example, Mill
claims that only a few individuals can render the service of impartiality, and he connects
impartiality to the exercise of justice. In this way, for him, only a few who we may call epistemic
diplomats have the capacity both to comprehend the truth and to directly contribute to epistemic
progress. The few have a greater capacity than the majority to developmentally benefit from their
impartiality. For, the few are more likely than the majority to develop just characters, because the
few have the developmental advantage of impartiality, and thus they are also more likely to
efficaciously contribute to the administration and implementation of socially just practices.
Finally, this chapter provides a utilitarian critique of the developmental aspects of Mill's
freedom-utilitarian project and, in particular, of the project's absolute notion of political equality:
that it is counterproductive to the maximization of utility. Mill overestimates the extent to which
mere developmental opportunities benefit society, even when he admits that there are important
cases in which only the few will be able to benefit from such opportunities. He expects various
outcomes from inherently diverse people in their responses to the developmental opportunities.
For Mill, society should foster the exercise of the developmental power o f everybody, but some
inherently have more developmental power - they are more individual than others and thus they
have more of the energy that drives progress. He calls such individuals "the stronger specimens
of human nature" (CW, 18, Ch. 3, ^[9). These few have greater capacities than the majority to
benefit from social environmental factors, such as the opportunity for free expression, and from
their own development.

This chapter will explore the preceding claims and discuss their

implications for the capacity of society to facilitate individual development and social progress.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

-

64

-

II. Social Progress:
This section supports the interpretive hypotheses that individuality and conformity
differentially influence the type of social change that is possible in certain situations. Mill thinks
that since the developmental elite are more likely to choose original actions than developmentally
normal or weak persons, they are also more likely to contribute to social and cultural progress.
By contrast, Mill thinks that since the developmentally normal or weak are more likely to commit
conformist actions, they are also more likely to contribute to situations in which only non
progressive or even regressive social change is possible.
Mill claims that the masses of persons are most likely to practice informal negative
political power in the form of mental coercion, and accepts an absolute notion of political
equality. I argue that absolute political equality is problematic because it facilitates the mental
coercion which Mill recognizes as counterproductive to the cultivation of the individual's
progressive capacities. Mentally coercive processes can make self-fulfilling prophecies. Even if
society would practice what Mill considers absolute political equality, and even if the
developmental elite were also the political elite, mental coercion would still be likely and
developmentally unfavourable self-fulfilling prophecies would lead to the violation of equality of
the masses of persons, and thus also to injustice. The notion of absolute political equality is
inadequately utilitarian and, therefore, is inconsistent with Mill's freedom-utilitarian project.

i) Individual Development and History
There is a parallel between Mill's view of individual development as the articulation of
individuality and his view that individual and social progress make history happen. Mill has a
favourable view of individual development; he claims that as long as persons individualize their
choices, in matters that regard only their selves, whatever life outcomes they have are good for
society because the individualization of choice increases liberty. He thinks that if one follows
individuality, one's orientation inclines, though not necessarily moves, towards the good. He
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excessively trusts the worth of individuality and individuals whom he deems possess greater
capacity for individuality.

For example, he claims that society is better off when persons

individualize their choices and their individualized actions have negative outcomes for
themselves than when they conform to legitimate modes of conduct which are beneficial to their
society. For Mill, although persons in the former situation inflict a "constructive injury" (CW,
18, Ch. 4, ^[11) on society, it is a bearable one that adds to "the greater good o f human freedom"
(CW, 18, Ch. 4, Ull).
Similarly, Mill flatters the nature of individuality insofar as he claims that history, not
only should involve, but actually depends on the development of individuality. For Mill, history
concerns more than events that influence social changes. History regards a special kind of social
change, namely progress. For Mill, progress means increases in the capacity o f individuals to
articulate their natures to the effect that they contribute to social, cultural, intellectual and/or
moral improvement. History requires individuality's gradual attainment of social improvement
and liberty. History's continuation depends on the struggle between individuality and despotic
custom.23 As long as individuality is in a social state in which it can win in its struggle with
despotic custom, history continues. An exploration of Mill's definition of progress will show that,
Mill thinks, as soon as custom triumphs over individuality, history ceases.
Mill claims that history depends on progress, not on mere social change. In his view, a
high degree of conformity to custom is incompatible with progress, but compatible with mere
social change. Conformity is a necessary condition for custom, and contributes to the despotism
of custom.

Conformity to custom hinders individuality which is a necessary, though not

sufficient, condition for social progress.

For Mill, progress, in terms o f liberty and social

improvement, and a despotic degree of conformity to custom are rivals on the stage of history.
He writes:
23
A custom is a common cultural practice. A despotic custom is a cultural practice that is exercised
so commonly that it undermines the social capacity for progress. The despotism o f custom occurs when
custom exercises more than a "divided rule with liberty and progress" (CW, 18, Ch. 3, f l7 ) .
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The despotism o f custom is everywhere the standing hindrance to human advancement, being in
unceasing antagonism to that disposition to aim at something better than customary, which is
called, according to circumstances, the spirit o f liberty, or that o f progress or improvement. . . the
contest between the two constitutes the chief interest o f the history o f mankind. (CW, 18, Ch. 3,
1117)

As well, improvement and liberty can become rivals in those times in which improvement is
forced upon a people, but liberty is, normally, the best friend of improvement (CW, 18, Ch. 3,
HIT).
According to Mill, history can come to an end by either the cessation of social progress
or the rejection of individuality, especially as a result of despotic custom. In fact, Mill claims:
"The greater part of the world has, properly speaking, no history, because the despotism of
Custom is complete" (CW, 18, Ch. 3, HI7, emphasis added). If there is no more social progress,
history ceases. If history ceases, social change without progress or what can be called the empty
form of social change may still be possible. For, the empty form of social change does not
require individuality. Mill recognizes that social change can occur as a result of conformity. In
particular, he claims that conformity en masse can cause social change. For example, he contrasts
the form of despotic custom of the East with the form of despotic custom which could occur in
Europe. The despotism of custom which threatens the European nations "does not preclude
change, provided all change together" (CW, 18, Ch. 3, 1|17). Whereas the East's despotism of
custom led to lack of social change, Mill predicts that in Europe despotic custom would lead to
lack of social progress. Thus, in his comparison of the forms of Eastern and Western despotic
custom, Mill distinguishes between social progress and mere social change.
Mill elaborates the distinction between social progress and mere social change, in his
discussion of the progressiveness of Europeans in at least three ways. First, Mill describes
Europeans as "progressive as well as changeable" (CW, 18, Ch. 3 , 1J17). Second, Mill implies
that progress and social change do not necessarily occur at the same time when he warns against
change for change's sake without any greater idea such as that of beauty to guide it (CW, 18, Ch.
3, HI7). Third, Mill warns about vain, counterproductive presumptions that guide European
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improvement. For example, he criticizes the European idea of moral improvement. This idea
holds Europeans as good and demands that others should be as good as Europeans (CW, 18, Ch.
3, TJ17). Mill objects to that idea because it goes against the maintenance of diversity which
protects society from despotic custom, and thus secures the social capacity for progress.
Mill claims that individuality causes progress. He writes: "A people, it appears, may be
progressive for a certain length of time, and then stop: when does it stop? When it ceases to
possess individuality" (CW, 18, Ch. 3, ^17). Thus, Mill claims that the works of individuality
sustain social progress, in his discussion that Europeans pretentiously claim that they are
progressive but lack the individuality that would make their claim true.
Therefore, according to Mill, social change can be subdivided into the empty form of
social change and progress. These two forms have distinct causes. Causes of the empty form of
social change include conformity en masse, the initiation of change for the sake of change, or the
social acceptance of a notion of improvement that is false or counterproductive. The widespread
adoption of a new cultural practice can be an example of the empty form of social change.
Conformity contributes to the creation, maintenance, and despotism o f customs.

Individual

development is the main cause of progress, and thus promotes the advancement of history. The
despotism of custom, which occurs when the proportion of the presence of conformity to custom
is greater than the proportions of progress and liberty, signals history's end.

ii) The Relationship between Progress and Custom
Mill often treats progress and conformity to custom as if they are mutually exclusive in
action when Mill claims that actions committed in conformity to custom cannot be progressive.
If people accept this claim as true, there are implications for the progressive capacities of the
majority of persons whom Mill views as the most likely to commit conformist actions, because of
their lack of individuality.
We can see how Mill regards progress as independent from custom when he writes: "the
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progressive principle . . . in either shape, whether as the love of liberty or of improvement, is
antagonistic to the sway of Custom, involving at least emancipation from that yoke" (CW, 18, Ch.
3, ^|17). The availability of customs is insufficient for the development o f the individuality which
is necessary for progress. For, individuality requires the exercise o f choice among things not
commonly done (CW, 18, Ch. 3, ^6).
Admittedly, Mill seems to aspire for the spirit of progress to be customarily or widely
accepted24 by means of greater toleration of originality and diversity in practice; this is evident in
two ways. First, Mill criticizes persons who lack the custom to tolerate originality, and who do
not see any need for progress; he claims that such persons are the ones who most need the
originality which is necessary for progressive action (CW, 18, Ch. 3, 1112).

Second, Mill

implicitly suggests that society should become accustomed to the sight of diversity, because
diversity is necessary for progress. He warns: "mankind speedily become unable to conceive
diversity, when they have been for some time unaccustomed to see it" (CW, 18, Ch. 3, HI9,
emphasis added). Thus, Mill treats the state of being unaccustomed to the sight of cultural
diversity as a problem, and he suggests that custom can be used to promote or at least secure
cultural diversity.
However, the customary or wide acceptance of the spirit of progress has a conformity
requirement; that it should be the cultural practice to tolerate individuality, originality and
diversity so as to allow the social promotion and maintenance of diversity. This conformity
requirement has much more limited causal importance than the requirement for the personal
exercise of active individuality because individuality has the diversity function. The cultural

24
I use the terms 'customarily' and 'widely accepted' as if they are interchangeable. I do not use the
term customarily to refer to only the mindless following o f custom. For, Mill recognizes that conformity to
a custom does not necessarily entail, though it generally entails, uncritical acceptance. He admits that
mindful conformity to custom is also possible. For example, he advises that "an intelligent following o f
custom, or even occasionally an intelligent deviation from custom, is better than a blind and simply
mechanical adhesion to it" (CW, 18, Ch. 3, 1J5, emphasis added). Thus, I think that it would be an
overstatement to claim that Mill defines 'customary acceptance' as uncritical conformity to custom.
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practice of toleration for individuality and experiments of life would empower only individuals
who have the capacities for individuality and originality, and Mill expects the developmental elite
have greater levels of these capacities.
Although Mill recognizes that there can be, and at times has been, too much
individuality, he does not explain how individuality can become excessive. The current problem,
Mill identifies, is that "society has now fairly got the better of individuality; and the danger which
threatens human nature is not the excess, but the deficiency, of personal impulses and
preferences" (CW, 18, Ch. 3, ^|6). For Mill, although custom is necessary to discipline persons so
that they may behave in accordance with the common good, too much custom is a hindrance to
the advancement of the common good. As despotic custom impedes the free exploration of one's
nature, despotic custom also impedes the original articulation o f individuality, and thereby
prevents the expression of human freedom, and the societal capacity for progress.
Finally, this discussion on the relationship between progress and custom adds support to
the fourth interpretive hypothesis that Mill negatively correlates conformist actions with
progressive consequences. This hypothesis was previously supported in the second chapter as
well as in this chapter's part, "Human Development and History." Mill views conformity to
custom as largely incompatible with progress. That view holds the implication that the societal
majority who lack the capacities for original actions and strong individuality, thus lack
progressive capacities.

iii) The Justice of Utilitarianism: Just for the Elite?
Here, I will argue that the absolute notion of political equality is inconsistent with the
goal o f Mill's freedom-utilitarian project to add to common beneficial developmental
consequences for society's members and thus do developmental justice. Mill's views that the
essence of justice is political equality and that we should reject mental coercion are inconsistent
with his claim that we should accept absolute political equality. This inconsistency is evident in
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that what Mill considers absolute political equality permits mental coercion and thus undermines
political equality and thereby also justice. I will argue that absolute political equality facilitates
mental coercion and is thus unjust. I will limit that discussion to what would be viewed as unjust
based on the general views on injustice that Mill discusses in the fifth chapter of his book
Utilitarianism (1863), and to what is recognizable as unjust from a freedom-utilitarian
perspective.

This perspective would regard as important whether mental coercion impedes

individual expression and hinders the capacity of an individual to expand her developmental
power, and thereby undermines the utility of her individual characteristics. For the constructive
part of my critique in this section, I will show that a freedom-utilitarian, consequentialist
perspective helps to compensate for the inadequacies of the general views on injustice. I will
elaborate on Mill's view that mental coercion is an unjust form of negative political power. In
contemporary terms, mental coercion includes psychological oppression.

I will show the

applicability of the general views on justice to psychological oppression.

Psychological

oppression interferes with the individual's capacity for free opinion expression, independent
opinion formation, and free action.
A rise in social awareness about what is unjust is a meaningful social improvement.
Mill's distinction between mere social change and social progress rests on whether social
improvement is involved, as the previous parts of this chapter discussed. Whereas social change
does not necessarily have good qualities, such as increases injustice, social progress does because
it is a matter o f greater liberty or of social improvement. M ill’s most insightful comment on
social improvement in Utilitarianism (1863) reads:
The entire history o f social improvement has been a series o f transitions, by which one custom or
institution after another, from being a supposed primary necessity o f social existence, has passed
into the rank o f a universally stigmatized injustice and tyranny. So it has been with the
distinctions o f slaves and freemen, nobles and serfs, patricians and plebeians; and so it will be, and
in part already is, with the aristocracies o f colour, race, and sex. (CW, 10, Ch. 5, f35)

Thus, he views increased recognition of injustice and inequality as an important characteristic of
social improvement.
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According to Mill, knowledge of injustice is practical for knowledge of justice. Mill
writes that to understand justice it is most useful to understand its opposite (CW, 10, Ch. 5, f3)
He addresses the commonly held views that it is unjust (1) to violate legal rights unless they be
forfeited or undeserved (CW, 10, Ch. 5, ^4); or (2) to violate moral rights (CW, 10, Ch. 5, f5); it
is unjust to (3) give more or less, whether punishment or reward, than others deserve (CW, 10,
Ch. 5, T[6); or (4) to dishonestly and deliberately express or build expectations of oneself and then
violate them (CW, 10, Ch. 5 ,1J7); or (5) to be partial in improper situations (CW, 10, Ch. 5, f8);
or what I take to be Mill's sixth view, though he does not number it, that it is unjust to violate
equality, which he holds to be the "essence" of justice (CW, 10, Ch. 5, ^[9), although under the
general view society may restrict equality by considerations o f social expediency (CW, 10, Ch. 5,
119).

Mill considers "the justice which is grounded on utility to be the chief part, and
incomparably the most sacred and binding part, of all morality" (CW, 10, Ch. 5, ^31). Thus, that
which impedes utility is both unjust and immoral. Indeed, Mill understands justice in terms of
moral principles which when taken as a whole are high in utility (CW, 10, Ch. 5, f36). These
principles facilitate the resolution among whatever existing principles of justice there are (CW,
10, Ch. 5, 1(36-37). Thus, moral principles can support Mill's position that utilitarianism is
practical.25 Mill writes: "particular cases may occur in which some other social duty is so
important, as to overrule any one of the general maxims of justice" (CW, 10, Ch. 5,136). These

25
Another reason for why Mill argues that utilitarianism is practical is because utilitarianism draws
from and puts to use the natural human attributes o f sociality, the sentiments o f social sympathy, and the
attribute o f human intelligence. The idea o f justice consistent with utilitarianism is not ethically egoistic.
That is to say, utilitarianism does not claim that persons ought to do what they think is best for themselves.
Rather, Mill writes that we should not resent hurts to ourselves unless the hurts are o f the sort which society
is also interested in repressing (CW, 10, Ch. 5, f20). It is moral to exclusively subordinate the sentiment o f
justice, an element o f which is the "natural feeling o f retaliation or vengeance" (CW, 10, Ch. 5,1(20), to the
"social sympathies" (CW, 10, Ch. 5, 1(20). Doing so allows us to be just persons, that is, persons who
resent a hurt to society, and thus, whose sentiment o f justice "acts in directions conformable to the general
good" (CW, 10, Ch. 5, f20). Our highly developed human intelligence allows us to have a wider range o f
sympathy (CW, 10, Ch. 5, TJ19). If we were not to subordinate the sentiment o f justice to social feeling, we
would be led by it to resent selfishly or to "resent indiscriminately whatever anyone does that is
disagreeable to us" (CW, 10, Ch. 5 ,1J20).
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principles are to be prioritized, though not without exceptions (CW, 10, Ch. 5,1(36).
Because it ranks the principle priorities, that would not otherwise be ranked,26 Mill argues
that utilitarianism has a practical role in its service to justice. However, his elitist assumptions
about human nature undermine the practicality of his freedom-utilitarian project. Mill claims that
impartiality, which is an attribute required for justice, is innately scarce.

Mill connects

impartiality to justice; being impartial is of both primary and secondary significance for it. Not
only is impartiality important for the fulfillment of other obligations of justice, such as impartial
judgement of the legality of the conduct of the accused, but it is also included by the most
ordinary and enlightened alike as a maxim among the precepts of justice. Impartial persons make
practical the greatest happiness principle27 by respecting the maxim of equality, for they can
regard the happiness of all with numerical equality, so that one person's happiness is "counted for
exactly as much as another's" (CW, 10, Ch. 5, K35). Thus, impartiality is "involved in the very
meaning of Utility, or the Greatest-Happiness Principle" (CW, 10, Ch. 5, 1(35).
Unfortunately, for Mill, only the few can render the service of impartiality - the
epistemic diplomats who thus have an essential role to play for the reconciliation of the partial
truths, and thus for the acquisition of the truth, as the fourth thesis chapter discusses. The
consideration of the view that only a few can be impartial, and the view that impartiality is
important for justice holds implications for the differential moral developmental capacities of
various individuals. The impartial few have certain advantages in the development of just and
moral characters, whereas the partial majority has the inherent misfortune that it lacks these
developmental advantages.
Furthermore, elitist perceptions about various inherent abilities can violate justice by
means of mentally coercive processes. The five general views about what is unjust that Mill
26
Mill argues that the various existent principles o f what is unjust, such as the five that he identifies,
show that natural justice is ambiguous. Natural justice can be used to justify various views (CW, 10, Ch. 5,
1(9). Thus, it cannot provide a ranking system for moral principles.
27
The greatest happiness principle states that individual actions and social practices that contribute
the most to social happiness are the most utilitarian.
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mentions in his discussion on justice, in addition to Mill's claim that the essence of justice is
equality, can help us to understand how mental coercion is unjust. I will focus on psychological
oppression which is a type of mental coercion. The general views, to be consistent with their
nature and with each other, can and should be applied to the case of psychological oppression.
Psychological oppression consists of the internalization of stereotypes and social perceptions.
When persons internalize the negative views others express of them, they forcefully become not
only oppressed by others but also self-oppressors (Bartky, 2005, p. 105). Contemporary societies
regularly commit psychologically oppressive practices, but societies tend to ignore the
implications of those practices for the oppressed individuals' capacity for freedom; I will examine
these implications especially for how society violates the psychologically oppressed individual's
political equality and freedom. The severity of the injustice of psychological oppression becomes
more apparent by the number of the general views of injustice, listed above, that can apply to it.
But recognition of the injustice of psychological oppression does not require that the general
views directly apply to it.
In some important ways, the general views are inadequately applicable to psychological
oppression. The general views give too much weight to the internal dispositions of the individual
and, in particular, to whether the individual is aware that she is doing wrong. For instance, the
fourth general view of injustice claims that it is unjust to deliberately develop false expectations
about one self. Under this view, intention matters. However, to the advantage of a utilitarian
perspective, it regards the consequences as important to understand whether a particular action is
unjust.
The fourth principle recognizes that it is unjust for individuals to build false expectations
about themselves, because doing so places others at a disadvantage in their relation with the
individual. In a social world, it is recognizable that it is unjust to build false expectations about
other individuals, because this places the individuals at a disadvantage in their relation with
others. Therefore, in contemporary society, we should recognize that it is unjust to dishonestly
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express or develop untrue expectations of others especially when they are thus forced to build
false expectations about themselves. This is even more remarkable when persons treat others in
such a way that they render others unable to violate the untrue expectations. Persons express one
of the most deeply unjust forms of dishonesty when they set self-fulfilling prophecies to work to
turn falsehood into truth.
Furthermore, the imposition of one’s opinions of others upon them to dictate others' selfimage is a violation of their legal and moral right to have freedom of opinion formation and
opinion expression. This illustrates that psychological oppression can also involve punishment
that is undeserved and thus violates principle three. The imposition o f the opinions one holds of
others upon them punishes others for not being whom one wants them to be, and compels them to
conform to one’s expectations and perceptions of the type o f persons that they are.
When one forces upon others what they think o f themselves, one does not treat them as
one ought to treat equals, and thus violates their equality. One takes away their capacity to
choose their identity.

Instead, one chooses for them in self-regarding matters.

Thus, one

interferes with the active exercise of their individuality, and thereby undermines their
developmental power.
If it is unjust to build false expectations about oneself, then it is unjust, whether
deliberately or inadvertently, to force others to, unknowingly, build false expectations about
themselves. This is especially the case when persons expect others to express that they are
treated more equally than they actually are or that they are unequal in regards to some important
characteristics and socially beneficial causal attributes. For, the advancement o f knowledge and
the expansion of individual developmental power add to utility, not the advancement of ignorance
and the hindrance of individual progress. This treatment both violates their equality and increases
the likelihood that their equality will be further violated as a consequence of the false
expectations.

Socially marginalized groups regularly receive such treatment in patriarchal

systems of whiteness (Henry & Tator, 2006). That is to say, the practice is common in social
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systems that treat white skin colour and masculinity and the individual attributes that are
associated with being white or being male as the standard of comparison for members of groups
viewed as deviant. Although the expressed or internalized expectations are untrue, they serve
many self-fulfilling prophecies. Thus, the expectations have real social consequences. This type
of injustice is one of the expenses28 of so-called free expression.
Mental coercion includes what is presently understood as 'psychological oppression.' For
Mill, mental coercion is an expression of negative political power. Those who have negative
political power can practice mental coercion. Mill views mental coercion as that which compels
persons to conform to the socially legitimate opinions and thought patterns. Mill writes that
persons need protection from how public opinion interferes with their individual development and
opinion formation. Consider this well-known passage:
Protection . . . [is needed] against the tendency o f society to impose, by other means than civil
penalties, its own ideas and practices as rules o f conduct on those who dissent from them; to fetter
the development, and, if possible, prevent the formation, o f any individuality not in harmony with
its ways, and compel all characters to fashion themselves upon the model o f its own. There is a
limit to the legitimate interference o f collective opinion with individual independence: and to find
that limit, and maintain it against encroachment, is as indispensable to a good condition o f human
affairs, as protection against political despotism. (CW, 18, Ch. 1, ^[5)

In the above passage, Mill asserts that the importance of the need to eliminate social and cultural
psychological coercion is as great as that of political despotism.
Yet, Mill accepts the absolute notion of equality, which, when socially applied, not only
facilitates mental coercion, but also limits the variety of developmental opportunities for
individuals, as I will now argue. Mill's acceptance of the absolute notion of political equality is
inconsistent with the pursuit of the maximization of individual development, because absolute
political equality facilitates the capacity of the elite to mentally coerce others and to influence the
kinds of developmental opportunities that are most commonly available in society. We can
understand this inconsistency in light of Mill's emphasis on the psychobiological differences
among individual natures, and his claim that their developmental needs vary.

28

Because the

In the fourth chapter, I will discuss how what Mill considers free speech as socially expensive.
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individual natures o f the developmental and political elite do not have exactly the same
developmental needs as everyone else, the reinforcement of elitist perceptions about what is the
best way to satisfy individual needs hinders the satisfaction of needs that the elite does not
experience. When various individuals are coerced by the elite's perceptions, for example, through
psychologically oppressive processes, to view their natures, not as they actually are, but as the
elite views them, it is more difficult for individuals to recognize and adequately satisfy their
actual developmental needs. Thus, the elite do not treat the natures o f others as distinct, and the
elite violate others' political equality because they interfere with others' capacity to independently
form their identities including their opinions about themselves.
In regards to the violation of equality, Mill insightfully and rightfully writes:
all social inequalities which have ceased to be considered expedient, assume the character not o f
simple inexpediency, but o f injustice, and appear so tyrannical, that people are apt to wonder how
they ever could have been tolerated; forgetful that they themselves perhaps tolerate other
inequalities under an equally mistaken notion o f expediency, the correction o f which would make
that which they approve seem quite as monstrous as what they have at last learned to condemn.
(CW, 10, Ch. 5, K35)

In the above passage, Mill connects mistaken notions of expediency to the violation of equality.
Additionally, Mill recognizes that the approach to equality is in certain cases itself mistaken. He
comments that "the justice of giving equal protection to the rights of all, is maintained by those
who support the most outrageous inequality in the rights themselves" (CW, 10, Ch. 5, T[9). In this
section I limit my discussion to the mistaken notion of absolute equality, and I will argue that the
social application o f this notion of equality leads to the violation of equality.
Society should support the worth of social policies with their practical effects, not merely
their ideal effects. If Mill's freedom-utilitarian project is to be practical, as Mill claims that it is, it
must be concerned with more than the intentions behind actions; undeniably, any utilitarian
project needs to be consequentialist. Thus, from a utilitarian perspective, it is important to
determine whether the real consequences of social policies are good and meet the objectives of
the policies. Yet, an absolute notion of political equality does not suffice for utilitarian purposes,
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because what is considered absolute equality serves mainly the progress of the political elite.
Unfortunately, Mill supports what he considers an absolute notion of political equality.
He endorses the "highest abstract standard of social and distributive justice" (CW, 10, Ch. 5, H35),
for which, he asserts, "all institutions, and the efforts of all virtuous citizens," should aspire (CW,
10, Ch. 5, f35). He states that "we should treat all equally well (when no higher duty forbids)
who have deserved equally well of us" (CW, 10, Ch. 5, 1135). He asserts that "society should treat
all equally well who have deserved equally well of it, that is, who have deserved equally well
absolutely" (CW, 10, Ch. 5, 1[35, emphasis added). Thus, he accepts a notion of political equality
that offers a highly abstract standard, and an absolute one, for how society treats its members that
deserve equal treatment. That standard is impractical for the purposes of the freedom-utilitarian
project, because that standard is inconsistent with the aim for development maximization.
Political equality based on what some consider absolute terms is not necessarily absolute
political equality. What Mill considers absolute political equality is based on an illusion of
absoluteness, as society tends to support its members in merely legally, not practically, absolute
equal terms.

Development maximization benefits from society's sensitivity to diverse

developmental needs. Yet, what is considered absolute political equality is insensitive to diverse
developmental needs, and thus it is inconsistent with their satisfaction.
Absolute political equality pertains to systematic equality. The elimination of systematic
(formal) inequality is insufficient, for systematic inequality is not the only type of inequality.
Systemic (informal) social inequality is more difficult to identify and eliminate than systematic
inequality. Power differentials among groups affect the social system, and produce systemic
political inequality. The consequences of those differentials conflict with the desired effect of
political equality. It is systemic inequality that makes possible mental coercion.
The "absolute" notion of political equality does not protect society from adopting biased
developmental standards and biased recommendations for the satisfaction of developmental
needs. People can treat each other in accordance with the dominant standard/s that are based on
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what the political elite consider the important needs, and the considered needs are not only the
developmental ones. The political elite influence society to practice what the elite considers the
best ways to satisfy those needs. The social supports are more compatible with the needs of the
socially privileged than with the needs of the socially disadvantaged. The socially available
developmental supports are incompatible with the satisfaction o f diverse needs.

Thus, the

treatment of persons is not in accordance to the actual needs of everyone. When political equality
is thus defined, the treatment of persons corresponds with the experiences and the things that
matter the most to the dominant group/s.
The "absolute" notion of political equality ignores how equal treatment can contribute to
political inequality. Political equality based on "absolute" terms mistakenly equates political
equality with equality of treatment. Although persons, at least in principle, have access to the
same supports, they do not all have access to precisely the ones they need, in practice. With its
emphasis on sameness and the same treatment, the absolute notion of political equality simply
refuses to take differences into account, as if doing so necessarily runs counter to politically equal
treatment. Ironically, its "political equality" does not extend to diverse groups. It makes political
equality a thing that roughly exists only within the dominant group, and a myth when used to
describe the whole o f society. Political equality based on absolute terms cannot foster equal
relations, for it lacks the flexibility required for equal relations. Consequently, on the basis of
absolute political equality, society cannot equally support the developmental needs of everyone.
The absolute notion of political equality does not ensure equal opportunities. Mill's focus
on competition among individual experiments of life corresponds with a notion of political
equality that is based on equal opportunities. Mill claims that society should give all individuals
the opportunity to develop themselves through experiments of life, but he expects that only a few
will create progressively effectual experiments of life, as I discussed in the second chapter.
Opportunities cannot be equal when persons do not stand an equal chance to successfully
pursue them.

In contemporary society, there are many progressives who prefer an equity
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approach, because when the competition is unfair, "equal opportunities" can only be an ideal.
Opportunities must have a significant likelihood of realizability in order to provide a basis for
equality. The greater is the likelihood that some persons stand to realize opportunities above
others, the lower is the equality of their opportunities. For those persons who are unlikely to
successfully pursue the opportunities, the "opportunities" can be nothing more than pseudo
opportunities.
The notion of absolute political equality conforms to the social aversions of the time, in
particular, today's aversion towards "unequal treatment." Absolute political equality denies more
than recognizes individual differences. The popularly held, "absolute" notion of political equality
is a reaction to the historical reality that the differential treatment of diverse people has been
linked to political inequality.

Yet, the aversion against unequal treatment ensures unequal

developmental results. Because of the aversion, society treats certain persons in ways that are
practical for the satisfaction of their needs, while it deprives others, who are presumably also
being treated as equals, of the developmental opportunities that foster the cultivation of their
particular natures.
For opportunities to be equally available for everybody, society has to be sensitive to the
various needs and circumstances among politically unequal persons.

It is not the same

opportunities that have to be available to everyone; it is the ones they need. Absolutely equal
treatment, in legal principle, can mean politically unequal treatment, in practice (Fleras and
Elliott, 2003, p. 133). Not even the condition of "equal opportunities" as the same opportunities
was met in M ill’s time, nor is it being met today. Neither is the relative condition of equal
opportunities, which I suggest is the availability of the particular opportunities required for one's
development.
The equal opportunities approach to political equality is inappropriate because it ignores
that social resources influence the variety of opportunities that people have. Equality of the
developmentally crucial resources that people have, such as formal education, permits persons

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

-

80

-

certain kinds of developmental opportunities. When the competition is unfair, society should
focus on the improvement of access to the various developmentally crucial resources and on the
achievement of equal levels of developmental realization, which does not necessarily mean the
same material and life-style outcomes. Individuals who have the freedom to develop themselves
according to their preferences, psychological needs, and interests will unlikely have the same
outcomes, since their outcomes will express the various preferences and interests they followed
which were not the same.
Development maximization would benefit from a notion of political equality that is
practical in that it optimizes the likelihood that people will achieve their potentials, whatever
those potentials may be. To understand development maximization, it is useful to distinguish
between (1) the likely degree to which one will achieve one's potential and (2) how much
potential one has to achieve. In the regards to the first of these, some persons have advantages for
the achievement of their potential, such as fast rates of intellectual,29 emotional, and moral
progress and privileged social conditions that allow them access to a good education. These are
factors that aid the realization of their biological capacities. Other persons have more social and
personal obstacles to overcome while they strive for individual development.

To take into

account these types of personal differences in development maximization project plans, society
should give relatively equal developmental supports to its members, that is, the supports should
be compatible with the various needs of persons. Society should support the development of its
members in proportion to and in ways appropriate to their developmental needs. Yet, with an
absolute notion of political equality, this sufficiently flexible support is not possible. The next
section of this chapter discusses a fallacy that Mill makes in his assumptions that there are various
potentials for intellectual, moral, and political achievement, and reveals further how M ill’s

29
I am not saying that a fast intellectual progress rate is always an advantage. Whether it is an
advantage depends on the social circumstances o f the learner including whether the formal educational
system has a curriculums and educational programs which are flexible enough to facilitate the intellectual
progress o f students with various needs.
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freedom-utilitarian project is practical for only a few individuals.

Til. The Elitist Assignment of Utility to Human Natures
Elitist expectations can spoil the chances for human nature’s progress and utilitarian
developmental powers.

With its hidden expectations, which are counter-productive to the

development of the majority of individuals, the society would undermine the very developmental
power that it sought to maximize, and along with it, its project's capacity for the maximization of
utility.
When the leaders and benefactors to society share in common similar personal
characteristics that permit them to constitute an elite category that consider themselves as most
capable to serve the common good, and base on their elitist and one-sided assumptions practices
that benefit only or mainly themselves, those people can be called politically egoistic. The
presence of political egoism in a social project is inconsistent with the aim for political equality.
The successful application of Mill's freedom-utilitarian project largely depends on individual
characteristics and causal attributes including the capacities for genius, effectual originality, and
impartiality, which he expects only a few individuals possess. This claim that the individual
characteristics that have high utility are scarce makes it seem impractical for most of society's
members to participate in the freedom-utilitarian project, and thus excludes not only their
characteristics but also their achievements from utility. An exclusive utilitarianism is impractical
because it cannot benefit from the whole social body, and denies a large social segment the
opportunities that they could obtain only through work as benefactors.30

i) Moral and Intellectual Elitism and Self-fulfilling Prophecies
Mill's freedom-utilitarian project sets up a self-fulfilling prophecy against the moral and
intellectual developmental progress of the societal majority.

The project promotes elitist

30
Benefactors are more likely to obtain direct and immediate benefits from their contributions to
society, as the fourth chapter will show in regards to knowledge.
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assumptions about differential inherent developmental capacities; these assumptions place the
majority of individuals at a developmental disadvantage, and thus hinder their capacity to add to
utility.
Kendall and Carey (1968) find that Mill is a precursor o f contemporary elitism. They
claim that M ill’s elitism does not consist of separate components - intellectual and moral - but
rather combines these into one form of elitism based on intellectual excellence. Mill assumes that
individuals who have the most intellectual worth also have the most moral worth and vice versa.
For Kendall and Carey (1968), M ill’s elitist mindset begins with the following proposition:
The “intellectual and “moral” resources (that is, “worth”) o f the citizenry o f the democratic state,
which must be “organized” for purposes o f government, is, like it or not, to be found in the Few,
not the Many, above the roster’s Great Divide, not above and below it. (Kendall & Carey, 1968, p.
38)

Mill proceeds to absorb moral worth into intellectual worth, as he posits that individuals who
have more knowledge or those endowed with intellectual superiority should have the power to
guide the conduct of government.
Mill expects that certain individuals have the inherent capacity to serve the common good
more than others. Mill claims that only the originality of a few would prove to have utility, as
discussed in the second chapter of this thesis. Also, Mill argues that few individuals benefit from
free individual expression more than others. Particularly, when it comes to natural "heroes,"
society "knows not how to make them" (CW, 18, Ch. 3, ^5) and the best that it can do for them is
allow them the freedom to make themselves, and respect that they cannot be socially-engineered.
For Mill, especially the gifted few who happen to inherently possess more of the "raw
material of human nature" and a more "energetic nature" (CW, 18, Ch. 3, f5), in other words,
more human potential, and thus, who can access a larger portion of human nature, suffer, if they
are not allowed to freely develop. In turn, society suffers the consequences when society does not
allow them to fully actualize their presumably greater potential for good. Consider M ill’s claims
in the following passage, and follow them to their final implications:
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To say that one person's desires and feelings are stronger and more various than those o f another,
is merely to say that he has more o f the raw material o f human nature, and is therefore capable,
perhaps o f more evil, but certainly o f more good. Strong impulses are but another name for
energy. Energy may be turned to bad uses; but more good may always be made o f an energetic
nature, than o f an indolent and impassive one. (CW, 18, Ch. 3, ^[5, emphasis added)

Thus, members of the developmental elite are capable of more evil as well as of more good
compared to those whom Mill considers the less developable. However, Mill assumes that if
members of the developmental elite are given liberty, then they are more likely to contribute to
social improvement than to social regression in terms of added injustice and falsehood.
Mill claims not only individuals who have achieved greater levels of moral maturity
deserve greater social privileges, but he also claims that some individuals have greater inherent
potential for greater moral privileges than others.

Also, in today's terms, they benefit from

psycho- and socio-biological developmental privileges.

Mill predicts that such individuals

naturally will acquire a greater morality, if given developmentally hospitable social
circumstances. First, while Mill recognizes that strong feelings and emotions are not necessarily
corrupt, Mill claims that those who have more of these qualities can develop a greater conscience
compared to those who have lower levels. He writes: "it is not because men's desires are strong
that they act ill; it is because their consciences are weak" (CW, 18, Ch. 3, f5). He continues:
"there is no natural connexion between strong impulses and a weak conscience. The natural
connexion is the other way" (CW, 18, Ch. 3, f5, emphasis added). The connection between
impulses and a weak conscience applies for those with inherently weak impulses but not for those
with strong impulses.

For Mill, how some persons develop conscience suffers from their

deficient energies, but how other persons develop conscience suffers from the improper balance
of their strong energies. He writes:
desires and impulses are as much a part o f a perfect human being, as beliefs and restraints: and
strong impulses are only perilous when not properly balanced; when one set o f aims and
inclinations is developed into strength, while others, which ought to co-exist with them, remain
weak and inactive. (CW, 18, Ch. 3,1(5)

For an energetic character, one must develop a strong will to govern strong impulses (CW, 18,
Ch. 3, T|5).
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The moral dimension of Mill's developmental elitism depends on the assumption that the
very attributes which he deems important in moral development are naturally scarce.

As

mentioned in the previous section, Mill suggests that impartiality is a helpful attribute for the
development of a just character. He claims that only a few are capable of impartiality, thus he
designates this important developmental attribute as a naturally scarce one.
Further, Mill's developmental elitism consists of natural scarcity claims including that
there are individuals who naturally have stronger passions and thus have more with which to
work in their development of other assets such as virtue and self-discipline which are also
required for a strong moral character. He writes:
Those who have most natural feeling, are always those whose cultivated feelings may be made the
strongest. The same strong susceptibilities which make the personal impulses vivid and powerful,
are also the source from whence are generated the most passionate love o f virtue, and the sternest
self-control. It is through the cultivation o f these, that society both does its duty and protects its
interests. (CW, 18, Ch. 3, ^[5, emphasis added)

Mill emphasizes the potential of the members of the developmental elite for good, and that
society should let them cultivate their greater developmental potential.

He adds that these

"stronger specimens of human nature" (CW, 18, Ch. 3, f9) should have their freedom of action
restricted only from "encroaching on the rights of others" (CW, 18, Ch. 3 , 1|9). Therefore, Mill
holds a moral psycho- and socio-biological developmental form of elitism but, as the previous
quotation shows, he prefers that they should not impede anyone's development.

The

recommendation that Mill makes for the prevention of the interference of the most developable
with the growth of the least developable is inadequate for the development maximization of both
groups.
Mill's elitist emphasis on the development of individuals whom he considers mentally
gifted is at the expense of full appreciation for the human potential of persons whom he supposes
do not inherently possess energetic natures, and have less access to portions of human nature.
Mill underestimates not only the intellectual but also the emotional, and even the moral potential
of those persons. Mill's view that development is possible for everyone means little next to his
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view that the degree of developmental potential varies by person. He excessively focuses on
what the mentally gifted can contribute to social progress. He ignores not only that those whose
abilities look ordinary are also capable of great growth, that they are not necessarily doomed by
their nature to mediocrity, but also especially that they, too, have much to contribute to social
progress. They can favourably influence the developmental power of others, as discussed in
chapter two.
Mill's position on the various inherent potentials o f human natures also suffers from
moral elitism, as mentioned earlier in this chapter. Mill's morally elitist claims have biological,
social and psychological developmental dimensions.

In his view, free expression is crucial

especially for the development of persons who have more potential than others to develop a good
conscience, virtue, self-discipline, and impartiality.
Mill claims that the developmental elite both developmentally and epistemically benefit
from free expression more than others. They can both earn more developmental power and leam
more through its exercise. For Mill, persons of genius can serve as benefactors to social freedom
and can benefit from that freedom more than others can. Persons of genius are "more individual"
than others (CW, 18, Ch. 3, 1J11).

If they receive the social freedom which permits self-

expression, then more individual growth can accrue to persons of genius than to persons who are
presumably less capable of individuality.

The assumed greater capacity to exercise active

individuality permits persons of genius a greater likelihood that they will improve the social
freedom that fosters their individual growth.
Mill's view that certain individuals have greater potential to benefit from free expression
functions as a self-fulfilling prophecy to the effect that society could permit some individuals
more freedom of expression on the basis of the expectation that they can benefit more from
freedom. Thus, society would fulfill the prophecy that some individuals benefit the most from
free expression. If some individuals receive the most opportunities to benefit, then they are likely
to experience the most benefit.
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Also, individuals whom society perceives as capable of producing greater utility, such as
for improving social freedom, could, on the basis of their perceived greater social utility, be
granted more privileges, for example, participation in the social policy making process. And their
greater social privileges would empower their developmental capacities, and they would likely
prove to have more social utility. Because "the moral worth of actions is to be judged in terms of
the consequences of those actions,"31 the actions of many persons comparatively turn out not only
to have lower social worth but also lower moral worth.
Mill's developmental elitism has social developmental dimensions in addition to the
psycho-biological dimension discussed earlier in this section.

The social developmental

dimension is evident, for instance, in Mill's considerations of how society can facilitate or impede
intellectual progress.

ii) The Fallacy of Innate Mental Giftedness
The fallacy of innate mental giftedness results from the overstatement of the connection
between a faster or "more energetic" intellectual developmental rate and intellectual potential.
Practices based on this fallacy interfere with society's capacity to satisfy the various individual
developmental needs. Here, I explain how some views of mental giftedness are problematic, and
make some recommendations for the optimization of individual development. First, 'genius' is a
socially constructed category.32 The dominant cognitive values o f society selectively pick and
choose the elements of genius, and they provide the basis for standards by which society judges
the 'genius' of individuals. Second, the development of most, if not all, persons who initially
appear to have ordinary intellectual abilities is not limited to the cultivation of their ability to
appreciate the extraordinary abilities of persons of genius enough to accept them as their leaders.
They can develop extraordinary abilities, if given sufficient opportunities to do so and a social

31
Wilson (2007).
32
For a discussion o f the problems with understanding intellectual abilities see Stephen Jay Gould's
Mismeasure o f Man (1981).
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environment which supports human growth in practical ways. Third, understanding the social
problems posed by views that the mentally gifted belong to a minority would help us to maximize
society's capacity to fully benefit from its members' cognitive abilities.
Although Mill claims that there are inherently diverse individual natures, he does not
acknowledge the possibility that the social conditions which optimize the intellectual capacities of
one developmental group may undermine the development of intellectual capacities for another
developmental group.

For example, Mill claims that persons of genius intellectually and

developmentally benefit the most from the unrestricted expression and formation of opinions.
However, he does not consider whether this practice is sometimes harmful for the intellectual
developmental capacities of others.
Mill underestimates the extent to which socially valued individual attributes such as
rationality, intelligence and genius are socially constructed, arbitrarily constituted and
demarcated, and subject to being enhanced or limited by social constraints. The assumption that
persons of genius are bom more than made will keep persons of genius in the elite and minority
category in which Mill expects that they will remain: “Persons of genius, it is true, are, and are
always likely to be, a small minority” (CW, 18, Ch. 3, Ull). However, the assumption of the
scarcity of genius is not in the interest of development maximization because it sets up a selffulfilling prophecy against the high prevalence of genius.
Mill's assumption that there are various human intellectual, creative, and moral potentials
results from a common fallacy of innate mental giftedness. It regards the growth potential of the
mentally gifted as superior to the growth potential of persons who mature at average rates,
because it takes innate speed as being indicative of innate mental capacity. Under this fallacy, the
faster rate of intellectual progress among individuals who society considers as exceptionally,
intellectually gifted, to use today's term, is taken as a sign of their greater potential to achieve
more than persons who progress more slowly.

Although many people accept this sort of

evaluation of intellectual potential, the fact that some mature at an earlier age is not of much
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relevance to their amount of potential for growth that remains. It is possible that one can assume
the opposite, i.e. the fact that a person has already reached a high level o f intellectual maturity can
indicate that she has less growth to experience, since she has already "grown up." To consider
another way to connect intellectual maturation rate to the unactualized potential that remains, it is
useful to compare persons who inherit faster psychological maturation rates with persons who
inherit privileged social circumstances. In proportion to the height of their social ascription,
society recognizes that persons do not have the potential for much more social ascendance. For
example, society does not expect a person bom into a billionaire family to have the potential to
experience much more upward social mobility. Yet, if a person demonstrates a faster rate of
intellectual progress, people normally expect that the person has much more growth to achieve
compared to persons who progress at an average rate. People tend to infer a person's full mental
potential from the amount of potential that the person has realized. For example, people tend to
take that women have not achieved as many considered great works o f philosophy as men have as
a sign of women's inferior intellectual potential. The expectation that what can be realized
follows from what has been realized is especially dubious when people judge what has been
realized in a politically unequal social context where some persons have greater developmental
opportunities than others, and thus a greater likelihood that they will achieve more than others.
Yet, I suggest that no inference at all about potential can be based on past individual
development. Only what has been actualized can be reliably measured. Mental potential, or
inherent mental capacity, is an illusory idea that has long been used to exclude certain human
beings from socially valued categories, even from the category o f human being itself. Mental
attributes, such as 'intelligence,' are largely, but not entirely, socially constructed. It is uncertain
and cannot be made certain whether human potential varies by person. My point is that no
measurement of arbitrarily constituted and arbitrarily demarcated constructs can be reliable, even
if there are (and there must be some) innate mental differences. Thus, M ill’s assumption that
there are various inherent differences among the mental capacities across human beings that

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

-

89

-

restrict their individual range of mental possibilities is not only unparsimonious or unnecessarily
strong, but even more so it is impractical for the purposes of utility maximization.
The acceptance, instead, of the simple assumption that the potential o f all human beings
is immeasurably great can help to maximize individual development.

For, we all have the

capacity to become persons of genius, if given a nurturing social environment with adequate and
appropriate supports and opportunities for individual growth. This assumption would prove to
have greater utility than the unparsimonious one that Mill accepts, and which continues to be
popularly held in the present day. What can be realized just does not follow from what has been
realized.

IV. Conclusion
I brought attention to Mill's claims that there are inherent differences among individual
potentials for intelligence, emotion, and morality. I disagreed with those claims and objected to
the notions of innate mental giftedness and innate mental scarcity which those claims contain.
Since Mill assumes that there is a positive correlation between intelligence and morality, his
intellectual elitism is doubly problematic.
Mill assumes that there are natural losers and natural winners. For Mill, the individual
can expand her developmental power within a limited range of possibilities that is unique to the
individual. Some individuals have a wider inherent range o f developmental possibilities. For
example, they are more capable of great evil but also of great good, and the direction o f their
development is inclined towards the good. Also, the strength o f the inherent developmental
power varies by individual.

Individuals can work within the range of their developmental

possibilities to affect the social expression of their developmental capacities, and realize
themselves.
Unfortunately, for Mill, individuals cannot favourably alter the inherent value of the
strength of their developmental capacities. The inherent strength o f particular traits is positively
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It follows from Mill's assumptions that

individuals who have a more narrow range of developmental possibilities are unlikely to escape
their disadvantaged condition because they have relatively lower inherent developmental power.
And since greater levels of developmental power increase the capacity for social utility, there are
unfair implications for the social worth which certain individuals can attain.
Because of the influential role of expectations upon behaviour, the views that some
persons have greater intellectual and moral biological potentials than others have real social
consequences. This is the case no matter how untrue the evaluations are. The evaluations are
problematic because they disregard the socially constructed aspects o f the mental attributes under
consideration, such as intelligence and genius.

Also, the evaluations disregard the genetic-

environmental interaction aspects of the mentioned attributes.
I am concerned that Mill's views that some persons can developmentally benefit more
from important social environmental factors, such as freedom of expression, also have real social
implications, regardless of whether they are truthful or not. One of the social developmental
implications of Mill's thought on the developmental elite is that political inequality interferes with
the adequate cultivation of human developmental capacities. Political inequality influences the
characterization of what is considered mental giftedness, and recognition o f human psychological
developmental needs, and of the practices adequate for their satisfaction.
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CHAPTER 4: FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND CULTURAL IMPERIALISM OVER
THE TRUTH
1. Introduction
This chapter argues that what Mill considers socially unrestricted speech is unlikely to
help much in the advancement of multi-sided knowledge, and is inconsistent with the promotion
of the independent thought mode, human rationality, and cultural diversity. I will explore the
utilitarian and consequentialist basis for Mill's main argument that free individual expression,
including free speech, independent thought, and free self-regarding action, add to common
epistemically beneficial social consequences.

The main argument for freedom of individual

expression is that it permits independent thinking, diversity of opinion and conduct, diversity of
education and experiments of life. These social conditions each serve utility by contributing to
individual development, rationality, and epistemic and social progress.
Mill argues for socially unrestricted speech because he is concerned that society's practice
of censorship does not encourage the independent thought mode. He recognizes that society
practices mental coercion and pressures persons to think along common lines of opinion, as I
discussed in the second chapter. Mill admits that protection is needed "against the tyranny of the
prevailing opinion and feeling" (CW, 18, Ch. 1 ,1J9), but he asserts that restricting expression is
not the appropriate way to obtain this protection.

On the one hand, Mill recognizes that

"unmeasured vituperation employed on the side of prevailing opinion, really does deter people
from professing contrary opinions, and from listening to those who profess them" (CW, 18, Ch. 2,
TJ42). As well, he concedes that "for the interest.. .of truth and justice, it is far more important to
restrain this employment of vituperative language" (CW, 18, Ch. 2, f42). On the other hand, he
states that it is "obvious that law and authority have no business with restraining" it (CW, 18, Ch.
2, T)42). Thus, Mill makes his position clear on freedom of speech: it should not be legally or
politically restricted.
Mill provides arguments for freedom of individual expression, not from the natural rights
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of human beings, but rather from the utility of free expression. Mill's arguments for liberty
emphasize the utility of liberty.

"If, somehow, the principles o f liberty and utility were to

conflict, Mill would assert that the principle of utility must be upheld," writes Strasser (1984, p.
68). Although utility could be used, for example, by referring to the no harm principle to support
censorship, in practice utility cannot support censorship on the basis o f avoiding harm;33 for
example, the selection of the most appropriate censors and ideas on what constitutes harm are not
infallible.
Whereas conflicts between utility and liberty may not be real, what Mill considers free
speech does conflict with his freedom-utilitarian project's aim to maximize utility. Mill's "genius
lay in showing why apparent conflicts between utility and liberty were not real. His greatness as
a defender of liberty is precisely due to his ability to show why liberty must be protected on
utilitarian grounds," according to Strasser (1984, p. 68).

This chapter will argue that the

maximization of utility conflicts with the socially unrestricted practice o f free speech which Mill
proposes on the basis of a faulty view of liberty, although not precisely with liberty.
The second section of this chapter, entitled, "Mill's Main Argument from Beneficial
Consequences for Freedom of Expression," reconstructs Mill's utilitarian arguments for what he
considers free speech and opinion formation.

The third section of this chapter, entitled

"Utilitarian Problems with the Use of Unrestricted' Expression for the Pursuit of Truth," provides
a utilitarian constructive critique of those arguments. It uses the concepts 'political egoism' and
'epistemic fairness' to describe the problems of Mill's social epistemology and to suggest
revisions for an improved freedom-utilitarian project. The third section's fourth part, entitled
"Response to the Argument from Rationality for Unrestricted' Expression," suggests a notion of
free speech as the social transmitter of cognitive independence that is more consistent with the
utilitarian aims o f Mill's freedom project for the pursuit of mental independence, openmindedness, and self-knowledge and social knowledge than the notion of unrestricted speech.
33

See Doyle (2001).
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II. Mill's Main Areument that Freedom of Expression has Beneficial Consequences for
Society
In this section, I will explore how Mill approaches free speech, and I will reconstruct the
various components of Mill's argument that free speech has epistemic and developmental
beneficial consequences for society's members.
Today "free" expression is accepted in many countries, especially first world
governments and the United Nations. For instance, article 19 o f the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights reads: "Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right
includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart
information and ideas through any media and regardless o f frontiers” (United Nations, 1948).
But societies approach such statements in culture-bound ways.

No power has bothered to

rigorously define the terms of'free expression.' Generally, these are assumed to have laissez-faire
meaning. Thus defined, being free from social restrictions imposed upon one's communicational
activities is indicative of having freedom to communicate and freedom to form one's opinions.
Mill's On Liberty (1859) is popularly credited for the laissez-faire approach to free
speech. Mill's position for free expression can be subdivided into the arguments from the benefits
of independent thinking, from fallibility, from rationality and from the synthesis of truth.

i) Free Opinion Formation
Here, I will discuss some of Mill's claims on the beneficial relationship between free
expression and individual development, and his concerns with the capacity of social restrictions
to undermine individual development. Mill thinks that free expression contributes to individual
development. For instance, free expression facilitates independent thinking, for free expression
fosters the open-mindedness which independent thinking requires.

Mill's concern is that

restricting expression beyond considerations regarding the good of society would not permit
individuals to develop to their full potential. Restricted expression could at best make strong
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individuals become resistant to the excessive demands of restraint (CW, 18, Ch. 3, f9). In other
words, unnecessary social restrictions not only impede the developmental need satisfaction of
stronger individuals but also promote their social deviance.
Mill also stresses the need to foster the development o f independent thinkers. He goes so
far as to credit the advancement of truth more to wrong opinions that result from the independent
thought mode than to true opinions that the thinker does not hold rationally. He writes: "Truth
gains more even by the errors of one who, with due study and preparation, thinks for himself,
than by the true opinions of those who only hold them because they do not suffer themselves to
think" (CW, 18, Ch. 2 ,1[20).
Furthermore, as Mill puts it, "no one can be a great thinker who does not recognize, that
as a thinker it is his first duty to follow his intellect to whatever conclusions it may lead" (CW,
18, Ch. 2, ^20). Mill assumes that the independent thinker values truth and is open-minded, that
is, has the attitude of willingness to be persuaded to any opinions, regardless of what they may be,
so long as they are true; the open-minded individual chooses to make as many modifications or
changes to her opinions as are necessary to make those opinions more truthful. The open-minded
search for the truth is necessary for developing good judgment and, thus, epistemically rightful or
rationally justified confidence in one's practices (CW, 18, Ch. 2, 1f7). Hence, for Mill, the
function of open-mindedness is the individual development of knowledge, good judgement, and
virtue; free expression permits the independent thinker to obtain these.

ii) Free Expression of Held Opinions:
Here, I will provide a summary of Mill's main arguments for free expression of personal
opinions.

These include arguments from human fallibility, rationality, and truth synthesis.

Lastly, I will discuss Mill's claims on the mutually beneficial relationship between free
expression and individual development.
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1) Argument from Fallibility
Mill argues from the fact that human beings are not infallible. He asserts that we should
not allow assumptions of certainty in matters in which we cannot have absolute certainty to be
used to restrict expression. Since it is possible that we can make mistakes even in matters of
which we feel the most certain, we should always permit the opportunity for the correction of our
mistaken beliefs.

Society should not deny that opportunity to anyone. Mill writes:

"if all

mankind minus one, were of one opinion, and only one person were of the contrary opinion,
mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person, than he, if he had the power,
would be justified in silencing mankind" (CW, 18, Ch. 2, f l). Mill continues with the claim that
to silence the opinions of no matter how small a number is a public offence because the benefits
of free expression are not only private. That is to say, those benefits are not limited to the persons
who express themselves. Thus, from the start of his fallibility argument for free expression, Mill
proceeds to further develop a general argument that individual opportunities for free expression
benefit society.

2) Argument from Rationality
The argument from the rationality of free expression consists of two main components.
Mill argues that free expression has a crucial role to play in the rational (1) acquisition of the truth
and (2) sustenance of the truth.
For Mill, the acquisition of the truth gains from knowledge about what is truthful as well
as about what is false. Consider:
the peculiar evil o f silencing the expression o f an opinion is, that it is robbing the human race;
posterity as well as the existing generation; those who dissent from the opinion, still more than
those who hold it. If the opinion is right, they are deprived o f the opportunity o f exchanging error
for truth: if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier
impression o f truth, produced by its collision with error. (CW, 18, Ch. 2,1(1, emphasis added)

In the above passage, Mill claims that to learn the truth of why something is false is almost as
useful as to learn the truth of why something is true. Mill connects the acquisition of truth with

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

-

96

-

the recognition of falsehood so much that, he thinks, knowledge o f why something is true nearly
half depends on knowledge of why something is false. That is to say, knowledge of falsehood is
part of knowledge of the truth; the truth of falsehood and the truth o f the truth are parts of the
whole truth. The rational acquisition of knowledge requires that one should explore both truths
and falsehoods while one responds to objections, as I will discuss next.

2.1) The Rationality of Responding to Objections
Mill thinks that the truth is multi-sided, and that responding to objections facilitates an
individual's capacity to identify the various sides of the truth. As well, he thinks that one should
respond to objections in order to have a justified claim to the truth. He writes:
He who knows only his own side, knows little o f that. His reasons may be good, and no one may
have been able to refute them. But if he is equally unable to refute the reasons on the opposite
side; if he does not so much as know what they are, he has no ground for preferring either opinion.
(CW, 18, Ch. 2, H22)

To develop rational opinions, one must not only understand the premises for one's side but also
defend one's position against objections. Consider that doctrines are "never really known, but to
those who have attended equally and impartially to both sides, and endeavoured to see the reasons
of both in the strongest light" (CW, 18, Ch. 2 ,1J22).
Mill assumes that free expression promotes diversity of opinions, which, in turn, is
necessary for the acquisition of truth. He writes: "only through diversity of opinion is there, in
the existing state o f human intellect, a chance offa ir play to all sides o f the truth" (CW, 18, Ch.
2 , 1J35, emphasis added). The promotion of diversity increases the availability of opinions; this
availability permits the opportunity for persons to work with all the available opinions, not only
with the ones with which they agree. Given diverse opinions, free expression allows persons to
consider equally the various opinions and their objections.

2.2) The Satisfaction of the Necessary Conditions for Liveliness of
Truthful Beliefs
The second component of Mill's argument from rationality primarily consists of the claim
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that liveliness of belief is a necessary condition for knowledge. In turn, the necessary conditions
for liveliness of belief include that the believer should arrive at and search for opinions to
constantly challenge her beliefs, and resolve the challenged beliefs through an independent
thought process. Discussion helps beliefs to satisfy the knowledge requirement, for it exposes
beliefs to challenges.

Mill warns about "the mischievous operation o f the absence of free

discussion" (CW, 18, Ch. 2, 1(25). Not only one's knowledge of the premises for one's beliefs but
also one's grasp o f the meaning of truthful beliefs diminishes through the passage of time, if one
does not discuss those opinions with others who do not hold them (CW, 18, Ch. 2, 1(25-26).
Thus, for truthful beliefs to be known, the believer must obtain and sustain them in a rational
manner, that is, through discussion.
Although Mill does not provide an explicit definition of free discussion, his claims about
the functions of free discussion, the "mischievous operation of the absence o f free discussion,"
and the consequences of its absence suggest how he defines free discussion. It is an intellectual
and communicational "struggle" (CW, 18, Ch. 2 ,1|26) among opposing opinions that sustains not
only the grounds of each true opinion, but "the meaning of the opinion itself' (CW, 18, Ch. 2,
K25). Mill strongly asserts that knowledgeable beliefs must be challenged to be lively so much
that he describes discussion in terms that contradict each other; his view of 'discussion' is
comparable to the phrase 'peace is war.' He writes: "[the meaning of ethical doctrines and
religious creeds] continues to be felt in undiminished strength, and is perhaps brought out into
even fuller consciousness, so long as the struggle lasts to give the doctrine or creed an
ascendancy over other creeds" (CW, 18, Ch. 2, ^[26, emphasis added). Thus, Mill describes
'discussion,' which is a word that suggests "a pacific attitude towards argumentation" (Hansen,
2006, p. 2), negotiation and diplomacy, as a matter of doctrines or creeds struggling to keep the
strength of the life o f their meaning, and even to gain greater strength in their dominance over
others (CW, 18, Ch. 2 , 1J26). Discussion is a rational requirement to sustain the "living power of
the doctrine," (CW, 18, Ch. 2 ,1[26, emphasis added) and to retain the full meaning of the original
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opinions (CW, 18, Ch. 2, 1J25). Later in this chapter, I will show how Mill's treatment of
discussion contributes to the incoherence of his argument that free expression facilitates the
advancement of rationality.

3) Argument from the Synthesis of Truth: Epistemic Diplomats
Another of M ill’s arguments for freedom of expression is from the synthesis of truth in
which he claims that epistemic diplomats play a central role.

"Truth has no chance but in

proportion as every side of it, every opinion which embodies any fraction o f the truth, not only
finds advocates, but is so advocated as to be listened to" (CW, 18, Ch. 2, ^38, emphasis added),
writes Mill. The synthesis of truth requires the bold expression of multiple opinions on the same
issues. Mill expects that the over all free play of expression is multi-sided and reveals various
stories and perspectives. In this way, one can know not only one's position but also others'
positions. The awareness of the various views allows one to be responsive to others’ objections,
and thereby inform one's position. Thus, free expression has the additional practical benefit that
it permits not only toleration of the co-existence of diverse views, but the various views to
interact, and hence the benefit of discourse. From M ill’s viewpoint, free expression is a process
by which the diverse partial truths gradually merge into opinion clusters of larger and more
integrated truths, until eventually there is only one cluster of whole truthful opinions.
Mill recognizes that controversy can raise "even persons o f the most ordinary intellect to
something o f the dignity of thinking beings" (CW, 18, Ch. 2, f20, emphasis added). Yet, he
expects "persons of the most ordinary intellect" (CW, 18, Ch. 2, ^20) neither to play an active
role in the synthesis of truth nor to immediately acquire knowledge o f society. In the truth
synthesizing process, epistemic diplomats would have the central role in the reconciliation of the
one-sided and disputed truths or, in other words, in the aggregation of truths.

Epistemic

diplomats are individuals who benefit from the possession of the main characteristic, namely
impartiality, which the synthesis of truth requires, who epistemically gain the most from free
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For Mill, the capacity for impartial

judgement is rare. Mill writes: "there are few mental attributes more rare than that judicial
faculty which can sit in intelligent judgement between two sides of a question, of which only one
is represented by an advocate before it" (CW, 18, Ch. 2,1(38). Mill's political egoism begins with
his restriction of the number of social epistemic agents to the developmental elite group to which
he belongs.
While Mill deems impartiality necessary to advance the comprehension of the truth, he
expects that impartiality benefits only a few individuals, and suggests that most individuals
neither can help much advance knowledge nor can they gain much rationality. Mill writes: "truth,
in the great practical concerns of life, is so much a question of the reconciling and combining of
opposites, that very few have minds sufficiently capacious and impartial to make the adjustment
with an approach to correctness" (CW, 18, Ch. 2, TJ35). So, epistemic diplomacy is the inherent
duty of the few. Mill suggests that the advancement o f rationality of the few is made at expense
to the rationality of the majority of individuals. For Mill, the danger that free expression poses
for the views of the majority is epistemically acceptable because it benefits the rational few who
act as epistemic diplomats. Mill writes:
I do not pretend that the most unlimited use o f the freedom o f enunciating all possible opinions
would put an end to the evils o f religious or philosophical sectarianism. Every truth which men o f
narrow capacity are in earnest about, is sure to be asserted, inculcated, and in many ways even
acted on, as if no other truth existed in the world, or at all events none that could limit or qualify
the first. I acknowledge that the tendency o f all opinions to become sectarian is not cured by the
freest discussion, but is often heightened and exacerbated thereby, the truth which ought to have
been, but was not, seen, being rejected all the more violently because proclaimed by persons
regarded as opponents. But it is not on the impassioned partisan, it is on the calmer and more
disinterested bystander, that this collision o f opinions works its salutary effect. (CW, 18, Ch. 2,
1(38, emphasis added)

It is the epistemic diplomats who are capable of advancing social knowledge, not the narrow
minded societal majority.

Thus, the risked loss to the majority's already small capacity for

knowledge and the risked reinforcement of the majority's ignorance do not count in Mill's social
knowledge acquisition equation.
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5) The Equal Treatment of Falsehood and Truth
Here, I will draw from Mill's arguments that human fallibility, the rationality of
responding to objections, and the epistemic need to attend to extreme opinions entail a need for
free expression.34 First, we are fallible. For example, we are not certain about which of the
available opinions is the most truthful.35 Second, false opinions can inform truthful opinions as
much or nearly as much as truthful opinions can inform false ones. Third, the consideration of
extreme opinions can inform our development of multi-sided opinions. Therefore, we should
treat all opinions as if they have equal potentials for being the most truthful or the most false, and
as if they can equally inform our opinions.
For Mill, "the truth of an opinion is part of its utility" (CW, 18, Ch. 2, ^|10). The other
part is its falsity. An earlier part of this chapter examined a passage which claims that falsehood
enhances the life of the truth, for falsehood shows the truth about what is false, not only about
what is true. Opinions that are partly true are also partly false, and so are their opposites, but the
false and true parts that the opposite opinions have are different from each other. Opinions that
are entirely true have their true content entirely missing from their opposite opinions which are
entirely false. Identification of the truths and falsehoods that one's opinion lacks undoubtedly
adds to one's capacity to respond to the objections of others as well as to one's capacity to
construct more persuasive positions. Mill gives the example that thought in terms of progress or
reform informs thought in terms of order or stability, and vice versa (CW, 18, Ch. 2, ^[35). When
one tries to reconcile both thought modes or observes the opinions of others who operate the
various thought modes, these modes can provide useful input to one's position, whether they
belong to oneself or not. Mill lists other pairs of opposites or antagonisms in social life including

34
The connection that I draw here can reveal the unacceptable implications o f Mill's argument from
rationality for the equal treatment o f falsehood and truth. The next section o f this chapter explores those
implications.
35
I use 'opinion' to refer to a belief consisting o f at least one proposition. If an opinion consists o f
multiple propositions, some o f its propositions can be false while others can be true. Thus, opinions can
have both true and false contents, and vary in their degree o f accuracy and falsity.
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democracy and aristocracy, property and equality, co-operation and competition, luxury and
abstinence, sociality and individuality, and liberty and discipline. Both elements in each pair are
useful, and, therefore, should be "enforced and defended with equal talent and energy" (CW, 18,
Ch. 2, Tf35, emphasis added). Thus, Mill argues that we should equally treat truths, falsehoods,
and extreme modes of thought.

III. Utilitarian Problems with the Use of 'Unrestricted' Expression for the Pursuit of Truth
Here, I will provide responses to Mill's arguments that truth synthesis and rationality
require no social restriction on expression. I will provide a response to Mill's argument for the
epistemically equal treatment of falsehood and truth; that argument includes an evaluation of
claims that Mill makes in his fallibility, rationality, and truth synthesis arguments. Mill neither
epistemically justifies nor ethically justifies his social epistemology, and it cannot be justified, for
it lacks epistemic fairness. For the individual to justify her knowledge, she needs to give more
than reasons for her beliefs. For the individual to rationally36 hold her reasons, she needs to
obtain them through epistemically fair means, as I will discuss next.
I will suggest what can be considered a utilitarian, and thus consequentialist notion of
epistemic fairness, and argue that Mill's freedom-utilitarian project does not pass the epistemic
fairness test.

Under my proposal, the examination for epistemic fairness must consider the

number of epistemic agents who are the benefactors and beneficiaries to the pursuit and the
attainment of knowledge. One criterion for epistemic fairness would consider the social means
by which individuals obtain knowledge. The means are epistemically fairer, the greater the
number of epistemic agents whose knowledge benefits from their own and others' pursuit of
knowledge. Another important criterion for epistemic fairness would consider the results or
likely results of particular epistemic pursuits. The results are fairer, the greater the number of
epistemic agents who actively and immediately benefit from the acquisition of knowledge. In
36
The examination o f the individual's rationality requires also an evaluation o f the social rationality
o f the individual's actions.
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short, the more the means and ends of the utilitarian society's freedom project contribute to the
equalization of the distribution of the benefits and harms from the acquisition of knowledge, the
fairer that those means and ends are.
In particular, two main conditions affect the extent of epistemic fairness of cases of
knowledge pursuit and attainment. First, the utilitarian society must maximize the number of
epistemic agents whose social and cognitive development benefits from the pursuit and the
attainment of social and self-knowledge. Second, the utilitarian society must minimize or reduce
the number o f epistemic agents whose social and cognitive development is undermined by their
own and others' pursuit and attainment of social and self-knowledge.
For Mill, the obtained knowledge would be ethically justified because under the free
expression of opinions, at least in principle, all have their chance to be heard. Mill is concerned
that society's interference with liberty is more likely to have harmful than good consequences
(Strasser, 1984, p. 65).

As an example of an unfavourable consequence o f restricting the

expression of opinions, society persecutes the benefactors to the truth and thus endangers the
emergence of new truths (CW, 18, Ch. 2, f 16-17). Mill argues that, therefore, society should not
impair the utilitarian capacities of expression through political and legal restrictions, and suggests
a marketplace of ideas37 which does not ban the sale of any deemed falsehood or unpopular truth.
However, historically, what Mill calls free expression has been more ideal than real
(McMurtry, 1998, p. 192), and the reality of its absence overpowers the ideal of its presence,
while the ideal that it is present makes it difficult for society to recognize the reality that it is
absent. "Society always has, and constantly exercises, the power to silence," as Kendall (1960)
puts the social incapacity for unrestricted expression (p. 979). In light of this problem, this
section asks, 'What will secure us from corrupt or tyrannical media?' When society views the
institution of the media as possessing liberty of the press, this view serves to legitimize the
37
Although Mill does not explicitly use the metaphor o f marketplace o f ideas (Hansen, 2006, p. 5),
his argument that society should not restrain the expression o f opinions is consistent with the use o f such a
metaphor to convey Mill's treatment o f the free expression o f opinions.
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media's practices, even when those practices are not free from harmful political influence.
Without appropriate and adequate censorship the news media, for example, cannot ethically
report the news.

Slanted news stories about war and violence promote the mistreatment of

members of badly portrayed social groups, and inaccurately represent the nature of the human
population and its diverse interests. Just because society gives the various sources of the media
the opportunity to consider diverse political interests and, in principle, media sources claim to do
so, does not mean that they will, over all, do so in a politically balanced, honest, multi-sided
manner in practice.
The press is inevitably restricted; it cannot escape censorship, whether externally by the
government or internally by its owners and by those who have the power to influence it. Since
the press is inevitably subjected to social restrictions, the social restrictions placed upon it should
be transparent and decided in a fair, equitable, and cooperative manner. This section advises that
we should understand freedom of expression not simply as a negative epistemic and
developmental right of the individual for socially unimpeded cognitive expression but rather
primarily as a positive right to think and choose actions independently. As well, this section
brings attention to society's responsibility for the promotion of freedom of expression; society has
the ethical obligation to facilitate its members' independent thought mode and independent choice
of actions. Only thus, can freedom of expression do justice to the truth.

i) Response to the Argument from the Rational Sustenance of the Life of Truth for
"Unrestricted" Expression
Here, I will raise some objections to Mill's argument that rationality helps to sustain the
liveliness of truth, in light of the following passage. Mill writes:
If the opinion is right, they are deprived o f the opportunity o f exchanging error for truth: if wrong,
they lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression o f truth,
produced by its collision with error. (CW, 18, Ch. 2, ^[1)

The premises in the above passage are one-sided in at least two ways. First, Mill emphasizes the
benefits of free expression to human society in the acquisition of rationally justified knowledge.
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He emphasizes the expenses to the society that does not permit the expression of all opinions in
terms of loss of opportunities to enliven or uplift the rationality of its members' opinions.
The second way in which the above passage reveals one-sided premises is that Mill
implicitly claims that falsehood enhances the life of the truth because exposure to falsehood gives
us the opportunity to understand why something is false. The validity o f that claim depends on
whether persons tend to benefit from that opportunity, and whether the personal benefits obtained
from that opportunity outweigh the personal harms.

However, the validity of that claim is

questionable: Mill expects that mainly the developmental elite group to which he belongs will
experience the benefits of exposure to beliefs that are based on falsehoods; thus the one-sidedness
of his claim is also politically egoistic.
The presence and awareness of opportunities do not necessarily have beneficial
consequences over all or even at all. For instance, some persons use the presence and awareness
of economic

and

communicational

opportunities

to

justify

unequal

economic

and

communicational outcomes. In Canada, members of privileged social groups are much more
likely to successfully pursue economic opportunities to obtain influential positions in the media
(Fleras & Elliott, 2003). Thus, the same opportunity can vary by its degree of likelihood to have
beneficial consequences depending on the person who pursues it. Also, persons can successfully
pursue opportunities to the benefit of the promotion of the opinions of certain social groups, and
the persons can, in turn, create other opportunities to harm the image of persons with rival
opinions. For example, persons can use their expression to poison the well for the expression of
others. Opportunities for expression do not necessarily, whether directly or indirectly, have good
outcomes for society.
By assuming that opportunities for expression will have beneficial consequences over all,
Mill overstates the reality of the benefits that "unrestricted" expression render to society. For
instance, in the last sentence of the previous quotation, the assumption is that the persons being
exposed to falsehood would recognize it as such, that is to say, that they would benefit from the
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opportunity to detect falsehoods. The argument that rationality requires "unrestricted" expression
rests on the validity o f the assumption. Mill claims that everyone can benefit from "unrestricted"
expression. However, he predicts that only a rational few, at a time, will epistemically benefit
from expression. He does not explain how social knowledge, in the long-term, will become more
rational.

Another opportunity that "unrestricted" expression brings is for the elimination of

prejudice. Prejudice, for Mill, is "not the way in which truth ought to be held by a rational being"
(CW, 18, Ch. 2 , 1J21). This opportunity has to be realized to be a true benefit, and, in line with
utilitarianism, the greater the number of persons who realize the opportunity, the greater the
benefit to society.
However, Mill predicts that the majority is too one-sided38 to benefit from the
opportunity. If one considers that dismal prediction, the acceptability o f the argument from
rationality that favours "unrestricted" expression is highly questionable. We should give weight
to Mill's argument from rationality only to the extent that "unrestricted" expression provides the
benefits that he claims it does. As we have seen so far, this is unlikely.

ii) Response to the Rationalization of the Equal Treatment of Falsehood and Truth
I will discuss the political implications of the epistemically equal treatment of falsehood
and truth, which support my argument against Mill's claim that "unrestricted" expression has
utility. This discussion will show how Mill rationalizes the epistemically equal treatment of the
expression of falsehood and truth. Mill goes too far when he overstates the epistemic and social
utility of falsehood by encouraging that it be treated as equal to that of the truth. I will argue that
Mill's claim that the equal treatment of falsehood and truth facilitates the advancement of
rationality is another reason for why Mill's social epistemology is inadequately utilitarian. Mill

38
Mill writes that the "generality o f the world" is one-sided in that it leans towards the side to which
it "feels most inclination" (CW, 18, Ch. 2, f22). I use the term 'one-sidedness' to refer either to this
inclination or the expression o f opinions that consider only or mainly one side o f an issue, and I use the
term 'one-sided' to describe those opinions.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

-106holds the unrealistic expectation that the epistemically equal treatment o f falsehood and truth
would add to the politically equal treatment of persons who hold the ignorant or knowledgeable
opinions.

Yet, the equal treatment of false opinions and truthful ones does not entail the

politically equal treatment of the human beings who hold those opinions. The epistemically equal
treatment of falsehood and truth facilitates the advancement of the rationality of the few at the
expense of the rationality of the many, and thus it offers an elitist treatment o f society.
Mill takes the perspective of the epistemic diplomat who tries to integrate the various
truths, and treats the ignorance of others as a tolerable part of the means to the end of knowledge.
Mill's argument for the equal treatment of falsehood and truth demonstrates one-sided thinking,
for Mill does not consider that this exposure endangers others' knowledge capacities. Also, this
treatment is politically egoistic because Mill recommends this treatment as beneficial for the
developmental elite group to which he belongs, and the epistemic diplomat in particular. Mill
considers only the positive consequences of the treatment of the expressions of falsehood and
truth as epistemic developmental equals, because he attends only to the positive consequences
that it has for epistemic diplomats.

Yet, he ignores that this treatment may have negative

epistemic developmental consequences for the partisans. The availability of extreme opinions
presents social opportunities for the rational development of epistemic diplomats, and potential
intellectual rewards. These opportunities are unlikely to bring rewards to the partisans, but rather
make the partisans likely to incur expenses from being the ones to make available the extreme
opinions. The implications o f this elitist bias in Mill's considerations o f the social capacity for
knowledge will be further discussed in my response to Mill's argument that "unrestricted"
expression makes possible the synthesis of truth.
I question the capacities of "unrestricted" expression and ignorance to add knowledge to
the common good, that is, their epistemic utility. Mill treats the ignorance of the extreme thinkers
as a means to the end of knowledge for society. Since he finds epistemic utility in the expression
of ignorance, Mill argues that society should treat the expression o f falsehood as equal to that of
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- 107truth. We are ignorant about which opinions are the most truthful opinions. And, even ignorant
opinions can serve epistemic utility. Not only can persons who hold untruthful opinions be more
knowledgeable because of those opinions than persons who hold more truthful opinions, they can
epistemically benefit from the ignorant or untruthful opinions of others. So, for Mill, we should
treat ignorant or untruthful opinions as the epistemic equals o f knowledgeable opinions.
The use of ignorance as a means to knowledge is unlikely to adequately permit the
attainment of knowledge for all members of society. Encouragement o f ignorance contradicts the
aim to obtain knowledge about, and of, society.

Mill's argument implies that the societal

majority's ignorance must be exploited for the knowledge of the social few. The epistemic
diplomatic pursuit of knowledge takes into account what extreme thinkers have to say in hope
that society will obtain the desired multi-sided knowledge. However, the obtained knowledge
lacks multi-sidedness and is epistemically unfair, as I will argue next.
Mill's consequentialism does not satisfy the first condition for epistemic fairness, since,
he expects, only a small number of individuals are the active benefactors and the immediate
beneficiaries to the pursuit of knowledge. Neither does his consequentialism satisfy the second
condition for epistemic fairness. The epistemic diplomats obtain knowledge at the risk to the
knowledge capacities of the many. Mill's freedom-utilitarian project encourages the extreme
thinkers, whose beliefs benefit the diplomats, to hold on to false or ignorant views. That the
expression of extreme versions of beliefs permits the epistemic diplomats to work to reconcile
those beliefs is not sufficient for the epistemic fairness of the knowledge that they obtain from
their investigation of the extreme beliefs. For, the epistemic diplomats cannot develop adequately
reconciled beliefs, and they should not try to do so, at the expense to maintain others' ignorant
beliefs especially the higher their number. That the ignorant or false and extreme views of the
many facilitate the knowledge acquisition of the few does not permit the satisfaction of the utility
requirement for epistemic fairness.
Furthermore, that, in principle, an "all-questions-are-open questions society" cannot value
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-108 the truth more than falsehood makes that society's capacity to acquire knowledge questionable
(Kendall, 1960). "Unrestricted" expression makes such a society more closed than the impression
its ideal gives. An "all-questions-are-open questions society," in practice, restricts the questions
that its members can pose (Kendall, 1960). As the society disperses into different directions of
opinions, it is likely to lose public consensus on fundamental truths. The public’s toleration of
both falsehood and truth makes it difficult or impossible for society to rectify extreme social
movements that falsehood drives. Thus, so long as the persons pose or attend to one-sided
questions the answers they find will unlikely be multi-sided.
Mill's ideal of a discursively open society, in practice, restricts what society's members
can say, and, as Kendall (1960) argues, in such a society "the ultimate loser is the pursuit of truth"
(p. 978). The equal treatment of falsehood and truth is epistemically and ethically unjustified.
For, when falsehood is tolerated so are, inevitably, the very things to which its presence
contributes including ignorance, and, in turn, injustice including oppression. False beliefs are
more likely than true beliefs to have unjust implications.39 Proponents of political opinions that
happen to be false are comparatively less likely interested in the politically equal treatment of
persons who are different from themselves, for they are less likely to accept the true claim that
political equality is ethical. And, the society that treats the proponents o f falsehoods and the
proponents o f truth as equal epistemic champions is most likely to fall into increasingly deeper
extremes and oppositions that lead to increased political inequality between its members. Thus,
the society suffers from severe discrepancies between its social principles and its practices.
In short, persons can exploit society's treatment of falsehood as the epistemic
developmental equal of the truth to restrict discussion in ways that demote its freedom, and thus
falsehood cannot appropriately serve as the epistemic ally of truth. In light of my discussion,
Mill’s claim that open discussion has utility is inconsistent with his call for the epistemically

39
Here, I accept the assumption that the good positively correlates with the truthful; this assumption
is evident in the works o f ancient Greek philosophers, such as Plato.
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-109 equal treatment o f the expression of falsehood and truth.

iii) Response to the Synthesis of Truth Argument
For Mill's truth synthesis argument that "unrestricted" expression has epistemic utility to
be valid, the truths must be able to become adequately integrated.

I will argue that such

integration is unlikely, and, therefore, that Mill's social epistemology is inadequately utilitarian
for the following three main reasons. First, political inequality facilitates cultural imperialism
over truth, and makes unlikely the integration of the truths of all cultures.

Since political

inequality interferes with the societal capacity for unrestricted expression, the synthesis of truths
of all cultures remains unlikely. Mill ignores that the societal majority's lack of participation in
the pursuit of knowledge interferes with the synthesis of truth. Second, if most persons cannot or
do not sufficiently participate and acquire knowledge, participation in the pursuit of knowledge is
exclusive, and can interfere with society's acquisition of multi-sided knowledge. This under
participation of society in that pursuit does not permit meaningful additions to common beneficial
epistemic consequences.

Mill ignores that socially limited participation in the pursuit of

knowledge and socially limited acquisition of knowledge lacks utility. If the incapacity of the
majority of individuals to participate in the pursuit of knowledge or their lack o f participation in
that pursuit interferes with their capacity to acquire knowledge, the few individuals who can and
do sufficiently participate in the pursuit of knowledge can add only little knowledge to the
common good.

Greater participation in the pursuit of knowledge leads to more multi-sided

knowledge with which to work in the further pursuit of knowledge. So, if most persons would
participate in the pursuit of knowledge, each person would have greater potential to add more
knowledge to the common good than if only a few participate. Yet, Mill suggests that the
majority o f individuals are likely neither to be able to sufficiently participate in the pursuit of
knowledge nor to acquire knowledge sufficient for meaningful increases in their capacity to
freely develop themselves.

Third, Mill's claims about the nature of the human mind are
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- 110inconsistent with the claim that the practices that he recommends for the synthesis of truth have
utility. Mill views the human mind as typically incapable of impartiality. Yet, he suggests a
notion of open-mindedness that is a form of scepticism akin to truth agnosticism, thus he also
suggests that open-mindedness requires a high level of impartiality. Also, Mill views the human
mind as inherently one-sided, and he encourages the expression of one-sided opinions. Yet, he
also encourages the acquisition of multi-sided opinions. The practices that Mill recommends for
the synthesis of truth, would exclude the majority of individuals from participation in the pursuit
of knowledge, and hinder their knowledge acquisition. Therefore, especially but not only if Mill's
claims about the nature of the human mind are true, the practices that Mill recommends for the
synthesis of truth would be more harmful than beneficial to the social acquisition o f knowledge,
and thus lack utility.
Consider that the relations among social groups have never been, and are not, politically
equal, and are unlikely to become so anytime soon. From this consideration, one can see that the
truth which Mill calls integrated is most likely to remain biased in favour of the values,
preferences, political interests, and worldviews of the dominant group/s for an indefinite period of
time. Although the ideals of cultural integration are different from those o f assimilation, "in
practice, however, the outcomes of either may be indistinguishable" (Fleras & Elliott, 2003, p.
16). Since the powerful benefit the most from "unrestricted" expression, they can use it for
assimilationist purposes. Based on the popular idea that the mainstream can safely "integrate"
minorities while it adds to itself some of the elements of the minority cultures, the integration
approach has not proven to be effective.

Persons who the mainstream cultures incorporate

normally are unable to keep much of significance from their original cultures.40 Thus, dominant
cultures ensure their own survival at the expense of the loss o f the cultural integrity of
40
"For example, although immigrants in the United States are expected to melt into the American
pot, this cauldron remains irrefutably white, male, English-speaking, and middle class in orientation," write
Fleras and Elliott (2003, p. 16). In the United States, the pot has served a rather "monocultural stew"
(Fleras & Elliott, 2003, p. 16). Unfortunately, Canada too is shifting towards the "integration" approach
(Fleras & Elliott, 2003, p. 16).
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subdominant cultures. Similarly, the pursuit of the integration of truth occurs within a cultural
context. The limitations that apply for cultural integration influence the integration of truth as
well.
The claim that society can adequately integrate all truths is for related reasons both
ethically and epistemically unjustified under circumstances in which there is political inequality
in the pursuit and attainment of knowledge. For the general consequentialist argument in favour
of what Mill considers unrestricted expression to be adequately utilitarian, the expenses that
society incurs as a result of the "unrestricted" expression must be acceptable.

That is, the

expenses must not be higher than the benefits, and they must not support the tyranny of the
minority. Yet, this is not the case, as I argued previously. The "unrestricted" expression of
extreme opinions reinforces the majority's ignorance and thus hinders the majority's knowledge
acquisition. It is the epistemic diplomats who are supposed to be the active benefactors and
immediate beneficiaries to social knowledge, under Mill's freedom-utilitarian project. Therefore,
it is the epistemic elite whose truths social knowledge reflects, and hence the social knowledge
does not reflect adequately integrated social truths.
Indeed, for Mill, knowledge is the outcome of violent competition, and, in my view, it is
unlikely that violent competition can yield adequately integrated truth. Mill claims that the nature
of the one-sidedness of the human mind makes it impossible for society to peaceably uncover the
truth. Due to the scarcity of epistemic diplomatic capacities, "the rough process of a struggle
between combatants fighting under hostile banners" (CW, 18, Ch. 2, Tf35) adjusts our conception
of the truth. In fact, Mill goes as far as the claim that,
Not the violent conflict between parts o f the truth, but the quiet suppression o f half o f it, is the
formidable evil; there is always hope when people are forced to listen to both sides', it is when they
attend only to one that errors harden into prejudices, and truth itself ceases to have the effect o f
truth, by being exaggerated into falsehood. (CW, 18, Ch. 2, ^[38, emphasis added)

In response to the preceding claim, however, we should acknowledge that "unrestricted"
expression itself does not and cannot force people to listen to all sides. What matters is whether
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-112 the expression actually is free. The "unrestricted" practice of expression can bring some persons
opportunities for development, not necessarily developmental results. Individuals choose what
they do with developmental opportunities including whether they recognize their developmental
worth.
Contrary to Mill's claim that "unrestricted" expression forces people to listen to all sides,
the "unrestricted" practice of expression promotes one-sided cognitive modes. "Unrestricted"
expression can be used to reinforce existent prejudice. Indeed, the majority takes what today is
considered free expression as simply an opportunity to search for opinions and facts that support
one's version o f the truth. Confirmation bias is the cognitive tendency to select or attend to
information that supports one's beliefs and to omit or ignore information that contributes to their
disconfirmation.41 Mill's assertions that "the generality of the world" leans to the side to which it
"feels most inclination" (CW, 18, Ch. 2, ^[22), and that free discussion likely reinforces the
"sectarian views" of "impassioned partisans" (CW, 18, Ch. 2, ^38) suggests his implicit
awareness of confirmation bias.

And so does his assertion that "in the human mind, one

sidedness has always been the rule, and many-sidedness the exception" (CW, 18, Ch. 2, ^33), and
his denial of the capacity of the societal majority for impartial thought (CW, 18, Ch. 2, 1J38).
These claims suggest that Mill has at least an implicit notion of confirmation bias. In his view,
the human tendency to be one-sided interferes with the majority's capacity to benefit from
expression.

Mill's freedom-utilitarian project hopes to maximize the individual capacity to

cognitively benefit from expression. Yet, his project's recommendation for socially unguided
cognitive expression are inconsistent with his views about the biased nature o f human cognition,
for the views suggest that the individual cannot adequately guide her own thoughts towards
knowledge. That he ignores the implications of his own psychological assertions when he argues
for "unrestricted" expression further suggests that Mill argues one-sidedly for that expression and
that his own one-sidedness may itself be the result of confirmation bias.
41

See Nickerson (1998).
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-113 Many-sidedness cannot have the force to guide without appropriate social facilitation of
cognitive free expression, if one-sidedness is the cognitive default and thus more inherently
forceful. Mill's expectation that epistemic advancement is slow but possible under the guidance
of those who accept "many-sidedness"42 is unjustified given his own claims about one-sidedness.
He recognizes that one-sidedness is the cognitive default. Even worse, Mill's expectation that
multi-sided truths can compete with one-sided truths is inconsistent with his claim that one-sided
truths have more force. Mill claims that
so long as popular truth is onesided, it is more desirable than otherwise that unpopular truth should
have one-sided assertors too; such being usually the most energetic, and the most likely to compel
reluctant attention to the fragment of wisdom which they proclaim as if it were the whole. (CW,
18, Ch. 2, T(33, emphasis, added)
Apparently, for Mill, the forceful assertion of one-sided truth is epistemically justified. For
example, he considers exposure to falsehood, which one-sided truth is more likely to reflect than
multi-sided truth, as epistemically beneficial. Mill expects that "wrong opinions and practices
[will] gradually yield to fact and argument" (CW, 18, Ch. 2, T[7). Yet, Mill recognizes, "very few
facts are able to tell their own story, without comments to bring out their meaning" (CW, 18, Ch.
2, T]7). It is questionable whether the rhetoric which often accompanies the story telling of
perspectives would be able to escape one-sidedness, for rhetorical comments tend to be politically
biased.
Mill's claim that social questions deserve, wherever warranted, "this and that" responses,
and should not be taken as being "either-or" questions is rational. However, he selectively targets
this advice, apparently giving it only to the epistemic diplomats and intellectuals. For, the mode
of extreme thought, which he encourages for partisans because he views the observation of
opinions obtained through that mode as epistemically beneficial for the epistemic diplomats,
happens to positively correlate with the either-or cognitive mode.

This mode of thought is

inconsistent with the aim to obtain social knowledge that reflects adequately integrated truth.
42
I use the terms "many-sidedness" as the expression of, or the capacity to understand multiple
perspectives and "multi-sided" as the expression of that capacity.
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Mill recommends that to synthesize the truth the epistemic diplomats must reconcile the
apparent antagonisms and dualisms. However, it is unlikely that this reconciliation will happen,
for the cognitive modes which Mill claims society should practice impede the epistemic
diplomats' capacity to obtain knowledge that reflects adequately integrated truths.
It merits notice that the claim that society should treat the elements in each pair of
opposites and social antagonisms as equals is questionable, for they unlikely have equal epistemic
and ethical importance. For example, property and political equality are unlikely to be of equal
benefit to society. The elements of property and equality are fundamentally incompatible. In
capitalist systems, in particular, private property tends to undermine equality.43
For Mill, the opposites, when combined, keep each other within the "limits of reason and
sanity" (CW, 18, Ch. 2, ^[35). The reason of the epistemic diplomats combines opposites, and
thus integrates truth and permits sanity.

Further, one could expect that as the diplomats'

knowledge spreads throughout society the extreme thinkers should become less extreme 44
Therefore, at the very best, there is a time lag in the social distribution of the rewards that
result from the extreme thought mode. This time lag in the distribution of knowledge from
epistemic diplomats to the extreme thinkers merits attention.

Next I will explore some

implications of this knowledge distribution time lag.
This time lag weakens Mill's freedom-utilitarian argument, because the knowledge
benefits are not socially distributed in a way that maximizes the epistemic utility o f the majority
of society's members. As we have seen, the impartial epistemic diplomats would obtain the
primary rational, developmental advantage from their investigation o f one-sided beliefs. By
contrast, those who hold the extreme beliefs have their rational development hindered by those
beliefs. The intellectual elite's epistemic cultural transformations are supposed to assist indirectly

43
For an account o f how M ill’s acceptance o f private property rights stands at odds with his ideal o f
gender equality, see, for example, Hughes (1979).
Mill does not make this expectation clear and he does not explain how this could happen.
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-115 and in the long-term the rational development of the partisans. The partisans cannot personally
benefit from their own extreme views, but rather they benefit as a social group from the extreme
views of previous generations o f extreme thinkers.
For Mill, the intellectual elite are most capable of being active epistemic agents, whereas
non-intellectuals can be the passive recipients of knowledge that intellectuals find.

Only

intellectuals can obtain social knowledge on their own, and thus they are active epistemic agents.
There is no active role partisans can play for the intellectual advancement o f their society. The
societal majority can obtain mainly second-hand social knowledge - i.e. knowledge that they did
not originally acquire, and thus most persons are passive social epistemic agents.
The multiple kinds of knowledge cannot be equally found by various persons. Anyone
can obtain self-knowledge through experiments of life. However, even for the acquisition of selfknowledge, the partisan is remarkably, epistemically disadvantaged compared to the diplomat in
two related ways. First, self-knowledge depends on social comparisons and thus on knowledge
not only of oneself but also of others. However, the epistemic diplomat can appreciate others'
perspectives more than the partisan can. The epistemic diplomats are not only supposed to be the
active benefactors but also immediate beneficiaries to synthesized truth. Society in general only
benefits in the long-term. Second, self-knowledge depends on social knowledge or knowledge
originally acquired by others, whether it is knowledge that others have found about themselves or
about their social and natural world.
The fact that self-knowledge to some extent depends on knowledge about others is
relevant not only to the partisan's capacity to obtain self-knowledge but also to that of the
epistemic diplomat. For, if the social knowledge that epistemic diplomats obtain does not reflect
adequately integrated truths, the social knowledge does not permit the epistemic diplomats to
understand others enough to optimize their own self-knowledge.
Mill encourages the continuation of one-sidedness in the unpopular opinions so long as
there is one-sidedness in the popular opinions (CW, 18, Ch. 2, TJ33). Contrary to Mill's claim that
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the forceful assertion o f one-sidedness can be epistemically beneficial, the assertion of one
sidedness is neither more forceful nor more epistemically beneficial when the popular opinions
are one-sided. One-sided expression likely demotes open-mindedness in the society that lacks
multi-sided expression.

Mill claims that an attitude o f open-mindedness is required for the

development of flexible and multi-sided thought.

Moreover, for Mill, the attitude of open-

mindedness upon which the pursuit of synthesized truth depends is akin to truth-agnostic
scepticism:

the open-minded person must be equally open to all opinions but, to avoid the

assumption of infallibility, closed to the conviction of any belief. That attitude is meant to guard
one from being “lost in one’s mind,” i.e. able to see only from one's perspective, as the partisan
supposedly is. But, this open-mindedness, instead, makes the way for one to “lose one’s mind,”
i.e. lose the progressive cognitive capacity to form new perspectives, because the attitude requires
the suspension o f judgment. In my view, the attitude which Mill views as open-mindedness is
more a matter of closed mindedness, that is, no new perspective taking, than open-mindedness
which requires the individual to understand, and form, multiple perspectives.

Thus, the

acceptance of the condition of truth-agnostic scepticism as necessary for the pursuit of truth
cripples, if not paralyzes, the epistemic endeavour.
Therefore, one-sidedness is inconsistent with the pursuit of multi-sidedness carried on by
the same person and the same society. The truth-agnostic, sceptical type o f open-minded attitude
avoids claims of certainty and hence conviction of belief. Thus, this attitude is incompatible with
the epistemic capacities of the societal majority who, according to Mill, are not capable of
impartiality, and much less are they capable of this kind of "open-mindedness," which requires an
extremely high level of impartiality. This attitude is also incompatible with the reconciliatory
aims of the epistemic diplomats who are supposed to judge the truths o f claims; with this
attitude's extreme approach to open-mindedness, they are also supposed to be non-judgemental.
Because of its social and cognitive incoherence, the truth synthesis argument for
"unrestricted" expression is weak and unacceptable. The expected gradual movement towards
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- 117many-sidedness seems infinite in duration since it is dysfunctional. By Mill's admission, the
opportunity for "unrestricted" expression would unlikely affect the majority's prejudice. Their
cognitive tendencies severely limit the extent to which the majority could benefit from their
cognitive expression and the chances that they can develop multi-sided beliefs. Even worse for
the prospects of the effectiveness of Mill's project, according to Mill, the movement towards
many-sidedness requires the strong assertion of one-sidedness, which would likely reinforce the
existent prejudice. As I argued, the requirement for the forceful assertion of one-sidedness is
inconsistent with the requirement for open-mindedness, and with the pursuit o f multi-sided truth.

iv) Response to the Argument from Rationality for "Unrestricted" Expression
For the advancement of human rationality, the practical thing to do is to socially regulate
the expression of opinions in ways that will optimally facilitate free cognitive expression, that is,
the independent and open-minded formation of opinions and the expression o f multi-sided
opinions. I will argue that what Mill considers socially unrestricted speech is inconsistent with
the aim to optimize free individual expression, and the exercise of the independent thought mode
in particular. Here, I outline the arguments that I will make in the next parts of this chapter.
I will provide a consequentialist critique of socially unrestricted speech. I maintain that
intentions have little importance in social reality where what matters are the implications and
consequences of our opinions and actions. From a consequentialist perspective, the meaning
conveyed is more important than the intentions of the speakers or writers, because the meaning
that their messages convey is more likely than the intentions to influence the actions of the
listeners or readers. Put another way, because it is more difficult to recognize the intentions than
the meaning conveyed, it is unlikely that they will influence one's actions. Similarly, I maintain
that principles provide insufficient guidance for cognitive developmental and communicational
activities. Principles neither guarantee nor optimize the chances that persons will act in ways that
have favourable consequences for the expression o f society's members.
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institutionalized practices can optimize freedom of expression.
I accept Mill's claim that freedom of expression makes societal progress towards justice
possible, but I reject his definition of free opinion expression and opinion formation. I will
discuss two general types of expression, one which reinforces the status quo and the other which
contributes to social progress. The relationship between the "unrestricted" expression that some
societies view as free expression and societal progress is incompatible, for that expression
charges expenses to, and in some important ways hinders, societal progress. The problem is that
contemporary societies that claim they permit free expression do not distinguish between these
two types of expression, because they overestimate the freedom of their expression. I maintain
that freedom of expression both benefits from social and epistemic justice and contributes to
justice. While free expression is a necessary condition for justice, justice is also a necessary
condition for free expression.
I will argue that it is a myth that "unrestricted" expression is more conducive to social
justice than regulated expression. "Unrestricted" expression is politically impossible in politically
unequal social contexts. The laissez-faire approach to expression simply allows those who hold
the most power over the communicative situation, namely the owners o f the press and the like, to
invisibly set the restrictions upon the expression. The invisibility o f the restrictions o f expression
makes it difficult for society to recognize what is unjust about the expression, and thus hinders
attempts to improve its freedom. I will show that the laissez-faire practice of free expression
increases the likelihood that expression will be socially expensive, that is, harmful for
disadvantaged groups. For, the laissez-faire practice of expression tends to benefit those who
have power and it disproportionately harms those who do not.

"Unrestricted" expression is

socially expensive in that it facilitates the political elite's capacity to restrict the communicational
and social opportunities o f the politically disadvantaged. Thus, it is developmentally harmful for
the elite because it undermines their social discipline and capacity for unbiased knowledge but
especially more for the disadvantaged.
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I will show that regulated expression can be free. Individuals who aspire for positive
freedom are misdirected, if they take the indirect route of negative freedom. The methods for
positive freedom of expression require that society should set and implement regulations to
optimize that freedom.

Liberal thinkers may worry that expression can become excessively

restricted. They need a reminder that negative freedom, too, can become excessive and, in its
extreme form, it is incompatible with positive freedom. Society can and should ensure freedom
by regulating expression in ways that optimize the individual capacity for open-mindedness and
the individual exercise of the independent thought mode. Thus, by means of the regulation of
expression, society can accomplish the following epistemically and developmentally beneficial
tasks.

Society can provide rational justification for its claim that it actually practices free

expression. Society can optimize positive freedom in ways that also promote negative freedom.
Regulations on the media's expression can ensure that the media covers a wide range and depth of
issues sufficient for society to render meaningful epistemic and developmental opportunities,
while these regulations also counteract the societal capacity for mentally coercive practices. In
these ways, society can facilitate the expansion of individual developmental power. For the
laissez-faire liberal thinker, the idea that government can optimize freedom may seem
paradoxical.

After all, the "unrestricted" expression which they assume is free expression

corresponds with the negative sort of right and with negative freedom. I will emphasize the need
for positive freedom o f expression while I will also recognize the need for negative freedom.
And, I will emphasize freedom as a positive right, while also recognizing that freedom is a
negative right as well.
I will discuss that "unrestricted" expression of opinion formation and the held opinions
does not generally favour societal progress towards justice over increasing societal injustice.
Likewise, "unrestricted" expression does not necessarily favour the acquisition of truth over the
acquisition of falsehood. I will show that "unrestricted" expression is fit for the reinforcement of
the socially held falsehoods and the production of additional social falsehoods.
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-120 Expression is free in proportion to the justice of the society in which it occurs. That is to
say, there is a positive relationship between the freedom of expression and the degree of justice
present in the society that practices freedom o f expression. I will suggest that the capacity of
expression to promote and contribute to justice and truth depends, in part, on how transparent its
social restrictions are.

Only an equitable kind of expression that is more concerned with

communicational outcomes than with mere communicational opportunities can do justice to the
pursuit of truth and social progress. The communicational outcomes need not be the same to
equally satisfy the various individual needs.

1) Free for Whom? 'Unrestricted' Expression: A Restricted Form of
Expression
Here, I will argue that "unrestricted" expression as a form of free expression is,
ultimately, restricted and socially expensive expression; it is socially and politically restricted and
epistemically and ethically costly. My critique on the laissez-faire practice of expression will
focus on how the media invisibly politically restricts speech with consequences that are
inconsistent with independent opinion formation, the promotion of open-mindedness, and the
acquisition of knowledge.
Mill does not substantiate that "unrestricted" expression is politically possible.

He

overlooks the role of political inequality, and thus he ignores questions such as 'Who gets to
communicate?' Mill holds an implicit notion of confirmation bias, as discussed in my response to
Mill's argument that "unrestricted" expression maximizes the societal capacity to synthesize the
truth. However, he does not consider the political effects of the fact that generally persons are
more likely to listen to other persons similar to themselves than to persons who are different from
themselves.

He does not consider that some persons benefit more politically not only

epistemically from the opportunity for expression. Such beneficiaries are normally those who
already have the power. He does not give serious coverage to the harms that society may incur as
a result of "unrestricted" expression. Contrary to his assumptions, expression is not free simply
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- 121 because one is, in principle, permitted to communicate with others. In fact, certain persons can
afford to express themselves more than others. The one-sided opinions o f socially privileged
persons are more likely to be vocal and more advocated in public than the one-sided opinions of
the socially disadvantaged.
Mill naively advocates "unrestricted" expression. Similarly, he also naively advocates
what is popularly considered free trade.

He advocates "the doctrine o f international free

trade...as the means whereby all countries [can] secure the benefits o f international
specialization" (Harris, 1956, p. 70).

Mill sees "no necessary connection between the

international free trade movement and imperialism" (Harris, 1956, p. 70).

For example, he

overlooks the fact that certain countries have their specializations forced upon them by, and
according to the interests of, the dominant countries. "Free" trade is comparable to "unrestricted"
expression in its negative implications for the individual capacity to independently cognitively
develop, and the question 'Free for whom?' applies to both. What is popularly considered free
expression is not necessarily free. The extent to which expression is free significantly depends on
the amount of power that is held by the communicative agents.
Mill misunderstands the issue of the exercise of power in social relations (Harris, 1956, p.
172). His lack of consideration for the role of power in social relations is evident in the fact that
he does not recognize that "the market of ideas," which to him means the process of free
discussion, can convert into "an arena of competitive salesmanship" (Harris, 1956, p. 172-173).
In short, to speak in capitalist terms, in the market place of ideas some can afford to advertise
their products more than others. This fact holds implications for the individual's capacity to
pursue knowledge through "unrestricted" or invisibly restricted social expression; this form of
expression is often based on the capitalist and laissez-faire notions o f the business of the press.
This form o f expression can propagate falsehoods and can result in social distress, and the
reinforcement of old, and creation of new, injustices As we will see next, these forms of
expression inevitably suffer from internal censorship of the press, that is, the owners of the press
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-122control its censorship according to their ideological interests.
The lack of freedom of the market and freedom of the press are mutually reinforcing
(McMurtry, 1998). The rules of the market hinder the freedom o f the press. Those who have
wealth and power can control the press and have an interest in, as well as the ability to, impede as
much as they desire expression opposed to the market. McMurtry (1998) argues that "the degree
of exclusion of oppositional representations and views in a market (or other) society is
proportionate to how clearly such representations or views contradict its pattern of rule" (p. 204),
or the basic social structural fact that capitalist corporations dominate the media. The operations
of exclusion choose what is to be "ruled out as unspeakable," "omitted," "selected out," and
"marginalized" (McMurtry, 1998, p. 202).
The ideal of the free press does not reflect reality,45 regardless of the claims of the press
that it does. Consider:
In the venerable ideal o f "a marketplace o f ideas," the "freedom o f the press" is the jewel in the
crown. It promises a vital congress o f contesting voices and views, a debate o f the public good in
which all who come to the meeting place o f fellow citizens can be heard by and argue with peers.
(McMurtry, 1998, p. 192)

By stigmatizing and mentally coercing individuals who dare question its freedom, the press
maintains the appearance that it is free. Consider:
Because o f its resonance as a social ideal, "the free press" is still expounded as a sacred value,
indeed as the ultimate expression o f the "free market." This, in turn, is conceived as synonymous
to a "free society" or to "the Free World." Anyone who ever doubts the freedom of'the free press'
risks being condemned as hostile to society's most basic liberties. (McMurtry, 1998, p. 195)

Because it violates free cognitive expression, mental coercion is inconsistent with free expression,
as the previous chapter explained. The press is free insofar as it can express what it wants, but
this capacity does not suffice for free expression. The press can "condition the conscious and

The conditions for a free press are not fulfilled now, and they have never been fulfilled. "Certain
conditions for a free press were more in evidence in North America in the second half o f the nineteenth
century," notes McMurtry (1998, p. 192). Although not in the same region o f the world, that was around
the time that On Liberty (1859) was published, and before corporate interests had taken over the press.
However, at that time, another form o f censorship affected the press, namely, religious censorship. The
second chapter o f On Liberty is largely a reaction to that censorship.
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unconscious lives of masses across the globe" (McMurtry, 1998, p. 195). Thus, the press hinders
the masses' free cognitive expression because it impedes their exercise o f the independent thought
mode. These consequences for the minds of the masses of the press's expression do not permit
the press freedom of expression.
Another way by which the press, under the influence of the economic market, hinders
independent thought formation is that it narrows the range of knowledge that it expresses.
Knowledge promotes independent thought formation because knowledge permits the thinker a
greater number of cognitive opportunities to make considerations and choices over beliefs.
However, the requirements of operations of the market contradict the requirements of knowledge.
Consider:
the concepts of "rationality" and "knowledge" come to be absurd expressions. What knowledge
requires, the "knowledge-based economy" mles out. What wider comprehension and impartiality
demand, the "rationality" of profit-maximization blinkers from view. When we examine the
assertion of the 'new knowledge-based economy' more closely, we come to realize that it selects
against whatever does not conform to its demand structures. It is, in this way, more properly
designated as "an ignorance-based economy." (McMurtry, 1998, p. 187)
The operations of the market are incompatible with the maximization of knowledge, rationality,
and impartiality.
Not surprisingly, the capitalist press is an inadequate educational resource, because it
does not express an adequate range and depth of opinions. The inconsistent standards between
the market and education can explain this inadequacy. In particular, the motivations, methods
and the standards of excellence of the market contradict the motivations, methods and the
standards of education. For instance, two standards of excellence in education include "how
inclusively it takes into account others' interests and avoids one-sided biases," and "how deep and
broad the problems it poses are to one who has it" (McMurtry, 1998, p. 188). In contrast to the
former educational standards, the standards for the economic market include "how one-sidedly its
own product is made to sell," and "how problem-free the product is and remains for its buyer"
(McMurtry, 1998, p. 188, emphasis added).
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-124 Consequently, "unrestricted" expression permits the tyranny of one-sided views, and the
tyranny of the economically privileged people who hold them. For example, invisibly restricted
expression facilitates indoctrination. Consider:
Propaganda and indoctrination are identifiable by repetition o f a one-sided view that is not open to
counterevidence or argument, by closure to opposing voices and facts, and by incessant repetition
o f a received doctrine. With the media as with other capitalist enterprises, private owners and
their advertiser patrons have the legal right to select and exclude as they choose. . . "Freedom o f
the press" belongs, by the mles o f the market itself, only to those who own one. (McMurtry, 1998,
p. 200)

The owners of the press can be as one-sided as they wish, able to spread propaganda and
indoctrinate their viewers, readers, and listeners, with the power to select and exclude the
expression of whomever they choose. Thus, expression, in public places, can be exercised mainly
by members of groups who already hold more than their fair share o f power. They have more
opportunities to do so. It is in their political interest to practice censorship. So too, consider that
the media "creates a condition for controlling thought without our awareness o f what is
happening," that "propaganda is the inevitable consequence o f creating messages that support one
point of view to the exclusion of others," and that "[reflect] the interests o f those who own or
control the media" (Fleras and Elliott, 2003, p. 331). Thus, with its expression under the guise of
being "unrestricted" expression, the media can interfere with the open-mindedness and
independent thought formation of its viewers.
Therefore, the myth that there is "unrestricted" expression facilitates power-driven
expression's capacity to maintain the existing societal structure.

For, when unrecognized as

restricted, expression can constrict thought and compel opinions to form toward the side of the
economically and politically privileged.
Society unevenly distributes the benefits of democracy and of its principles, including
freedom of expression, and, so long as society continues to do this, it will continue to be unable to
maximize the acquisition and expression of knowledge. For example, racialized groups, that is,
groups of persons whom society considers as having a visible minority status, benefit the least
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from what society largely considers democratic and free expression (Henry and Tator, 2006).46
The media simply dismiss the concerns of racialized groups with claims that the groups are
opposed to freedom of expression. Consider:
There exists in the media a significant resistance to altering the power o f the dominant culture.
Attempts by racial minorities to protest and resist racist images and discourse in the media are
frequently challenged by the media. These protests are seen by the corporate elite as attempts to
suppress freedom o f expression and are equated with censorship. (Henry and Tator, 2006, p. 272)

Ironically, the media does not recognize that racialized minority groups concerned with the media
may regard White-dominated expression as tyrannical because it impedes their own freedom of
expression.

Society connects the way the marketplace operates without constraint to the

championed freedom of expression (Henry & Tator, 2006, p. 272). Terribly, free speech refers to
only "the rights and privileges that very few groups in .. . society possess, in terms of their access
to the media" (Henry & Tator, 2006, p. 273, emphasis added).
Furthermore, when members of disadvantaged groups express themselves in public,
society expects them to be polite to the interests of the dominant groups. Disadvantaged persons
are coerced by social expectations to make overly generous concessions and deny the extent to
which society discriminates, exploits, marginalizes or oppresses them. Take the example of first
generation racialized immigrants and their children who may be citizens by birth, all of whom
may state in public their actual social experiences in an effort to raise awareness o f the true extent
to which they are socially devalued and subordinated. When they do so, society tends to perceive
them as outrageous and ungrateful to the kindness that has been given to them by their great,
"host" country. Terribly thus, some persons simply can afford to express themselves truthfully
more than others, whereas covert demands for dishonesty are systemically imposed upon some in
w ays that are inconsistent w ith the prom otion o f their political equality.

In terms of consequences for the freedom of the involved parties, the social and mental

46
The media are not democratic in their portrayals o f racialized groups because the "norms, values,
and assumptions o f White, male-dominated institutions continue to prevent the mass media from fairly and
accurately reflecting and representing the multiracial reality o f Canadian society" (Henry & Tator, 2006, p.
273).
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coercion to express things about oneself, and to adopt opinions, that favour the politically
privileged interests is comparable to the coercion against the "least developed" and "developing"
states in international liberalization. I discussed psychological oppression's interference with the
free formation of opinions including the opinions that persons hold about themselves, in the
previous chapter. Now I will briefly mention how international "liberalization" interferes with
the self-determination o f economically disadvantaged societies, and thus with the free social and
cultural expression of its members. In international trade, the largely unregulated exchange of
goods benefits the "first" world more than the "third" world.
participate in those exchanges more freely than others.

Some countries can afford to

In fact, "free" trade, not only is

accompanied by international agreements on regulations for trade conduct, but is actually forced
upon some societies. In principle, free trade is meant to be free for whomever is willing to sell
and buy. In practice, there are regulations that in effect force some unfortunate societies to
participate in those exchanges, even when participation goes against their economic interests. For
example, coerced by the international bank institutions, some countries are forced to adopt
programs to restructure their domestic economies, even when these programs are against the
interests of their civil life (Madeley, 2000, p. 58). The World Trade Organization falsely presents
"itself as a forum for members to negotiate over trade liberalization" (p. 60), writes Madeley
(2000). He continues:
In practice the organization is a trade liberalization juggernaut which has been ceded enormous
power by its members. It uses that position to further the cause o f liberalization, to the chief
benefit o f those who stand to gain the most: in practice, the transnational corporations. (Madeley,
2000, p. 60)

The interests of transnational corporations monopolize how societies practice liberalization.
Lastly, there are what can be considered cultural monopolies in the context of
“unrestricted” expression and “negotiable” truths. And there are cultural monopolies that do not
permit free competition over the “best buy” culture. When the standards to measure the worth of
a culture are determined by the dominant culture, it is of no surprise that the culture most likely to
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be viewed favourably by those standards is the dominant culture. In practice, through the control
of the press by capitalist interests, the free market serves in the assimilation of culture. The
dominant cultures are able to cast the most influence in the assimilation of the subordinate
cultures into the dominant, "market-friendly" culture. The final part of this chapter will return to
this point.

2) Free Speech as a Social Transmitter of Cognitive Independence
Here, I will focus on the pursuit of free speech and independent opinion formation. I will
argue that the freedom of speech depends on the extent to which independent thought motivates
the speech, and the extent to which the speech promotes others' independent thought mode.
Independent thought both benefits from knowledge and contributes to knowledge. As well, the
capacity for open-mindedness benefits from freedom and it contributes to freedom.

Hence,

freedom of speech has to be positively supported by educational and social resources that
facilitate the acquisition of knowledge, and by adequate opportunities for public expression.
Independent thought should be informed enough to be able to properly, wisely, and freely direct
speech toward the truth and justice, because doing so will increase the likelihood of the speech's
promotion of further independent thought.
Free speech cannot be limited to self-talk, nor can free thinking be limited to
introspection. Free expression is a social activity, and as such an internal disposition-focused
definition of, and approach to, it is inappropriate. To adequately understand free expression,
society needs knowledge of how social situations affect the internal dispositions that contribute to
the freedom of opinion formation and an individual's motivation to communicate her opinions.
Free expression can be socially facilitated by practices that are informed by relevant social,
cognitive, and behavioural scientific knowledge on how to socially promote the independent
thought mode. The freedom of speech is positively influenced when it is directed from within by
independent, informed, and principled thought modes, and from without by fair policies and
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programs set by the government and by media organizations designed to facilitate independent
thought formation.
Invisibly restricted speech is not necessarily guided by the love of the truth and justice,
and thus, there is no reason to believe, as Mill does, that it will result in the acquisition of either.
Undeniably, when society allows persons to say whatever they want they can use their
"unrestricted" speech, for example, to express lies, to disregard the truth, or to be neutral to the
truth. The point is that "unrestricted" expression is not necessarily a better friend of justice and
truth than transparent, socially regulated expression.

Certain conditions have to be met for

expression to come to be an ally of the just and truthful, and a companion o f freedom.
Regulated expression can be consistent with free cognitive expression so long as its
restrictions facilitate the exercise of the independent thought mode. Counterproductive to the
promotion of the independent thought mode, the politically privileged persons can politically and
unfairly benefit from the illusion of unrestricted expression and its constriction of human thought.
And, they can unnecessarily limit what can be expressed to the political advantage of the
politically privileged themselves.

Thus, expression disempowers the growth capacities of

individuals, for it limits their cognitive and social developmental opportunities.
For Mill, if it is to be free, thinking must be independent, as the previous section of this
chapter discussed. The requirement of independent thought for freedom which Mill accepts is
inconsistent with his acceptance of "unrestricted" cognitive expression and social communication.
It is also inconsistent with his implicit encouragement of the majority's ignorance for the sake of
the epistemic diplomats' knowledge advancement. Knowledge fosters mental independence, so
the acquisition of knowledge is inconsistent with invisibly, politically restricted expression,
which facilitates mental coercion and the promotion of one-sided views. As well, unrestricted
thought is led only by the default of human cognition, and independent thought is not one of those
inherent cognitive defaults. Rather, independent thought requires social and cognitive discipline.
Standards of logic can guide independent thought so that it may avoid fallacious thought modes.
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-129 As well, it benefits from the guidance of social cognitive knowledge identified by the social
sciences. Mill would agree with the claim that independent thought must be guided by rational
principles so long as these are not socially imposed. While an agent is free who gets to think or
say in such and such a way, such and such a thing, this freedom can be developmentally
expensive for both the recipients and the agent herself. For example, human beings tend to think
in heuristic ways, using schemata acquired by social learning (Aronson, Wilson, Akert &
Beverly, 2004, p. 76), and they tend to select only the information that fits into those schemes and
ignore other information (Nickerson, 1998). For that reason, when human beings are left alone to
think in an undisciplined way, they may make foolish decisions, some of which result in social
costs both to others and to themselves. If the schemes they hold are false, and unjust, no one
benefits from their thoughts no matter how unrestricted their faulty thought mode is considered to
be. Their thinking thus can, in fact, be expensive in terms of eliminating opportunities to develop
more sophisticated thinking habits and thereby good judgement. Also, their unrestricted thought
mode could be expensive in that it leads them to close themselves to being persuaded to the
contrary opinion with the result that they are unjust to others. For instance, negative stereotypes
influence persons to unjustly expect the worst from certain others, and, in many cases, lead
persons to treat others according to the held stereotypes. Thinkers who stereotype the most
severely are unlikely to choose to give the discriminated persons the opportunity to be perceived
in a more positive light.
Therefore, expression may be free insofar as it tolerates the opinions of existent
independent thinkers, but to the extent that it hinders the formation o f new independent thinkers,
it may, indeed, lack freedom and be socially and developmentally expensive. "Unrestricted"
expression of thought can be counterproductive to the aim for individual development, as evident,
for example, when persons act in accordance with gender and racial stereotypes to deny
developmental opportunities to others. Individual thought requires a good education, whether
formal or informal, to develop the critical and creative skills, habits and attitudes, and knowledge
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bases with which to proceed from and towards free thought. Independent thought cannot occur
when one proceeds from ignorance and an undisciplined mind. Individual thought needs to be
provided with certain cognitive and social supports for it to develop the independence which is
necessary for its freedom. That is why education should be treated as a positive right. The
independent thought modes are unlikely to be exercised by under- or mal-educated minds.
Mill overemphasizes the beneficial contributions that "unrestricted" expression
supposedly renders to social progress. He does not do justice to the social distress, the social
expenses incurred as a result of "unrestricted" expression. He does not acknowledge the fact that
"unrestricted" expression can be a hindrance to social progress.

For instance, Mill unfairly

challenges persons who, as he says, may be ill thought of, and ill spoken of, or persons whom
what he considers "free" speech may victimize, to simply learn to cope with it. He writes:
Those whose bread is already secured, and who desire no favours from men in power, or from
bodies o f men, or from the public, have nothing to fear from the open avowal o f any opinions, but
to be ill-thought o f and ill-spoken of, and this it ought not to require a very heroic mould to enable
them to bear. (CW, 18, Ch. 2, |1 9 )

Thus questioning the intentions and dispositions of persons who others may adversely target
through their speech, he turns the issue into a personal one for any of those to whom the comment
may apply, not only for the intended group.
In the previous quotation, Mill ignores the fact that private issues can also be public ones,
that what affects persons can also have significance for the groups to which the persons belong.
He does not seriously consider the fact that marginalized social groups can be disempowered by
what he considers free speech when they are unfavourably targeted by it. Admittedly, Mill
recognizes that in regards to the resolution of the various beliefs on the truth,
if either o f the two opinions has a better claim than the other, not merely to be tolerated, but to be
encouraged and countenanced, it is the one which happens at the particular time and place to be in
a minority. That is the opinion which, for the time being, represents the neglected interests, the
side o f human well-being which is in danger o f obtaining less than its share. (CW, 18, Ch. 2,1(35)

However, the preceding comment gives empty advice. Mill expects that there should not be any
institutional practices to optimize adherence to principles such as that persons should act to
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-131 minimize harm through speech, because such practices would have the "undesirable"
consequence that they restrict expression. But, institutional practices can promote independent
thought, and facilitate free cognitive expression through their maximization of favourable,
developmental opportunities to increase the likelihood of rational cognitive outcomes.

For

example, imagine a society that regulates the way that hateful books can be sold and signed out of
libraries.

The society legally requires that hateful books be sold or signed out in pairs or

multiples such that the buyer or library patron must purchase or borrow at least two books with
opposing perspectives, one hateful, and the other or others informed by ethics, philosophy and the
social sciences. That society would maximize the opportunity for the buyers of books to read the
counter-perspective books. Although this opportunity would not necessarily prove beneficial, it
would increase the likelihood that the readers consider the more informed, counter-perspectives
instead of simply accepting the messages of the hateful book. This practice, which I proposed
above, would encourage the individual exercise of the independent thought mode and would
actually demote the extreme form of censorship of harming books.

Thus, the practice is

consistent with Mill's argument that society should encourage the development of independent
thinkers and with his criticism against silencing controversial voices. Mill considers that ideally
individuals should listen to the lowest voices, but that is as far as he goes. He does not consider
that without endorsing the necessary practical institutional changes, given the political imbalances
in communication, such advice lacks seriousness and is devoid o f substance. What I brought
attention to in the previous parts of this section are the differences between Mill's ideal of free
speech and the requirements for the practice of free speech.

3) The Pursuit of Truth through Laissez-faire Freedom and Social
Darwinism
Here, I will explore whether the freedom-utilitarian project's argument from rationality
promotes violence and has social Darwinist implications.

I will argue that, ironically, the

argument from rationality is willing to sacrifice the rationality of many individuals for the sake of
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the rationality of a few individuals. The argument from rationality promotes not only symbolic
violence, but also human physical violence over the truth, and has some social Darwinistic
implications for members of cultures whose truths the privileged do not select. Mill's freedomsocial epistemological project is incompatible with the pursuit of epistemic and cultural progress.
Mill recognizes that "unrestricted" expression can do disservice to justice (CW, 18, Ch. 2,
f37). However, Mill sees some injustices as "necessary" or permissible evils for the ultimate end
of the justice which he thinks will result from knowledge of the whole truth.
Mill argues for "unrestricted" expression because of the developmental service that it
does for the rational acquisition of truth, although it does so through militancy. "Unrestricted"
expression performs a militant service for the truth, since keeping the truth lively requires the
sacrifice of life. For true opinions to be rationally held, violence is permissible. Reconsider
Mill's claim that "not the violent conflict between parts of the truth, but the quiet suppression of
half of it, is the formidable evil" (CW, 18, Ch. 2, T[38). Mill suggests that to keep the life of the
truth is more important than to safeguard human life. Partial truths are embodied in those who
hold them, including those who are willing to fight for them, and are loyal to them to the death.
Mill associates the rational acquisition of the whole truth with violence which may be
deadly, by associating its parts with engagement in violent conflict that would have the distant,
but eventual consequence of arrival at the whole truth. So, while Mill associates the truth with
life and falsehood with death, he also, whether intentionally or not, associates the truth with death
and falsehood with life. The quality of the life of the truth benefits from keeping falsehood alive
as well. Mill's argument that "unrestricted" expression advances rationality promotes not only
symbolic violence among partial truths but, while it promotes that symbolic violence, it also
promotes physical violence among the persons who hold those partial truths. Mill's argument that
there are utilitarian benefits to "unrestricted" expression inadequately accounts for the fact that
human social conflicts can result from persons' aggressive demands that others should accept the
truths of the demanding party.

Mill's argument from rationality implicitly claims that the
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-133majority's ignorance should be tolerated so that the knowledgeable few may work with the
ignorant, partially true, extreme beliefs of others to rationally uncover larger truths. Thus, that
argument accepts the uneven social distribution of knowledge, without considering how that mal
distribution can impede certain people from achieving the benefits of social knowledge and from
benefiting society through the informed choosing of actions.
Next, I will consider the connection from the freedom-utilitarian project's social
epistemology to social Darwinism. Mill assumes that the truth is to a large extent invincible. He
says:
"when an opinion is true, it may be extinguished once, twice, or many times, but in the course of
ages there will generally be found persons to rediscover it, until some one o f its reappearances
falls on a time when from favourable circumstances it escapes persecution until it has made such
head as to withstand all subsequent attempts to suppress it" (CW, 18, Ch. 2, f 17).

However, humankind has neither ever witnessed, nor is it witnessing right now, a historical stage
in which political inequality has been absent, and thus political inequality has so far proven that it
reproduces itself throughout the ages. And, so long as political inequality is not directly treated,
Mill's prediction that the most truthful stories will become immortal, while the false ones will die
out is not justified. Neither is the expectation that the most just and beautiful ideas and cultures
will persevere, while the ugly and unjust ones will be chased out of what some presume is the
naturally good order of the world.

Social Darwinists, and the like, make the preceding

presumption. They locate the defects to lie within the dispositions and cultures of marginalized
groups for their apparent lack of adaptability, and fail to see the defects in the social environment.
Thus, they fail to take into account that not only good and truthful things are demanded from
persons by their society as requirements for their social fitness. Social Darwinists assume that
everyone is so cia lly g iven a fair chance to satisfy those dem ands or that the unfairness is the

result of inherent differences. At the very least, social Darwinists do not recognize the epistemic
need to consider whether the demands the social environment makes are fair for the identification
of good cultures. Since the order of the social world is mainly socially constructed, and those
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social constructions do not necessarily correspond with the truth o f anything, there is no reason
for why we should expect that the 'whole' truth, if there is such a thing, would fit the best into our
social world.
In great irony, the connection between market theory and social Darwinism is
noteworthy. Social Darwinist ideology, which holds that the socially fittest survive, impedes
capitalists from seeing the defects of their theory. The proponents o f market theory assume that
their theory is infallible:
Market theory introduces the logic o f social Darwinism before Darwin. Darwin reproduced the
struggle for survival, in which masses o f the species die as a matter o f course, to the non-human
realm, in which selection is not by man-made design. The market theory has not developed such a
distinction between realms . . . It did not occur to Smith or Ricardo that starvation, even mass
starvation, could count as an argument against the truth or beneficence o f the invisible hand o f the
market. On the contrary, they saw it as the effective mechanism whereby market laws o f supply
and demand worked with the labour factor o f production. They did not much concern themselves
with the death or life o f the "inferior classes." Like the Social Darwinists they preceded by a
century, they thought this to be a "natural law" . . . The certitude and the dominance o f market
doctrine have increased in intensity as crises become more acute . . . An intense certitude and
demand for absolute rule in accordance with perceived divine design are characteristics o f
fundamentalist faiths, particularly in dark times. O f note here, however, is the closure o f the
market doctrine at its most "scientific" and "rigorous" levels o f advocacy and defence to any
possible disproof o f its principles. If a theory rules out any possibility o f factual disconfirmation,
it is not a scientific or even rational theory, but a closed dogma. But which basic principle o f the
market doctrine is now open to evidence or argument that could show it to be mistaken? What
extreme accumulation o f wealth at the top o f society, or destitution and misery for the majority o f
society, can indicate to this system o f thought that something is wrong with its invisible hand o f
distribution? (McMurtry, 1998, p. 76-77)

The deaths of persons whose needs have not been met are obvious signals that political inequality
interferes with the proper function of the market laws of supply and demand. Capitalists ignore
these signals. Capitalists cannot recognize the unreliability of the laws of supply and demand
because, under the spell of perceived infallibility, they are irreversibly confident about these laws.
No social observation, no matter how severe, could stop the capitalists continued following of
these laws. These optimists dogmatically expect that eventually the laws of supply and demand
will prove to be the rational mechanisms for the distribution of goods, even though there are no
indications that it is rational to expect this.
With capitalists' overwhelming control over it, the "free press" excludes knowledge in
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proportion to how much the knowledge goes against capitalist interests. Ironically, it turns out
that market theory, as discussed in the previous quotation, and upon which Mill naively places his
faith, has made the very assumption of infallibility which Mill warns against. The proponents of
the “free" market deny the public the opportunity to refute market theory. Mill never anticipates
that the "market place of ideas," as a result of "free trade," could suffer this fate.
So, how does the social Darwinism present in the capitalist treatment of the economic
market compare to Mill's freedom-utilitarian social epistemological treatment of the market place
of ideas and the market place of life styles? Mill does not concern himself with the life or death
of cultures which are "proven" to be unsuitable for individual development by the cultural
preferences which individuals freely express.

The market laws o f supply and demand are

applicable to the "unrestricted" selection o f the most developmentally appropriate cultures.
Invisibly restricted freedom permits the demand for the "fittest" cultures, while diversity permits
the various cultural supply. The developmental elite get to select the "fittest" truths. Mill writes:
"Progress, which ought to superadd, for the most part only substitutes, one partial and incomplete
truth for another, improvement consisting chiefly in this, that the new fragment of truth is more
wanted, more adapted to the needs o f the time, than that which it displaces" (CW, 18, Ch. 2, ^[33,
emphasis added). The truths that are selected mainly depend on the preferences and social and
individual needs of the persons who have a say in the selection. The same main problems are
present in both the capitalist market and the market place of ideas and lifestyles.

Political

inequality hinders the capacity of demand to accurately reflect the preferences and developmental
needs of all persons. The social and cultural supplies are not distributed among all persons who
actually need and prefer them.
The important distinction between the social Darwinist principle for the identification of
the "best" products in the capitalist market and freedom, as a social epistemological principle for
the pursuit of truth and the most developmentally supportive cultures, is that the utilitarian nature
of the freedom project can guard it from the assumption of infallibility. The freedom social
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epistemological project which Mill proposes can be judged based on the most important
utilitarian standard, namely, utility. This thesis has sought to understand the utility of Mill's
freedom-utilitarian project

including

that of the project's

developmental

and

social

epistemological features through an investigation of the project's consequences for the various
members of society. This investigation has included a careful examination o f the features o f the
freedom-utilitarian project plan with the aim to predict the project's likely consequences for
various social groups based on philosophical reflection, current social scientific knowledge, and
interdisciplinary insight.

IV. Conclusion
This thesis chapter finds that Mill’s ill-defined freedom misdirects his social
epistemological project. The laissez-faire freedom principle does not take into account political
inequality. Instead, the principle hinders awareness of the influence o f political inequality on the
expression of individuality and on efforts to develop one's various capacities. Optimistically,
Mill expects gains in political equality will result from the freedom-utilitarian project's cultural
and epistemic improvement functions. The practice of laissez faire freedom for the freedomutilitarian project's pursuit of individual development maximization is doubly problematic and
inappropriate. For, this practice both adds to the project's limitations and makes those limitations
difficult to identify.
The confounding effects of political inequality undermine not only the epistemic
capacities of politically disadvantaged persons.

The epistemic capacities of the politically

privileged are undermined as well, although not as severely as those o f the disadvantaged. Recall
that, for Mill, the kinds of knowledge which persons can find depend on their capacity for
impartial judgement and on the nature of the opinions which they hold. The epistemic diplomat
can obtain both knowledge of self and social and natural world, whereas extreme thinkers can
obtain mainly self-knowledge. Persons can obtain self-knowledge through "experiments" of life.
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-137 The epistemic diplomat has the advantage, above extreme or partial thinkers, of the capacity to
obtain other kinds of knowledge that are useful to make informed social comparisons. However,
due to the influence o f political inequality on our capacity to make accurate social comparisons,
even the epistemic diplomat's capacity to obtain self-knowledge is social and psychologically
hindered.
The approach to free speech that condemns social restrictions upon it throws Mill's
freedom- utilitarian social project into error. This approach treats free speech as apolitical, but
free speech cannot be properly depoliticized. "Unrestricted" expression is not politically possible
in a social context of political inequality. Mill's argument for "unrestricted" expression from truth
synthesis is weak. The main reason for this is that "unrestricted" expression facilitates cultural
assimilation, and thus it politically biases the expression of the obtained "integrated" truths.
"Unrestricted" expression conflicts with the adequate distribution of opportunities for free
expression. If society always restricts expression at least invisibly, it is best to regulate the
expression transparently. Therefore, the most reasonable option to maximize social freedom is to
properly regulate expression.
As it turns out, because it lacks consideration of how political inequality interferes with
the utility maximization of society, Mill's "freedom-utilitarian" project is inadequately utilitarian,
because the project's consequentialist assessment of the utility of free expression is politically
egoistic. The freedom-utilitarian arguments for "unrestricted" expression make considerations
from its favourable consequences for individuals who, because of their social circumstances and
presumed inherent superior endowments, are the most capable of being the benefactors to, as well
as benefiting from, such expression Those arguments do not consider the harmful consequences
for anyone.

Mill's politically egoistic social project primarily considers the individual

development and the benefits of political and individual expression for the few developmentally
strong individuals. The developmental and political gains of the few are promoted at expense to
the gains of the under-developed and even the presumably less developable. Last but not least,
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-138the project permits a greater likelihood of social harm for the politically under-privileged who
have less social permission to express themselves and are thus unlikely to developmentally
benefit from that expression.
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION
Mill's utilitarian argument for the free expression of individuality is weak.

Mill's

politically egoistic assumptions and claims about human nature recommend social attitudes and
practices that could help optimize the developmental power of only a minority of individuals.
The societal majority will be excluded from being the benefactors to, and the active and direct
beneficiaries of, the practices that Mill recommends. From a utilitarian perspective, lack of
consideration for the societal majority's utility is a profound weakness: the majority would either
be unlikely to benefit developmentally or not benefit as much as the elite from the practices that
the freedom-utilitarian argument claims are beneficial to society.
Mill's assumptions about inherent developmental power differentials encourage a social
condition of unequal benefactors and beneficiaries, in light o f the causal interdependence of
individual developmental power and utility.

In Mill's view, some individuals have inherent

strengths across the attributes which he considers serve social utility, and which, when used,
allow such individuals a greater likelihood of being the benefactors to social progress. As well,
when these individuals have these attributes, they are likely to be the beneficiaries of social
environmental factors that foster individual development.
Mill holds several forms of elitism: intellectual, moral and political elitism.
together, these constitute a broader form of elitism, namely, developmental elitism.
presumes that the developmental elite consist of rare individuals.

Taken
Mill

If accepted, the ideal of

developmental elitism would rationalize the deprivation of most persons' opportunities for
individual development. Thus, developmental elitism would waste the developmental resources
of most persons. So, I am concerned with Mill's view that society should grant intellectuals more
political power. What warrants concern about his form of intellectual elitism are its unwarranted
psycho-biological and social developmental assumptions.
Mill's intellectual elitism constitutes a self-fulfilling prophecy. The social expectation
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that certain persons, in this case those among the majority, who have developed their abilities to
ordinary levels, cannot much serve society in socially important practices such as public
administration has developmentally unfavourable implications for such persons.

This social

expectation could lead them to not receive the opportunity to further their abilities. Deprived of
adequate developmental opportunities, the majority of individuals would, consequently, most
likely provide little utility. Thus, such persons would be set up to have less social worth.
Mill emphasises individual responsibility for self-development, and for the improvement
of one's social and personal worth. Mill is concerned with the responsibility of society mainly
when it comes to society's duty to let persons develop themselves as it suits each one. He thinks
that this permission for their developmental independence would leave them a sufficient range of
choices to improve their "comparative worth" as human beings (CW, 18, Ch. 3, ^4).
Mill places the locus of developmental responsibility on the individual who is supposed
to exercise and expand her developmental power in ways that produce not only individual but
also social progress.

He recognizes that individual expression has not only personal

consequences, but social consequences as well for the pursuit of knowledge. He recognizes that
the pursuit of knowledge is both an individual and social pursuit.
However, Mill's recommendations for approaching individual and social freedom and for
the pursuit of knowledge focus on an individual's dispositions and pay little attention to the social
situations which contribute to the maximization of individual development. Mill's position that
the individual can use "unrestricted" expression to learn the truth about her psychological nature
removes the recommended "experiments" of life from their social context. Mill's arguments do
not account for the effects of the existing social and power differentials on the degree of accuracy
possible for the experimental results.
Mill's freedom-utilitarian project does not account for political inequality, an interfering
factor in both self-education and the advancement of knowledge of others and world. Rather, he
naively expects that self-education and social epistemic advancement will remedy political
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inequality. Consequently, Mill inadequately explores society's duties for the maximization of
individual development. He ignores the social responsibility required for the maximization of the
freedom of every individual's expression and opinion formation.
Political egoism is a form of argumentative bias under which an arguer recommends
certain practices based on the claim that those practices will benefit society, yet the arguer
suggests that the benefit will apply only or mainly for an elite to which she belongs. Politically
egoistic arguments hold political implications that an exclusive social group will benefit from
certain recommended practices while other social groups will be either unaffected or harmed by
those practices.
For a strong freedom-utilitarian project, the freedom of expression and its benefits should
be widely distributed, as the fourth chapter explained.

Yet, political egoism in Mill's

considerations prevents a distribution of benefits wide enough for meaningful additions to the
common good, and thus political egoism prevents an epistemically fair project.
This thesis identifies the main problem with Mill's freedom-utilitarian project is that it is
to be pursued in profound contradiction to its aim to maximize utility. Over all, "unrestricted"
expression is an epistemically and ethically unjustified way to pursue the truth. Mill does not
carefully examine the consequences of "unrestricted" expression; he ignores how the means that
he recommends for the advancement of knowledge contradict the ends. Mill does not recognize
the cognitive and social incoherence present between each of the following pairs of ideals and
practices. First, he promotes a culture of individualism for the sake of cultural pluralism, but, in
turn, for the sake of the arrival at the one "perfect" culture of knowledge. Second; he promotes
diversity toleration for the expression of personal one-sidedness, but also for the sake of the
advancement towards impersonal multi-sidedness. Third, he encourages the competition among
the "sales people in the market place of ideas" over the promotion and sale o f their one-sided
truths, but for the sake of the cooperative production of multi-sided truths.

Fourth, Mill

encourages cultural diversity and declares opposition to cultural assimilation, but disregards the
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suggested cultural assimilation's de facto cultural genocide of the deemed falsehoods that can
occur, even when what is pursued is the de jure "integration" of the deemed truths. Thus, at best,
it is possible to integrate the truths of the privileged cultures while denying the truths of
subdominant cultures. Fifth, Mill encourages the assertion of personal opinions that are one
sided and thus largely ignorant because they lack multi-sided truth, for the sake of opinions that
are multi-sided and thus knowledgeable because they include reconciled one-sided truths. Out of
one-sided opinions, the impartial few may develop multi-sided truthful opinions which the one
sided opinion possessors may never know. Thus, the ignorance o f the partial many is the means
to the knowledge of the impartial few.

Sixth, Mill encourages the expression of one-sided

opinions, which he deems are most compelling, for the sake o f the promotion o f openmindedness, which requires the acquisition of multi-sided opinions, but if one-sided opinions
actually are more compelling, then it is most likely that they would demote open-mindedness.
Seventh, Mill neglects the irrational world that would be dying over falsehood for the sake of a
rational few living with the truth. Mill encourages the blood sport in which the contestants must
fight over partial truths for the sake of the impartial reconciliation of truths by the more
epistemically worthy spectators. Mill disregards the loss of human life that can result from the
pursuit of the enlivenment of the truth, and he disregards that it is socially harmful to tolerate the
irrationality of the majority of individuals for the sake of the rationality o f the few.
Mill explicitly denies support for the tyranny of the developmentally strong minority, but
this is only his intention.

While it tries to avoid the tyranny of the majority, the freedom-

utilitarian project plan expresses political egoism that promotes the tyranny of the minority in
practice through the promotion of the developmental elite's rule over social progress.

This

tyranny may seem paradoxical because progress proceeds under it. However, the progress is
based on the satisfaction of the elite's developmental needs, and the advancement o f their political
interests and various preferences. This is not progress that considers the needs of all society's
members.

This is just politically egoistic progress under which the developmentally strong
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-143 individuals are the main possessors of their social world. History belongs to the developmentally
strong. They are the progressive ones who continue it. Culture belongs to them. They are the
ones who originate and diversify its cultural practices. The truth belongs to them. They are the
ones who find its whole. Freedom belongs to them. They are the ones whose individualities are
strong enough to permit them to contribute the most to, and benefit the most from, freedom's
improvement. Society belongs to them. They are the ones deemed fit to lead it. For Mill, the
societal majority is most wise when it simply follows.
Mill optimistically looks forward to a time in the distant future, when there would be one
culture of knowledge, but as many ways of life as there are individual natures. I submit, even
then, society under the influence of the developmental elite would assign the various individual
natures differential levels of social utility, but no longer on the basis of their advancement of
social progress. This differential assignment would likely be based on their capacity to sustain
the achieved state of social progress. Since, for Mill, the social worth of the consequences of
one's actions determines their moral worth, and he expects that only a small number of
individuals will take such effectual actions, high levels of moral worth would continue to belong
to the few.
While he argues for "unrestricted" speech from the need to sustain the life of the truth,
Mill misses the wide, concrete picture. The "market place of ideas" is located on the earth.
Disputes within it are part of an ongoing battle upon the stage of human history with real social
consequences, real social distress, as humankind is forced to confront life and death issues, not
only epistemic issues. The loss of life that occurs in battles over some perceived truth is not only
the loss of the liveliness of the truths present in one's opinions. The life risked does not only
belong to the ideas in a contest between the "sales persons" in the "marketplace of ideas." The
loss of the life of the deemed truth does not only result in the academic distress o f thinkers whose
opinions have been refuted, or in the loss of rationality for those who, unable to discuss their
beliefs, have lost a rationally justified claim to them. The issues humankind confronts have to do
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-144with the survival of the rational aspects of our cognitive and social life and the potential for
civilizational extinction, both materially and socially.
Cultural imperialism over the truth has implications for the ways o f life that society
deems acceptable or rejects. The political and social environment between and within all nations
of the world sets the specific demands or the criteria for the adaptability o f nations. So long as in
the world environment, the dominant cultures continue to set their politically egoistic, selfinterested demands on diverse people, the cultures that survive the longest are not going to be the
most adapted to the truth or the good. Instead, it is cultures that are the most compatibly selfcentered which will be the fittest in it, that is, so long as society does not destroy itself through its
own corruption of “rationality,” "truth," and the “good.”
Some cultures are destined to die away because they cannot adapt to the demands of the
corrupt world historical environment. Regardless of their truths, some beliefs are destined to die
with their cultures because they lack compatibility with the dominant cultures. The political and
social environment of the extinct culture was likely structured largely by its dominant groups and
in accordance to their own political interests and their own versions o f the truth and justice, which
do not necessarily reflect the truthful and just. In fact, dominant versions o f truth and justice tend
to be based on the opposite, that is, falsehoods and oppressive ideologies. Bluntly put, when
one's social environment demands one's acceptance of falsehoods, one is not going to survive in it
by telling the truth. Thus, the truths which are the most dominant are neither necessarily nor
potentially the most synthesized socially available truths, so long as the social structures do not
reflect the truth of the various individual natures. For example, the real biological potential of
human beings is not, and has never been, reflected by the social structures; these better reflect the
truth that the world is dominated by falsehoods about individual developmental capacities.
The freedom-utilitarian project treats the rational life and developmental needs of the
individual as if their satisfaction can, to a large extent, be detached from the social environment
which influences the nature of those needs. For this reason, the progress that Mill's freedom-
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-145 utilitarian project can bring for the individual is mainly in principle, not in practice.

The

enhanced appearance o f progress is not necessarily accompanied by actual progress. The mere
appearance of progress can help to secure the mainstream illusion that society is already
progressive. Laissez-faire freedom ideals, such as those o f Mill, which are not meant to be
implemented through enforceable programs, can only add to rationalizations o f the existing order.
Since laissez-faire freedom ideals appear to support rationality, and "unrestricted" expression is
the "blessed" rule o f the "developed" world, many accept the view that challenging the status quo
is irrational. Consequently, while progress is hindered in practice, progress is preserved as an
abstract notion held in some principled minds.
The social developmental capacity is inherent to the individuals that constitute society,
but this capacity can, to a large extent, be socially facilitated or hindered for individuals.
"Unrestricted" expression and formation of opinions interferes with the capacity for individual
development.

At its best such expression unevenly promotes individual development.

As

"unrestricted" expression makes the strong developmental capacity scarcer and promotes the
contest over the worth of the development of each individual, the freedom-utilitarian project
continues a perpetual condition of unequal benefactors and beneficiaries.
Finally, I suggest that there are various argumentative biases including one-sidedness that
weaken Mill's consequentialist arguments for freedom, and thus that he fails to meet his own
epistemic standard of multi-sidedness. Mill is perhaps motivated to assert one-sided views so that
his position may be more forceful and compelling (CW, 18, Ch. 2, f33). This would explain why
Mill's discussions on the capacity of free individual expression to add to the common good are
often biased in their coverage. Mill focuses on the benefits o f politically unrestricted expression,
but he does not give enough coverage to the harms that can result from it. He ignores logical
conflicts and examples that problematize his views.47 This thesis has identified at least seven of
the incoherences in Mill's freedom-utilitarian project, and explained that these incoherences are
47

See Kimball (1998).
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VITA AUCTORIS
Sulma Portillo was bom in San Salvador, El Salvador, in August 28, 1977, where she
spent her early years during a time of civil war. To escape the Salvadoran civil war, in 1982, her
family migrated to the United States, then, in 1985, to Windsor, Ontario, Canada where she has
lived since.
Portillo has dedicated much time to learning and cultivating her various intellectual and
creative skills. In 1998, she commenced her undergraduate studies at the University of Windsor
in the psychology program. That year, she took her first course in philosophy "Reasoning Skills."
She did not pre-cognize that she would later study philosophy as an undergraduate student, while
working for Informal Logic, and that she would assist the same professor of the "Reasoning
Skills" course, who happened to be an Editor of the journal. Even less did she pre-cognize that
she would go on to study philosophy at the Master's level, while working as a Graduate Teaching
Assistant of the "Reasoning Skills" course.
In her fourth year of psychology, she took the course "Informal Logic: Argumentation"
which was taught by Ralph Johnson who would later employ her at the journal Informal Logic.
The argumentation course stimulated her interest in the study of philosophy. The capacity of
philosophical study to help in the development of good reasoning and argumentation skills
impressed her. Also, that year, she took the course "Informal Logic: Fallacy" which she would
later take again, but this time as a Graduate Teaching Assistant, while working with Catherine
Hundleby, the professor o f the course, and her Master's philosophy thesis advisor.
Portillo graduated from the University of Windsor with a Bachelor of Arts degree with
Honours in Psychology with Thesis in 2002. During the academic year after her graduation, she
worked as a Research Assistant for the Psychotherapy Research Centre at the University of
Windsor. In this time, she studied International Relations and Development. As well, she held
other positions as a Research Assistant for the Department of Political Science and for the
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Department of Sociology & Anthropology.
Portillo took the undergraduate courses "Philosophy of Science" and "Philosophy of
Education" which Professor Parr taught, and "Metaphysics," "Environmental Ethics" and "Social
and Political Philosophy" which Jeff Noonan taught. As well, she took the undergraduate third
year course "Philosophy of Mind" which Marcello Guarini taught. These courses stimulated her
interest in philosophical study so much that they influenced her choice to major in Philosophy.
In her official, first semester as a philosophy undergraduate major, she took the third year
course "Mind Design and Android Epistemology" which Guarini taught. Later in her first year of
graduate philosophical studies, she took a course on Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence &
Cognitive Science which Guarini taught, while employed as a Research Assistant helping Guarini
in the development o f neural networks. Also, in her first semester as a philosophy undergraduate
major, she obtained the position of Editorial Assistant at the journal Informal Logic where she
worked for three years helping the Editors including Hans Hansen. Hansen later employed her to
contribute to the research analysis of the arguments used in the 2004 Canadian national election
campaign. As well, she took a graduate seminar course on John Stuart Mill which Hansen taught,
and for Portillo's philosophy Master's thesis, Hansen was the internal reader. Additionally, that
same semester, she took the course "Existentialism" which Johnson taught and an ethics course
which Blair taught. Last but not least, in the same semester she took the courses "Early Modem
Philosophy: Empiricism" and the third year course "Theories o f Nature" which were taught by
Philip Rose, with whom she later worked as the Graduate Teaching Assistant of the course
"Environmental Ethics."
In 2005, Portillo graduated from the University o f Windsor with the Bachelor of Arts
degree with Combined Honours in Philosophy and Political Science, and a minor equivalent in
Sociology.

During the summer which followed her graduation, she worked as a Teaching

Assistant in the Department of Philosophy.
Portillo was able to pursue her Master of Arts degree in Philosophy with the help of a
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University of Windsor tuition scholarship. As well, graduate assistantships have permitted her an
interesting and rewarding experience working with the instructors o f some of the courses that she
completed earlier as a student at the same university.
Portillo has a wide range of academic interests, and looks forward to further opportunities
to explore these interests.

Her main philosophical interests include social and political

philosophy, particularly, the notion of the 'just society.' Also, she is interested in philosophy of
social science, in part, because the development of fair, non-elitist approaches to the study of
social phenomena is essential for understanding the nature of the just society. Additionally, she is
interested in the philosophy of education, and, in particular, anti-oppressive education, because it
is crucial for the development of wisdom on social justice. Last but not least, she is interested in
the philosophy of mind and concepts such as wisdom and rationality which consists of both
critical thinking and creativity. These mental attributes are important for the development of
good judgment which is essential for the capacity to understand and conceive the just and
peaceful society.
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